diff options
author | Pauli <paul.dale@oracle.com> | 2020-05-08 10:25:19 +1000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Pauli <paul.dale@oracle.com> | 2020-06-24 20:05:42 +1000 |
commit | f000e82898af251442ca52e81fc1ee45996090dc (patch) | |
tree | b378db85b032065a595ce8d7b0422981f09e0d58 /crypto/rand | |
parent | a998b85a4f0e706fa6a07b7feab557d9e570d372 (diff) |
CTR, HASH and HMAC DRBGs in provider
Move the three different DRBGs to the provider.
As part of the move, the DRBG specific data was pulled out of a common
structure and into their own structures. Only these smaller structures are
securely allocated. This saves quite a bit of secure memory:
+-------------------------------+
| DRBG | Bytes | Secure |
+--------------+-------+--------+
| HASH | 376 | 512 |
| HMAC | 168 | 256 |
| CTR | 176 | 256 |
| Common (new) | 320 | 0 |
| Common (old) | 592 | 1024 |
+--------------+-------+--------+
Bytes is the structure size on the X86/64.
Secure is the number of bytes of secure memory used (power of two allocator).
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11682)
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/rand')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rand/build.info | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c | 1056 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rand/rand_lib.c | 309 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rand/rand_local.h | 72 |
4 files changed, 341 insertions, 1108 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/rand/build.info b/crypto/rand/build.info index 7840428045..b7a4d598f1 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/build.info +++ b/crypto/rand/build.info @@ -1,16 +1,10 @@ LIBS=../../libcrypto -$COMMON=rand_pool.c rand_lib.c drbg_lib.c drbg_ctr.c drbg_hash.c drbg_hmac.c -$CRYPTO=rand_unix.c rand_win.c randfile.c rand_err.c +$COMMON=drbg_lib.c rand_lib.c +$CRYPTO=randfile.c rand_err.c IF[{- !$disabled{'egd'} -}] - $CYPTO=$CYPTO rand_egd.c -ENDIF -IF[{- $config{target} =~ /vxworks/i -}] - $CYPTO=$CYPTO rand_vxworks.c -ENDIF -IF[{- $config{target} =~ /vms/i -}] - $CYPTO=$CYPTO rand_vms.c + $CRYPTO=$CRYPTO rand_egd.c ENDIF diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c index 94a4e98d73..80759cbfaf 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c @@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ #include <openssl/crypto.h> #include <openssl/err.h> #include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/core_names.h> #include "rand_local.h" #include "internal/thread_once.h" #include "crypto/rand.h" -#include "crypto/rand_pool.h" #include "crypto/cryptlib.h" /* @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ typedef struct drbg_global_st { * * There are three shared DRBG instances: <master>, <public>, and <private>. */ + CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; /* * The <master> DRBG @@ -70,14 +71,6 @@ typedef struct drbg_global_st { CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg; } DRBG_GLOBAL; -typedef struct drbg_nonce_global_st { - CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_nonce_lock; - int rand_nonce_count; -} DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL; - -/* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */ -static const char ossl_pers_string[] = DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING; - #define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS ( \ RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE ) @@ -110,45 +103,76 @@ static const unsigned int rand_drbg_used_flags = static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type); -static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, - int secure, - int type, - unsigned int flags, - RAND_DRBG *parent); - -static int rand_drbg_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags); -static int rand_drbg_init_method(RAND_DRBG *drbg); - -static int is_ctr(int type) +static int get_drbg_params(int type, unsigned int flags, const char **name, + OSSL_PARAM params[3]) { + OSSL_PARAM *p = params; + switch (type) { - case NID_aes_128_ctr: - case NID_aes_192_ctr: - case NID_aes_256_ctr: + case 0: return 1; default: return 0; + +#define CTR(v) \ + *name = "CTR-DRBG"; \ + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_CIPHER, v, 0) + + case NID_aes_128_ctr: + CTR(SN_aes_128_ctr); + break; + case NID_aes_192_ctr: + CTR(SN_aes_192_ctr); + break; + case NID_aes_256_ctr: + CTR(SN_aes_256_ctr); + break; + +#define DGST(v) \ + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_DIGEST, v, 0); \ + if ((flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC) == 0) { \ + *name = "HASH-DRBG"; \ + } else { \ + *name = "HMAC-DRBG"; \ + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAC, \ + SN_hmac, 0); \ } -} -static int is_digest(int type) -{ - switch (type) { case NID_sha1: + DGST(SN_sha1); + break; case NID_sha224: + DGST(SN_sha224); + break; case NID_sha256: + DGST(SN_sha256); + break; case NID_sha384: + DGST(SN_sha384); + break; case NID_sha512: + DGST(SN_sha512); + break; case NID_sha512_224: + DGST(SN_sha512_224); + break; case NID_sha512_256: + DGST(SN_sha512_256); + break; case NID_sha3_224: + DGST(SN_sha3_224); + break; case NID_sha3_256: + DGST(SN_sha3_256); + break; case NID_sha3_384: + DGST(SN_sha3_384); + break; case NID_sha3_512: - return 1; - default: - return 0; + DGST(SN_sha3_512); } + *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + return 1; } /* @@ -170,23 +194,23 @@ static void *drbg_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx) OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL); #endif + dgbl->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); + if (dgbl->lock == NULL) + goto err0; + if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, NULL)) goto err1; if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, NULL)) goto err2; - dgbl->master_drbg = drbg_setup(libctx, NULL, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER); - if (dgbl->master_drbg == NULL) - goto err3; - return dgbl; - err3: - CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->public_drbg); err2: CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg); err1: + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dgbl->lock); + err0: OPENSSL_free(dgbl); return NULL; } @@ -198,6 +222,7 @@ static void drbg_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdgbl) if (dgbl == NULL) return; + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dgbl->lock); RAND_DRBG_free(dgbl->master_drbg); CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg); CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->public_drbg); @@ -210,104 +235,12 @@ static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD drbg_ossl_ctx_method = { drbg_ossl_ctx_free, }; -/* - * drbg_ossl_ctx_new() calls drgb_setup() which calls rand_drbg_get_nonce() - * which needs to get the rand_nonce_lock out of the OPENSSL_CTX...but since - * drbg_ossl_ctx_new() hasn't finished running yet we need the rand_nonce_lock - * to be in a different global data object. Otherwise we will go into an - * infinite recursion loop. - */ -static void *drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx) -{ - DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dngbl)); - - if (dngbl == NULL) - return NULL; - - dngbl->rand_nonce_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); - if (dngbl->rand_nonce_lock == NULL) { - OPENSSL_free(dngbl); - return NULL; - } - - return dngbl; -} - -static void drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdngbl) -{ - DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl = vdngbl; - - if (dngbl == NULL) - return; - - CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dngbl->rand_nonce_lock); - - OPENSSL_free(dngbl); -} - -static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_method = { - drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_new, - drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_free, -}; - static DRBG_GLOBAL *drbg_get_global(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx) { return openssl_ctx_get_data(libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_INDEX, &drbg_ossl_ctx_method); } -/* Implements the get_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks()) */ -size_t rand_drbg_get_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - unsigned char **pout, - int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len) -{ - size_t ret = 0; - RAND_POOL *pool; - DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl - = openssl_ctx_get_data(drbg->libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_NONCE_INDEX, - &drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_method); - struct { - void *instance; - int count; - } data; - - if (dngbl == NULL) - return 0; - - memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data)); - pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, min_len, max_len); - if (pool == NULL) - return 0; - - if (rand_pool_add_nonce_data(pool) == 0) - goto err; - - data.instance = drbg; - CRYPTO_atomic_add(&dngbl->rand_nonce_count, 1, &data.count, - dngbl->rand_nonce_lock); - - if (rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0) == 0) - goto err; - - ret = rand_pool_length(pool); - *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool); - - err: - rand_pool_free(pool); - - return ret; -} - -/* - * Implements the cleanup_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks()) - * - */ -void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) -{ - OPENSSL_clear_free(out, outlen); -} - /* * Set the |drbg|'s callback data pointer for the entropy and nonce callbacks * @@ -322,8 +255,8 @@ void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg, */ int RAND_DRBG_set_callback_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg, void *data) { - if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED - || drbg->parent != NULL) + if (EVP_RAND_state(drbg->rand) != EVP_RAND_STATE_UNINITIALISED + || drbg->parent != NULL) return 0; drbg->callback_data = data; @@ -345,68 +278,71 @@ void *RAND_DRBG_get_callback_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg) */ int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags) { - return rand_drbg_set(drbg, type, flags) && rand_drbg_init_method(drbg); -} + OSSL_PARAM params[6], *p = params; + unsigned int reseed_interval; + time_t reseed_time_interval; + const char *name = NULL; + EVP_RAND *rand; + EVP_RAND_CTX *pctx; + int use_df; -static int rand_drbg_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags) -{ if (type == 0 && flags == 0) { type = rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER]; flags = rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER]; } - /* If set is called multiple times - clear the old one */ - if (drbg->type != 0 && (type != drbg->type || flags != drbg->flags)) { - if (drbg->meth != NULL) - drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg); - rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool); - drbg->adin_pool = NULL; + if (drbg->parent == NULL) { + reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval; + reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval; + } else { + reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval; + reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval; + } + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS, + &reseed_interval); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_time_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, + &reseed_time_interval); + use_df = (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0; + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_USE_DF, &use_df); + + if (!get_drbg_params(type, flags, &name, p)) { + RANDerr(0, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE); + return 0; } - drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED; + rand = EVP_RAND_fetch(drbg->libctx, name, NULL); + if (rand == NULL) { + RANDerr(0, RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED); + return 0; + } + + EVP_RAND_CTX_free(drbg->rand); + drbg->rand = NULL; + drbg->flags = flags; drbg->type = type; - drbg->meth = NULL; - if (type == 0 || is_ctr(type) || is_digest(type)) - return 1; + pctx = drbg->parent != NULL ? drbg->parent->rand : NULL; + drbg->rand = EVP_RAND_CTX_new(rand, pctx); + EVP_RAND_free(rand); + if (drbg->rand == NULL) { + RANDerr(0, RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED); + goto err; + } + if (!EVP_RAND_set_ctx_params(drbg->rand, params)) { + RANDerr(0, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG); + goto err; + } + return 1; +err: + EVP_RAND_CTX_free(drbg->rand); + drbg->rand = NULL; drbg->type = 0; drbg->flags = 0; - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE); - return 0; } -static int rand_drbg_init_method(RAND_DRBG *drbg) -{ - int ret; - - if (drbg->meth != NULL) - return 1; - - if (is_ctr(drbg->type)) { - ret = drbg_ctr_init(drbg); - } else if (is_digest(drbg->type)) { - if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC) - ret = drbg_hmac_init(drbg); - else - ret = drbg_hash_init(drbg); - } else { - /* other cases should already be excluded */ - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INIT_METHOD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - drbg->type = 0; - drbg->flags = 0; - return 0; - } - - if (ret == 0) { - drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INIT_METHOD, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG); - } - return ret; -} - /* * Set/initialize default |type| and |flag| for new drbg instances. * @@ -415,7 +351,10 @@ static int rand_drbg_init_method(RAND_DRBG *drbg) int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags) { int all; - if (!(is_digest(type) || is_ctr(type))) { + const char *name; + OSSL_PARAM params[3]; + + if (!get_drbg_params(type, flags, &name, params)) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE); return 0; } @@ -443,20 +382,17 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags) /* - * Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The DRBG is allocated on - * the secure heap if |secure| is nonzero and the secure heap is enabled. + * Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. * The |parent|, if not NULL, will be used as random source for reseeding. * * Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure. */ static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, - int secure, int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent) { - RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ? OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg)) - : OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg)); + RAND_DRBG *drbg = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg)); if (drbg == NULL) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); @@ -464,49 +400,11 @@ static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, } drbg->libctx = ctx; - drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg); - drbg->fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id(); drbg->parent = parent; - if (parent == NULL) { - drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy; - drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy; -#ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE - drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce; - drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce; -#endif - - drbg->reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval; - drbg->reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval; - } else { - drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy; - drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy; - /* - * Do not provide nonce callbacks, the child DRBGs will - * obtain their nonce using random bits from the parent. - */ - - drbg->reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval; - drbg->reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval; - } - if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) == 0) goto err; - if (parent != NULL) { - rand_drbg_lock(parent); - if (drbg->strength > parent->strength) { - /* - * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C - * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source - */ - rand_drbg_unlock(parent); - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK); - goto err; - } - rand_drbg_unlock(parent); - } - return drbg; err: @@ -518,7 +416,7 @@ static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent) { - return rand_drbg_new(ctx, 0, type, flags, parent); + return rand_drbg_new(ctx, type, flags, parent); } RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent) @@ -526,16 +424,6 @@ RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent) return RAND_DRBG_new_ex(NULL, type, flags, parent); } -RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type, - unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent) -{ - return rand_drbg_new(ctx, 1, type, flags, parent); -} - -RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent) -{ - return RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(NULL, type, flags, parent); -} /* * Uninstantiate |drbg| and free all memory. */ @@ -544,18 +432,8 @@ void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg) if (drbg == NULL) return; - if (drbg->meth != NULL) - drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg); - rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool); - CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(drbg->lock); -#ifndef FIPS_MODULE CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RAND_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data); -#endif - - if (drbg->secure) - OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg)); - else - OPENSSL_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg)); + OPENSSL_free(drbg); } /* @@ -569,92 +447,8 @@ void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg) int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen) { - unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL; - size_t noncelen = 0, entropylen = 0; - size_t min_entropy, min_entropylen, max_entropylen; - - if (drbg->meth == NULL && !rand_drbg_init_method(drbg)) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, - RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED); - goto end; - } - - min_entropy = drbg->strength; - min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen; - max_entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen; - - if (perslen > drbg->max_perslen) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, - RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG); - goto end; - } - - if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) { - if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE); - else - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED); - goto end; - } - - drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; - - /* - * NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1 says you can combine getting the entropy - * and nonce in 1 call by increasing the entropy with 50% and increasing - * the minimum length to accommodate the length of the nonce. - * We do this in case a nonce is require and get_nonce is NULL. - */ - if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) { - min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2; - min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen; - max_entropylen += drbg->max_noncelen; - } - - drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter); - if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) { - drbg->reseed_next_counter++; - if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter) - drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1; - } - - if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL) - entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, min_entropy, - min_entropylen, max_entropylen, 0); - if (entropylen < min_entropylen - || entropylen > max_entropylen) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY); - goto end; - } - - if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) { - noncelen = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, &nonce, drbg->strength / 2, - drbg->min_noncelen, drbg->max_noncelen); - if (noncelen < drbg->min_noncelen || noncelen > drbg->max_noncelen) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE); - goto end; - } - } - - if (!drbg->meth->instantiate(drbg, entropy, entropylen, - nonce, noncelen, pers, perslen)) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG); - goto end; - } - - drbg->state = DRBG_READY; - drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1; - drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL); - tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter); - - end: - if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL) - drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen); - if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce != NULL) - drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, nonce, noncelen); - if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) - return 1; - return 0; + return EVP_RAND_instantiate(drbg->rand, EVP_RAND_strength(drbg->rand), 0, + pers, perslen); } /* @@ -667,10 +461,9 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg) { int index = -1, type, flags; - if (drbg->meth != NULL) { - drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg); - drbg->meth = NULL; - } + + if (!EVP_RAND_uninstantiate(drbg->rand)) + return 0; /* The reset uses the default values for type and flags */ if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER) @@ -687,7 +480,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg) flags = drbg->flags; type = drbg->type; } - return rand_drbg_set(drbg, type, flags); + return RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags); } /* @@ -701,288 +494,152 @@ int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen, int prediction_resistance) { - unsigned char *entropy = NULL; - size_t entropylen = 0; - - if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE); - return 0; - } - if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED); - return 0; - } - - if (adin == NULL) { - adinlen = 0; - } else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG); - return 0; - } - - drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; - - drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter); - if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) { - drbg->reseed_next_counter++; - if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter) - drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1; - } - - if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL) - entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength, - drbg->min_entropylen, - drbg->max_entropylen, - prediction_resistance); - if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen - || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY); - goto end; - } - - if (!drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen)) - goto end; - - drbg->state = DRBG_READY; - drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1; - drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL); - tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter); - - end: - if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL) - drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen); - if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) - return 1; - return 0; + return EVP_RAND_reseed(drbg->rand, prediction_resistance, NULL, 0, + adin, adinlen); } /* - * Restart |drbg|, using the specified entropy or additional input - * - * Tries its best to get the drbg instantiated by all means, - * regardless of its current state. + * Generate |outlen| bytes into the buffer at |out|. Reseed if we need + * to or if |prediction_resistance| is set. Additional input can be + * sent in |adin| and |adinlen|. * - * Optionally, a |buffer| of |len| random bytes can be passed, - * which is assumed to contain at least |entropy| bits of entropy. + * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null. * - * If |entropy| > 0, the buffer content is used as entropy input. + * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. * - * If |entropy| == 0, the buffer content is used as additional input + */ +int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, + int prediction_resistance, + const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen) +{ + return EVP_RAND_generate(drbg->rand, out, outlen, 0, + prediction_resistance, adin, adinlen); +} + +/* + * Generates |outlen| random bytes and stores them in |out|. It will + * using the given |drbg| to generate the bytes. * - * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. + * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null. * - * This function is used internally only. + * Returns 1 on success 0 on failure. */ -int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy) +int RAND_DRBG_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) { - int reseeded = 0; - const unsigned char *adin = NULL; - size_t adinlen = 0; - - if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; - rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool); - drbg->seed_pool = NULL; + return EVP_RAND_generate(drbg->rand, out, outlen, 0, 0, NULL, 0); +} + +/* DRBG call back shims */ +static int rand_drbg_get_entroy_cb(const OSSL_PARAM *params, OSSL_PARAM *out, + void *vdrbg) +{ + RAND_DRBG *drbg = (RAND_DRBG *)vdrbg; + int entropy = 0, prediction_resistance = 0; + size_t min_len = 0, max_len = 2048; + const OSSL_PARAM *p; + OSSL_PARAM *q; + + if (drbg->get_entropy == NULL) return 0; - } - if (buffer != NULL) { - if (entropy > 0) { - if (drbg->max_entropylen < len) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, - RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG); - drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - if (entropy > 8 * len) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_ENTROPY_OUT_OF_RANGE); - drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - /* will be picked up by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback */ - drbg->seed_pool = rand_pool_attach(buffer, len, entropy); - if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL) - return 0; - } else { - if (drbg->max_adinlen < len) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, - RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG); - drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; - return 0; - } - adin = buffer; - adinlen = len; - } - } + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_ENTROPY_REQUIRED); + if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &entropy)) + return 0; - /* repair error state */ - if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) - RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg); - - /* repair uninitialized state */ - if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) { - /* reinstantiate drbg */ - RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, - (const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string, - sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1); - /* already reseeded. prevent second reseeding below */ - reseeded = (drbg->state == DRBG_READY); - } + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE); + if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &prediction_resistance)) + return 0; - /* refresh current state if entropy or additional input has been provided */ - if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) { - if (adin != NULL) { - /* - * mix in additional input without reseeding - * - * Similar to RAND_DRBG_reseed(), but the provided additional - * data |adin| is mixed into the current state without pulling - * entropy from the trusted entropy source using get_entropy(). - * This is not a reseeding in the strict sense of NIST SP 800-90A. - */ - drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0); - } else if (reseeded == 0) { - /* do a full reseeding if it has not been done yet above */ - RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0); - } - } + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_LENGTH); + if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &max_len)) + return 0; - rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool); - drbg->seed_pool = NULL; + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_LENGTH); + if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &min_len)) + return 0; + + q = OSSL_PARAM_locate(out, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RANDOM_DATA); + if (q == NULL || q->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR || q->data == NULL) + return 0; - return drbg->state == DRBG_READY; + q->return_size = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, (unsigned char **)q->data, entropy, + min_len, max_len, prediction_resistance); + return 1; } -/* - * Generate |outlen| bytes into the buffer at |out|. Reseed if we need - * to or if |prediction_resistance| is set. Additional input can be - * sent in |adin| and |adinlen|. - * - * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null. - * - * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. - * - */ -int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, - int prediction_resistance, - const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen) +static int rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy_cb(const OSSL_PARAM *params, void *vdrbg) { - int fork_id; - int reseed_required = 0; - - if (drbg->state != DRBG_READY) { - /* try to recover from previous errors */ - rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0); - - if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE); - return 0; - } - if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED); - return 0; - } - } + RAND_DRBG *drbg = (RAND_DRBG *)vdrbg; + const OSSL_PARAM *p; + size_t sz; - if (outlen > drbg->max_request) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG); + if (drbg->cleanup_entropy == NULL) return 0; - } - if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG); + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_SIZE); + if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &sz)) return 0; - } - fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id(); + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RANDOM_DATA); + if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR) + return 0; - if (drbg->fork_id != fork_id) { - drbg->fork_id = fork_id; - reseed_required = 1; - } + drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, p->data, sz); + return 1; +} - if (drbg->reseed_interval > 0) { - if (drbg->reseed_gen_counter > drbg->reseed_interval) - reseed_required = 1; - } - if (drbg->reseed_time_interval > 0) { - time_t now = time(NULL); - if (now < drbg->reseed_time - || now - drbg->reseed_time >= drbg->reseed_time_interval) - reseed_required = 1; - } - if (drbg->parent != NULL) { - unsigned int reseed_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter); - if (reseed_counter > 0 - && tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter) - != reseed_counter) - reseed_required = 1; - } +static int rand_drbg_get_nonce_cb(const OSSL_PARAM *params, OSSL_PARAM *out, + void *vdrbg) +{ + RAND_DRBG *drbg = (RAND_DRBG *)vdrbg; + int entropy = 0; + size_t min_len = 0, max_len = 10240; + const OSSL_PARAM |