AES CTR-DRGB: performance improvement

Optimize the the AES-based implementation of the CTR_DRBG
construction, see 10.2.1 in [1].
Due to the optimizations, the code may deviate (more) from the
pseudocode in [1], but it is functional equivalence being decisive
for compliance:

"All DRBG mechanisms and algorithms are described in this document
in pseudocode, which is intended to explain functionality.
The pseudocode is not intended to constrain real-world
implementations." [9 in [1]].

The following optimizations are done:

- Replace multiple plain AES encryptions by a single AES-ECB
  encryption of a corresponding pre-initialized buffer, where
  possible.
  This allows platform-specific AES-ECB support to
  be used and reduces the overhead of multiple EVP calls.

- Replace the generate operation loop (which is a counter
  increment followed by a plain AES encryption) by a
  loop which does a plain AES encryption followed by
  a counter increment. The latter loop is just a description
  of AES-CTR, so we replace it by a single AES-CTR
  encryption.
  This allows for platform-specific AES-CTR support to be used
  and reduces the overhead of multiple EVP calls.
  This change, that is, going from a pre- to a post- counter
  increment, requires the counter in the internal state
  to be kept at "+1" (compared to the pseudocode in [1])
  such that it is in the correct state, when a generate
  operation is called.
  That in turn also requires all other operations to be
  changed from pre- to post-increment to keep functional
  equivalence.

[1] NIST SP 800-90A Revision 1

Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>

(cherry picked from commit 28bdbe1aaa474ae8cd83e520d02e463e46ce89d9)

Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11968)

2 files changed, 129 insertions, 75 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c
index 0f0ad1b37b..89c9ccc876 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c
@@ -63,15 +63,15 @@ static void ctr_XOR(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
  * Process a complete block using BCC algorithm of SP 800-90A 10.3.3
  */
 __owur static int ctr_BCC_block(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out,
-                                const unsigned char *in)
+                                const unsigned char *in, int len)
 {
     int i, outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 
-    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
         out[i] ^= in[i];
 
-    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_df, out, &outlen, out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
-        || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_df, out, &outlen, out, len)
+        || outlen != len)
         return 0;
     return 1;
 }
@@ -82,12 +82,16 @@ __owur static int ctr_BCC_block(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out,
  */
 __owur static int ctr_BCC_blocks(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in)
 {
-    if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, in)
-        || !ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 16, in))
-        return 0;
-    if (ctr->keylen != 16 && !ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 32, in))
-        return 0;
-    return 1;
+    unsigned char in_tmp[48];
+    unsigned char num_of_blk = 2;
+
+    memcpy(in_tmp, in, 16);
+    memcpy(in_tmp + 16, in, 16);
+    if (ctr->keylen != 16) {
+        memcpy(in_tmp + 32, in, 16);
+        num_of_blk = 3;
+    }
+    return ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, in_tmp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE * num_of_blk);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -96,19 +100,14 @@ __owur static int ctr_BCC_blocks(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in)
  */
 __owur static int ctr_BCC_init(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
 {
+    unsigned char bltmp[48] = {0};
+    unsigned char num_of_blk;
+
     memset(ctr->KX, 0, 48);
-    memset(ctr->bltmp, 0, 16);
-    if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, ctr->bltmp))
-        return 0;
-    ctr->bltmp[3] = 1;
-    if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 16, ctr->bltmp))
-        return 0;
-    if (ctr->keylen != 16) {
-        ctr->bltmp[3] = 2;
-        if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 32, ctr->bltmp))
-            return 0;
-    }
-    return 1;
+    num_of_blk = ctr->keylen == 16 ? 2 : 3;
+    bltmp[(AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 1) + 3] = 1;
+    bltmp[(AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2) + 3] = 2;
+    return ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, bltmp, num_of_blk * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -197,20 +196,20 @@ __owur static int ctr_df(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
         || !ctr_BCC_final(ctr))
         return 0;
     /* Set up key K */
-    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx, ctr->cipher, NULL, ctr->KX, NULL, 1))
+    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->KX, NULL, -1))
         return 0;
     /* X follows key K */
-    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->KX, &outlen, ctr->KX + ctr->keylen,
+    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX, &outlen, ctr->KX + ctr->keylen,
                           AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
         || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
         return 0;
-    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->KX + 16, &outlen, ctr->KX,
+    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX + 16, &outlen, ctr->KX,
                           AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
         || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
         return 0;
     if (ctr->keylen != 16)
-        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->KX + 32, &outlen, ctr->KX + 16,
-                              AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX + 32, &outlen,
+                              ctr->KX + 16, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
             || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
             return 0;
     return 1;
@@ -229,31 +228,25 @@ __owur static int ctr_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
 {
     RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
     int outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+    unsigned char V_tmp[48], out[48];
+    unsigned char len;
 
     /* correct key is already set up. */
+    memcpy(V_tmp, ctr->V, 16);
     inc_128(ctr);
-    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->K, &outlen, ctr->V, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
-        || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
-        return 0;
-
-    /* If keylen longer than 128 bits need extra encrypt */
-    if (ctr->keylen != 16) {
+    memcpy(V_tmp + 16, ctr->V, 16);
+    if (ctr->keylen == 16) {
+        len = 32;
+    } else {
         inc_128(ctr);
-        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->K+16, &outlen, ctr->V,
-                              AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
-            || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
-            return 0;
+        memcpy(V_tmp + 32, ctr->V, 16);
+        len = 48;
     }
-    inc_128(ctr);
-    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->V, &outlen, ctr->V, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
-        || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, out, &outlen, V_tmp, len)
+            || outlen != len)
         return 0;
-
-    /* If 192 bit key part of V is on end of K */
-    if (ctr->keylen == 24) {
-        memcpy(ctr->V + 8, ctr->V, 8);
-        memcpy(ctr->V, ctr->K + 24, 8);
-    }
+    memcpy(ctr->K, out, ctr->keylen);
+    memcpy(ctr->V, out + ctr->keylen, 16);
 
     if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) {
         /* If no input reuse existing derived value */
@@ -268,7 +261,8 @@ __owur static int ctr_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
         ctr_XOR(ctr, in2, in2len);
     }
 
-    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx, ctr->cipher, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, 1))
+    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1)
+        || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1))
         return 0;
     return 1;
 }
@@ -285,8 +279,10 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
 
     memset(ctr->K, 0, sizeof(ctr->K));
     memset(ctr->V, 0, sizeof(ctr->V));
-    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx, ctr->cipher, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, 1))
+    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1))
         return 0;
+
+    inc_128(ctr);
     if (!ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, pers, perslen, nonce, noncelen))
         return 0;
     return 1;
@@ -296,20 +292,40 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
                                   const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen,
                                   const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
 {
+    RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
+
     if (entropy == NULL)
         return 0;
+
+    inc_128(ctr);
     if (!ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0))
         return 0;
     return 1;
 }
 
+static void ctr96_inc(unsigned char *counter)
+{
+    u32 n = 12, c = 1;
+
+    do {
+        --n;
+        c += counter[n];
+        counter[n] = (u8)c;
+        c >>= 8;
+    } while (n);
+}
+
 __owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
                                     unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
                                     const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
 {
     RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
+    unsigned int ctr32, blocks;
+    int outl, buflen;
 
     if (adin != NULL && adinlen != 0) {
+        inc_128(ctr);
+
         if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
             return 0;
         /* This means we reuse derived value */
@@ -321,28 +337,51 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
         adinlen = 0;
     }
 
-    for ( ; ; ) {
-        int outl = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+    inc_128(ctr);
 
+    if (outlen == 0) {
         inc_128(ctr);
-        if (outlen < 16) {
-            /* Use K as temp space as it will be updated */
-            if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->K, &outl, ctr->V,
-                                  AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
-                || outl != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
-                return 0;
-            memcpy(out, ctr->K, outlen);
-            break;
-        }
-        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, out, &outl, ctr->V, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
-            || outl != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+
+        if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
             return 0;
-        out += 16;
-        outlen -= 16;
-        if (outlen == 0)
-            break;
+        return 1;
     }
 
+    memset(out, 0, outlen);
+
+    do {
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr,
+                               NULL, NULL, NULL, ctr->V, -1))
+            return 0;
+
+        /*-
+         * outlen has type size_t while EVP_CipherUpdate takes an
+         * int argument and thus cannot be guaranteed to process more
+         * than 2^31-1 bytes at a time. We process such huge generate
+         * requests in 2^30 byte chunks, which is the greatest multiple
+         * of AES block size lower than or equal to 2^31-1.
+         */
+        buflen = outlen > (1U << 30) ? (1U << 30) : outlen;
+        blocks = (buflen + 15) / 16;
+
+        ctr32 = GETU32(ctr->V + 12) + blocks;
+        if (ctr32 < blocks) {
+            /* 32-bit counter overflow into V. */
+            blocks -= ctr32;
+            buflen = blocks * 16;
+            ctr32 = 0;
+            ctr96_inc(ctr->V);
+        }
+        PUTU32(ctr->V + 12, ctr32);
+
+        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ctr, out, &outl, out, buflen)
+            || outl != buflen)
+            return 0;
+
+        out += buflen;
+        outlen -= buflen;
+    } while (outlen);
+
     if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
         return 0;
     return 1;
@@ -350,7 +389,8 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
 
 static int drbg_ctr_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
 {
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ecb);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ctr);
     EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_df);
     OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.ctr, sizeof(drbg->data.ctr));
     return 1;
@@ -374,25 +414,36 @@ int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
         return 0;
     case NID_aes_128_ctr:
         keylen = 16;
-        ctr->cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
+        ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
+        ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_128_ctr();
         break;
     case NID_aes_192_ctr:
         keylen = 24;
-        ctr->cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
+        ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
+        ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_192_ctr();
         break;
     case NID_aes_256_ctr:
         keylen = 32;
-        ctr->cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
+        ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
+        ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_256_ctr();
         break;
     }
 
     drbg->meth = &drbg_ctr_meth;
 
     ctr->keylen = keylen;
-    if (ctr->ctx == NULL)
-        ctr->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
-    if (ctr->ctx == NULL)
+    if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL)
+        ctr->ctx_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL)
+        ctr->ctx_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL || ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL
+        || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb,
+                              ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1)
+        || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr,
+                              ctr->cipher_ctr, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1))
         return 0;
+
+    drbg->meth = &drbg_ctr_meth;
     drbg->strength = keylen * 8;
     drbg->seedlen = keylen + 16;
 
@@ -410,7 +461,8 @@ int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
         if (ctr->ctx_df == NULL)
             return 0;
         /* Set key schedule for df_key */
-        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_df, ctr->cipher, NULL, df_key, NULL, 1))
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_df,
+                               ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, df_key, NULL, 1))
             return 0;
 
         drbg->min_entropylen = ctr->keylen;
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_local.h b/crypto/rand/rand_local.h
index 1bc9bf7d26..0cdfb3332e 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_local.h
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_local.h
@@ -138,9 +138,11 @@ typedef struct rand_drbg_method_st {
  * The state of a DRBG AES-CTR.
  */
 typedef struct rand_drbg_ctr_st {
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_ecb;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_ctr;
     EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_df;
-    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ecb;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ctr;
     size_t keylen;
     unsigned char K[32];
     unsigned char V[16];