diff options
author | Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 2017-06-22 09:21:43 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 2017-07-15 01:51:34 -0400 |
commit | da8fc25a989cf4f4d26d626a85477e8a9282da12 (patch) | |
tree | 428bd385034d2a3a24d13cb0e8fa3ee37f06f6b7 /crypto/rand | |
parent | 71d57be52e7c4d5389dfe950ad9ee4e54aea5411 (diff) |
Start to overhaul RAND API
Remove unused rand_hw_xor, MD/EVP indirection
Make rand_pseudo same as rand.
Cleanup formatting and ifdef control
Rename some things:
- rand_meth to openssl_rand_meth; make it global
- source file
- lock/init functions, start per-thread state
- ossl_meth_init to ossl_rand_init
Put state into RAND_STATE structure
And put OSSL_RAND_STATE into ossl_typ.h
Use "randomness" instead of "entropy"
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3758)
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/rand')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rand/build.info | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c (renamed from crypto/rand/md_rand.c) | 329 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h | 36 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rand/rand_lib.c | 95 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rand/rand_unix.c | 19 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rand/rand_vms.c | 79 |
6 files changed, 238 insertions, 322 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/rand/build.info b/crypto/rand/build.info index 3ad50e2590..9e0a90b73d 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/build.info +++ b/crypto/rand/build.info @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ LIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ - md_rand.c randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \ + ossl_rand.c randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \ rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c index 8cbfae170f..016653d227 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c +++ b/crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c @@ -23,35 +23,40 @@ #include <openssl/crypto.h> #include <openssl/rand.h> #include <openssl/async.h> -#include "rand_lcl.h" - #include <openssl/err.h> - #include <internal/thread_once.h> +#include "rand_lcl.h" #if defined(BN_DEBUG) || defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION) -# define PREDICT +# define PREDICT 1 #endif -/* #define PREDICT 1 */ - #define STATE_SIZE 1023 -static size_t state_num = 0, state_index = 0; -static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; -static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; -static long md_count[2] = { 0, 0 }; -static double entropy = 0; -static int initialized = 0; +typedef struct ossl_rand_state_st OSSL_RAND_STATE; + +struct ossl_rand_state_st { + size_t num; + size_t index; + unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + unsigned char md[RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + long md_count[2]; +}; +static OSSL_RAND_STATE global_state; +static double randomness = 0; +static int initialized = 0; static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_lock = NULL; static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_tmp_lock = NULL; -static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; +static CRYPTO_ONCE ossl_rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; +static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL key; /* May be set only when a thread holds rand_lock (to prevent double locking) */ static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; -/* access to locking_threadid is synchronized by rand_tmp_lock */ -/* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ +/* + * access to locking_threadid is synchronized by rand_tmp_lock; + * valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set + */ static CRYPTO_THREAD_ID locking_threadid; #ifdef PREDICT @@ -60,51 +65,35 @@ int rand_predictable = 0; static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); -static void rand_cleanup(void); -static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); -static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); -static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo); -static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); -#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L -static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); -#endif -static int rand_status(void); +static void rand_thread_cleanup(void *arg) +{ + OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = arg; -static RAND_METHOD rand_meth = { - rand_seed, - rand_nopseudo_bytes, - rand_cleanup, - rand_add, -#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L - rand_pseudo_bytes, -#else - NULL, -#endif - rand_status -}; + OPENSSL_clear_free(sp, sizeof(*sp)); +} -DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init) +DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_ossl_rand_init) { + int ret = 1; + OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL); rand_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); + ret &= rand_lock != NULL; rand_tmp_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); - return rand_lock != NULL && rand_tmp_lock != NULL; + ret &= rand_tmp_lock != NULL; + ret &= CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&key, rand_thread_cleanup) == 1; + return ret; } RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void) { - return (&rand_meth); + return &openssl_rand_meth; } static void rand_cleanup(void) { - OPENSSL_cleanse(state, sizeof(state)); - state_num = 0; - state_index = 0; - OPENSSL_cleanse(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); - md_count[0] = 0; - md_count[1] = 0; - entropy = 0; + OPENSSL_cleanse(&global_state, sizeof(global_state)); + randomness = 0; initialized = 0; CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_lock); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_tmp_lock); @@ -114,10 +103,11 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) { int i, j, k, st_idx; long md_c[2]; - unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + unsigned char local_md[RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH]; EVP_MD_CTX *m; int do_not_lock; int rv = 0; + OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = &global_state; if (!num) return 1; @@ -146,7 +136,7 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) if (m == NULL) goto err; - if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) + if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init)) goto err; /* check if we already have the lock */ @@ -160,58 +150,58 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); - st_idx = state_index; + st_idx = sp->index; /* * use our own copies of the counters so that even if a concurrent thread * seeds with exactly the same data and uses the same subarray there's * _some_ difference */ - md_c[0] = md_count[0]; - md_c[1] = md_count[1]; - - memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); - - /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ - state_index += num; - if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) { - state_index %= STATE_SIZE; - state_num = STATE_SIZE; - } else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) { - if (state_index > state_num) - state_num = state_index; + md_c[0] = sp->md_count[0]; + md_c[1] = sp->md_count[1]; + + memcpy(local_md, sp->md, sizeof(sp->md)); + + /* sp->index <= sp->num <= STATE_SIZE */ + sp->index += num; + if (sp->index >= STATE_SIZE) { + sp->index %= STATE_SIZE; + sp->num = STATE_SIZE; + } else if (sp->num < STATE_SIZE) { + if (sp->index > sp->num) + sp->num = sp->index; } - /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ + /* sp->index <= sp->num <= STATE_SIZE */ /* * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] are what we * will use now, but other threads may use them as well */ - md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0); + sp->md_count[1] += (num / RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0); if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); - for (i = 0; i < num; i += MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) { + for (i = 0; i < num; i += RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH) { j = (num - i); - j = (j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH : j; + j = (j > RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH : j; - if (!MD_Init(m)) + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, RAND_DIGEST, NULL)) goto err; - if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)) + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH)) goto err; k = (st_idx + j) - STATE_SIZE; if (k > 0) { - if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j - k)) + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], j - k)) goto err; - if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k)) + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[0], k)) goto err; - } else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j)) + } else if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], j)) goto err; - /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */ - if (!MD_Update(m, buf, j)) + /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO EVP_DigestUpdate()! */ + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, buf, j)) goto err; /* * We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind @@ -221,9 +211,9 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) * insecure keys. */ - if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c))) + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c))) goto err; - if (!MD_Final(m, local_md)) + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, local_md, NULL)) goto err; md_c[1]++; @@ -238,7 +228,7 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) * conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the * random state. */ - state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k]; + sp->state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k]; if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE) st_idx = 0; } @@ -249,14 +239,14 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) /* * Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other * thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented - * counter). By XORing it we keep at least as much entropy as fits into + * counter). By XORing it we keep at least as much randomness as fits into * md. */ - for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) { - md[k] ^= local_md[k]; + for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(sp->md); k++) { + sp->md[k] ^= local_md[k]; } - if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */ - entropy += add; + if (randomness < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */ + randomness += add; if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); @@ -271,15 +261,16 @@ static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) return rand_add(buf, num, (double)num); } -static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo) +static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { static volatile int stirred_pool = 0; int i, j, k; size_t num_ceil, st_idx, st_num; int ok; long md_c[2]; - unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + unsigned char local_md[RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH]; EVP_MD_CTX *m; + OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = &global_state; #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS pid_t curr_pid = getpid(); #endif @@ -323,9 +314,9 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo) if (m == NULL) goto err_mem; - /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ + /* round upwards to multiple of RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ num_ceil = - (1 + (num - 1) / (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2); + (1 + (num - 1) / (RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2); /* * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:) @@ -345,7 +336,7 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo) * global 'md'. */ - if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) + if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init)) goto err_mem; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); @@ -369,28 +360,28 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo) if (!stirred_pool) do_stir_pool = 1; - ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED); + ok = (randomness >= RANDOMNESS_NEEDED); if (!ok) { /* * If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG * output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have - * to decrease the entropy estimate. Once we've had enough initial - * seeding we don't bother to adjust the entropy count, though, + * to decrease the randomness estimate. Once we've had enough initial + * seeding we don't bother to adjust the randomness count, though, * because we're not ambitious to provide *information-theoretic* * randomness. NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before - * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected in a separate - * input pool and be transferred to the output pool only when the - * entropy limit has been reached. + * we have enough randomness. Randomness should be collected in a + * separate input pool and be transferred to the output pool only + * when the randomness limit has been reached. */ - entropy -= num; - if (entropy < 0) - entropy = 0; + randomness -= num; + if (randomness < 0) + randomness = 0; } if (do_stir_pool) { /* * In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, so we - * better make sure that the required entropy gets 'evenly + * better make sure that the required randomness gets 'evenly * distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. The input * function (rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more * suitable for this purpose. @@ -398,37 +389,37 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo) int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */ while (n > 0) { -#if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20 +#if RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20 # error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED." #endif -#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */ +#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH */ /* * Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that * rand_add expects to have something to hash. */ - rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0); - n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH; + rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0); + n -= RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH; } if (ok) stirred_pool = 1; } - st_idx = state_index; - st_num = state_num; - md_c[0] = md_count[0]; - md_c[1] = md_count[1]; - memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); + st_idx = sp->index; + st_num = sp->num; + md_c[0] = sp->md_count[0]; + md_c[1] = sp->md_count[1]; + memcpy(local_md, sp->md, sizeof sp->md); - state_index += num_ceil; - if (state_index > state_num) - state_index %= state_num; + sp->index += num_ceil; + if (sp->index > sp->num) + sp->index %= sp->num; /* * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] are now * ours (but other threads may use them too) */ - md_count[0] += 1; + sp->md_count[0] += 1; /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ crypto_lock_rand = 0; @@ -436,63 +427,64 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo) CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); while (num > 0) { - /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ - j = (num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num; + /* num_ceil -= RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 */ + j = (num >= RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num; num -= j; - if (!MD_Init(m)) + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, RAND_DIGEST, NULL)) goto err; #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS if (curr_pid) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */ - if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid)) + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid)) goto err; curr_pid = 0; } #endif if (curr_time) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */ - if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_time, sizeof curr_time)) + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_time, sizeof curr_time)) goto err; - if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof tv)) + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof tv)) goto err; curr_time = 0; if (!rand_hw_seed(m)) goto err; } - if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)) + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH)) goto err; - if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c))) + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c))) goto err; - k = (st_idx + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num; + k = (st_idx + RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num; if (k > 0) { - if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k)) + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k)) goto err; - if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k)) + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[0], k)) goto err; - } else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) + } else if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) goto err; - if (!MD_Final(m, local_md)) + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, local_md, NULL)) goto err; - for (i = 0; i < MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) { /* may compete with other threads */ - state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i]; + sp->state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i]; if (st_idx >= st_num) st_idx = 0; if (i < j) - *(buf++) = local_md[i + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2]; + *(buf++) = local_md[i + RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2]; } } - if (!MD_Init(m) - || !MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)) - || !MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)) + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, RAND_DIGEST, NULL) + || !EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c)) + || !EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH)) goto err; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); /* * Prevent deadlocks if we end up in an async engine */ ASYNC_block_pause(); - if (!MD_Update(m, md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Final(m, md)) { + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, sp->md, sizeof(sp->md)) + || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, sp->md, NULL)) { CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); goto err; } @@ -502,14 +494,10 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo) EVP_MD_CTX_free(m); if (ok) return (1); - else if (pseudo) - return 0; - else { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED); - ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, " - "https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html"); - return (0); - } + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED); + ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, " + "https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html"); + return (0); err: RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); EVP_MD_CTX_free(m); @@ -521,28 +509,13 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo) } -static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) -{ - return rand_bytes(buf, num, 0); -} - -#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L -/* - * pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable - */ -static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) -{ - return rand_bytes(buf, num, 1); -} -#endif - static int rand_status(void) { CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur; int ret; int do_not_lock; - if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) + if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init)) return 0; cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); @@ -578,7 +551,7 @@ static int rand_status(void) initialized = 1; } - ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED; + ret = randomness >= RANDOMNESS_NEEDED; if (!do_not_lock) { /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ @@ -595,9 +568,6 @@ static int rand_status(void) * rand_hw_seed: get seed data from any available hardware RNG. only * currently supports rdrand. */ - -/* Adapted from eng_rdrand.c */ - #if (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) \ @@ -618,40 +588,12 @@ static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(); if (rnd == 0) return 1; - if (!MD_Update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t))) + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t))) return 0; } return 1; } -/* XOR an existing buffer with random data */ - -void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num) -{ - size_t rnd; - if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32)))) - return; - while (num >= sizeof(size_t)) { - rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(); - if (rnd == 0) - return; - *((size_t *)buf) ^= rnd; - buf += sizeof(size_t); - num -= sizeof(size_t); - } - if (num) { - rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(); - if (rnd == 0) - return; - while (num) { - *buf ^= rnd & 0xff; - rnd >>= 8; - buf++; - num--; - } - } -} - #else static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) @@ -659,9 +601,14 @@ static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) return 1; } -void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num) -{ - return; -} - #endif + + +RAND_METHOD openssl_rand_meth = { + rand_seed, + rand_bytes, + rand_cleanup, + rand_add, + rand_bytes, + rand_status +}; diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h index d98c90e2ac..69c9630122 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h @@ -10,37 +10,15 @@ #ifndef HEADER_RAND_LCL_H # define HEADER_RAND_LCL_H -# define ENTROPY_NEEDED 32 /* require 256 bits = 32 bytes of randomness */ - -# if !defined(USE_MD5_RAND) && !defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) && !defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) && !defined(USE_MD2_RAND) -# define USE_SHA1_RAND -# endif +/* we require 256 bits of randomness */ +# define RANDOMNESS_NEEDED (256 / 8) # include <openssl/evp.h> -# define MD_Update(a,b,c) EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c) -# define MD_Final(a,b) EVP_DigestFinal_ex(a,b,NULL) -# if defined(USE_MD5_RAND) -# include <openssl/md5.h> -# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH -# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md5(), NULL) -# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md5(), NULL) -# elif defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) -# include <openssl/sha.h> -# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH -# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_sha1(), NULL) -# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_sha1(), NULL) -# elif defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) -# include <openssl/mdc2.h> -# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH -# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_mdc2(), NULL) -# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_mdc2(), NULL) -# elif defined(USE_MD2_RAND) -# include <openssl/md2.h> -# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH -# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md2(), NULL) -# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md2(), NULL) -# endif +# include <openssl/sha.h> + +# define RAND_DIGEST EVP_sha1() +# define RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH -void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num); +extern RAND_METHOD openssl_rand_meth; #endif diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c index 84d6b5d6c7..1a1e2829b3 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c @@ -14,17 +14,19 @@ #include "internal/rand.h" #include <openssl/engine.h> #include "internal/thread_once.h" +#include "rand_lcl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */ -static ENGINE *funct_ref = NULL; -static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock = NULL; +static ENGINE *funct_ref; +static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock; #endif -static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth = NULL; -static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock = NULL; -static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; +static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock; +static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth; +static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; -DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init) + +DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init) { int ret = 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE @@ -36,9 +38,22 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init) return ret; } +void rand_cleanup_int(void) +{ + const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth; + + if (meth != NULL && meth->cleanup != NULL) + meth->cleanup(); + RAND_set_rand_method(NULL); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock); +#endif + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock); +} + int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth) { - if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) + if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init)) return 0; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock); @@ -55,25 +70,26 @@ const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void) { const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL; - if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) + if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init)) return NULL; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock); - if (!default_RAND_meth) { + if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE - ENGINE *e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND(); - if (e) { - default_RAND_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e); - if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) { - ENGINE_finish(e); - e = NULL; - } - } - if (e) + ENGINE *e; + + /* If we have an engine that can do RAND, use it. */ + if ((e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND()) != NULL + && (tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e)) != NULL) { funct_ref = e; - else + default_RAND_meth = tmp_meth; + } else { + ENGINE_finish(e); + default_RAND_meth = &openssl_rand_meth; + } +#else + default_RAND_meth = &openssl_rand_meth; #endif - default_RAND_meth = RAND_OpenSSL(); } tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock); @@ -85,10 +101,10 @@ int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine) { const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL; - if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) + if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init)) return 0; - if (engine) { + if (engine != NULL) { if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) return 0; tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(engine); @@ -106,55 +122,48 @@ int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine) } #endif -void rand_cleanup_int(void) -{ - const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth; - if (meth && meth->cleanup) - meth->cleanup(); - RAND_set_rand_method(NULL); - CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE - CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock); -#endif -} - void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); - if (meth && meth->seed) + + if (meth->seed != NULL) meth->seed(buf, num); } -void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy) +void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); - if (meth && meth->add) - meth->add(buf, num, entropy); + + if (meth->add != NULL) + meth->add(buf, num, randomness); } int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); - if (meth && meth->bytes) + + if (meth->bytes != NULL) return meth->bytes(buf, num); RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); - return (-1); + return -1; } #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); - if (meth && meth->pseudorand) + + if (meth->pseudorand != NULL) return meth->pseudorand(buf, num); - return (-1); + return -1; } #endif int RAND_status(void) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); - if (meth && meth->status) + + if (meth->status != NULL) return meth->status(); return 0; } diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c index 241f287fd1..bfdd3e6efa 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void) RAND_add(&curr_uid, sizeof curr_uid, 1); curr_uid = 0; - for (i = 0; i < (ENTROPY_NEEDED * 4); i++) { + for (i = 0; i < (RANDOMNESS_NEEDED * 4); i++) { /* * burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache collisions, bus * interference, etc. @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void) unsigned long l; pid_t curr_pid = getpid(); # if defined(DEVRANDOM) || (!defined(OPENSS_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)) - unsigned char tmpbuf[ENTROPY_NEEDED]; + unsigned char tmpbuf[RANDOMNESS_NEEDED]; int n = 0; # endif # ifdef DEVRANDOM @@ -144,12 +144,12 @@ int RAND_poll(void) # ifdef DEVRANDOM memset(randomstats, 0, sizeof(randomstats)); /* - * Use a random entropy pool device. Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD have + * Use a randomness device. Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD have * this. Use /dev/urandom if you can as /dev/random may block if it runs * out of random entries. */ - for (i = 0; (i < OSSL_NELEM(randomfiles)) && (n < ENTROPY_NEEDED); i++) { + for (i = 0; (i < OSSL_NELEM(randomfiles)) && (n < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED); i++) { if ((fd = open(randomfiles[i], O_RDONLY # ifdef O_NONBLOCK | O_NONBLOCK @@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void) if (try_read) { r = read(fd, (unsigned char *)tmpbuf + n, - ENTROPY_NEEDED - n); + RANDOMNESS_NEEDED - n); if (r > 0) n += r; } else @@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void) } while ((r > 0 || (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) && usec != 0 - && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED); + && n < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED); close(fd); } @@ -255,16 +255,15 @@ int RAND_poll(void) # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD) /* - * Use an EGD socket to read entropy from an EGD or PRNGD entropy - * collecting daemon. + * Use an EGD socket to read randomness from the daemon. */ - for (egdsocket = egdsockets; *egdsocket && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED; + for (egdsocket = egdsockets; *egdsocket && n < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED; egdsocket++) { int r; r = RAND_query_egd_bytes(*egdsocket, (unsigned char *)tmpbuf + n, - ENTROPY_NEEDED - n); + RANDOMNESS_NEEDED - n); if (r > 0) n += r; } diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c index 9c462dd374..ec99dbfe26 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c @@ -7,16 +7,11 @@ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ -/* - * Modified by VMS Software, Inc (2016) - * Eliminate looping through all processes (performance) - * Add additional randomizations using rand() function - */ - -#include <openssl/rand.h> -#include "rand_lcl.h" +#include "e_os.h"< |