diff options
| author | Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org> | 2008-03-28 02:49:43 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org> | 2008-03-28 02:49:43 +0000 |
| commit | f7ccba3edf9f1f02d7bd3b019d7bc96f25a95718 (patch) | |
| tree | 734b39872b1b8c3cee1db78ed5eb7e3214d6a0a7 /crypto/rand/md_rand.c | |
| parent | eb77ebe26c5228a9a9688b33901e79968789b980 (diff) | |
There was a need to support thread ID types that couldn't be reliably cast
to 'unsigned long' (ie. odd platforms/compilers), so a pointer-typed
version was added but it required portable code to check *both* modes to
determine equality. This commit maintains the availability of both thread
ID types, but deprecates the type-specific accessor APIs that invoke the
callbacks - instead a single type-independent API is used. This simplifies
software that calls into this interface, and should also make it less
error-prone - as forgetting to call and compare *both* thread ID accessors
could have led to hard-to-debug/infrequent bugs (that might only affect
certain platforms or thread implementations). As the CHANGES note says,
there were corresponding deprecations and replacements in the
thread-related functions for BN_BLINDING and ERR too.
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/rand/md_rand.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/rand/md_rand.c | 17 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c index cfc78774f7..59535b9e70 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c +++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c @@ -145,8 +145,7 @@ static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND * (to prevent double locking) */ /* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */ -static unsigned long locking_thread_id = 0; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ -static void *locking_thread_idptr = NULL; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ +static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_tid; #ifdef PREDICT @@ -214,8 +213,10 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) /* check if we already have the lock */ if (crypto_lock_rand) { + CRYPTO_THREADID tid; + CRYPTO_THREADID_set(&tid); CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - do_not_lock = (locking_thread_id == CRYPTO_thread_id()) && (locking_thread_idptr == CRYPTO_thread_idptr()); + do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_tid, &tid); CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); } else @@ -373,8 +374,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - locking_thread_id = CRYPTO_thread_id(); - locking_thread_idptr = CRYPTO_thread_idptr(); + CRYPTO_THREADID_set(&locking_tid); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); crypto_lock_rand = 1; @@ -536,8 +536,10 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void) * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */ if (crypto_lock_rand) { + CRYPTO_THREADID tid; + CRYPTO_THREADID_set(&tid); CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - do_not_lock = (locking_thread_id == CRYPTO_thread_id()) && (locking_thread_idptr == CRYPTO_thread_idptr()); + do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_tid, &tid); CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); } else @@ -549,8 +551,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void) /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - locking_thread_id = CRYPTO_thread_id(); - locking_thread_idptr = CRYPTO_thread_idptr(); + CRYPTO_THREADID_set(&locking_tid); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); crypto_lock_rand = 1; } |