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authorRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>2000-07-26 08:32:00 +0000
committerRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>2000-07-26 08:32:00 +0000
commita4125514f5eb538848622d6c3ae04a3d38fddf91 (patch)
tree67632d4dfc198182dc05fe5fb0b711f11377d453 /crypto/rand/md_rand.c
parent033d001e907f4ca7f9a3876e6b1033dec6d7cb1b (diff)
There's a deadlock when ssleay_rand_bytes is called the first time, since
it wants to stir the pool using ssleay_rand_add. This fix provides the possibility to call ssleay_rand_add inside a locked state by simply telling it not to do any locking through a static variable. This isn't the most elegant way one could do this, but it does retain thread safety during the stirring process.
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/rand/md_rand.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/md_rand.c18
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index 0138f57e55..f874f2fe2c 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -141,6 +141,11 @@ static long md_count[2]={0,0};
static double entropy=0;
static int initialized=0;
+/* This should be set to 1 only when ssleay_rand_add() is called inside
+ an already locked state, so it doesn't try to lock and thereby cause
+ a hang. And it should always be reset back to 0 before unlocking. */
+static int add_do_not_lock=0;
+
#ifdef PREDICT
int rand_predictable=0;
#endif
@@ -201,7 +206,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
* hash function.
*/
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (!add_do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
st_idx=state_index;
/* use our own copies of the counters so that even
@@ -233,7 +238,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (!add_do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)
{
@@ -275,7 +280,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
}
memset((char *)&m,0,sizeof(m));
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (!add_do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
/* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that
* other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
* the incremented counter). By XORing it we keep at least as
@@ -286,7 +291,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
}
if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
entropy += add;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (!add_do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
#ifndef THREADS
assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
@@ -345,6 +350,8 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
RAND_poll();
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ add_do_not_lock = 1; /* Since we call ssleay_rand_add while in
+ this locked state. */
initialized = 1;
if (!stirred_pool)
@@ -409,6 +416,9 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
* are now ours (but other threads may use them too) */
md_count[0] += 1;
+
+ add_do_not_lock = 0; /* If this would ever be forgotten, we can
+ expect any evil god to eat our souls. */
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
while (num > 0)