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authorPauli <paul.dale@oracle.com>2019-08-21 08:00:12 +1000
committerPauli <paul.dale@oracle.com>2019-09-06 19:27:57 +1000
commit5eb43d382b3eb3fb6950cc8e0dce82886e23e984 (patch)
treeb32e637f7349322afae2edaca63690b6b7d59d69 /crypto/kdf
parentdc5bcb88d819de55eb37460c122e02fec91c6d86 (diff)
Move KDFs to the provider.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9662)
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/kdf')
-rw-r--r--crypto/kdf/hkdf.c440
-rw-r--r--crypto/kdf/pbkdf2.c324
-rw-r--r--crypto/kdf/scrypt.c506
-rw-r--r--crypto/kdf/sshkdf.c292
-rw-r--r--crypto/kdf/sskdf.c558
-rw-r--r--crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c375
-rw-r--r--crypto/kdf/x942kdf.c407
7 files changed, 0 insertions, 2902 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c b/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 33c74da86a..0000000000
--- a/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,440 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/kdf.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include "internal/numbers.h"
-#include "internal/evp_int.h"
-#include "kdf_local.h"
-
-#define HKDF_MAXBUF 1024
-
-static void kdf_hkdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
-static int HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
- const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
- const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
- const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
- unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
-static int HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
- const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
- const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
- unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len);
-static int HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
- const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
- const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
- unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
-
-struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
- int mode;
- const EVP_MD *md;
- unsigned char *salt;
- size_t salt_len;
- unsigned char *key;
- size_t key_len;
- unsigned char info[HKDF_MAXBUF];
- size_t info_len;
-};
-
-static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_hkdf_new(void)
-{
- EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
-
- if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return impl;
-}
-
-static void kdf_hkdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- kdf_hkdf_reset(impl);
- OPENSSL_free(impl);
-}
-
-static void kdf_hkdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->key, impl->key_len);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(impl->info, impl->info_len);
- memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
-}
-
-static int kdf_hkdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
-{
- const unsigned char *p;
- size_t len;
- const EVP_MD *md;
-
- switch (cmd) {
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
- md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
- if (md == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- impl->md = md;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_HKDF_MODE:
- impl->mode = va_arg(args, int);
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
- p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
- len = va_arg(args, size_t);
- if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
- impl->salt = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
- if (impl->salt == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- impl->salt_len = len;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY:
- p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
- len = va_arg(args, size_t);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->key, impl->key_len);
- impl->key = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
- if (impl->key == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- impl->key_len = len;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_RESET_HKDF_INFO:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(impl->info, impl->info_len);
- impl->info_len = 0;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_HKDF_INFO:
- p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
- len = va_arg(args, size_t);
- if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- if (len > (HKDF_MAXBUF - impl->info_len))
- return 0;
-
- memcpy(impl->info + impl->info_len, p, len);
- impl->info_len += len;
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return -2;
- }
-}
-
-static int kdf_hkdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
- const char *value)
-{
- if (strcmp(type, "mode") == 0) {
- int mode;
-
- if (strcmp(value, "EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND") == 0)
- mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND;
- else if (strcmp(value, "EXTRACT_ONLY") == 0)
- mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
- else if (strcmp(value, "EXPAND_ONLY") == 0)
- mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
- else
- return 0;
-
- return call_ctrl(kdf_hkdf_ctrl, impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_HKDF_MODE, mode);
- }
-
- if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
- return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "info") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_HKDF_INFO,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexinfo") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_HKDF_INFO,
- value);
-
- return -2;
-}
-
-static size_t kdf_hkdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- int sz;
-
- if (impl->mode != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY)
- return SIZE_MAX;
-
- if (impl->md == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_SIZE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
- sz = EVP_MD_size(impl->md);
- if (sz < 0)
- return 0;
-
- return sz;
-}
-
-static int kdf_hkdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
- size_t keylen)
-{
- if (impl->md == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
- if (impl->key == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_KEY);
- return 0;
- }
-
- switch (impl->mode) {
- case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND:
- return HKDF(impl->md, impl->salt, impl->salt_len, impl->key,
- impl->key_len, impl->info, impl->info_len, key,
- keylen);
-
- case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY:
- return HKDF_Extract(impl->md, impl->salt, impl->salt_len, impl->key,
- impl->key_len, key, keylen);
-
- case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY:
- return HKDF_Expand(impl->md, impl->key, impl->key_len, impl->info,
- impl->info_len, key, keylen);
-
- default:
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-const EVP_KDF hkdf_kdf_meth = {
- EVP_KDF_HKDF,
- kdf_hkdf_new,
- kdf_hkdf_free,
- kdf_hkdf_reset,
- kdf_hkdf_ctrl,
- kdf_hkdf_ctrl_str,
- kdf_hkdf_size,
- kdf_hkdf_derive
-};
-
-/*
- * Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
- * Section 2 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2) and
- * "Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme"
- * Section 4.2 (https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf).
- *
- * From the paper:
- * The scheme HKDF is specified as:
- * HKDF(XTS, SKM, CTXinfo, L) = K(1) | K(2) | ... | K(t)
- *
- * where:
- * SKM is source key material
- * XTS is extractor salt (which may be null or constant)
- * CTXinfo is context information (may be null)
- * L is the number of key bits to be produced by KDF
- * k is the output length in bits of the hash function used with HMAC
- * t = ceil(L/k)
- * the value K(t) is truncated to its first d = L mod k bits.
- *
- * From RFC 5869:
- * 2.2. Step 1: Extract
- * HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK
- * 2.3. Step 2: Expand
- * HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM
- */
-static int HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
- const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
- const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
- const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
- unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
-{
- unsigned char prk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- int ret, sz;
- size_t prk_len;
-
- sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
- if (sz < 0)
- return 0;
- prk_len = (size_t)sz;
-
- /* Step 1: HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK */
- if (!HKDF_Extract(evp_md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk, prk_len))
- return 0;
-
- /* Step 2: HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM */
- ret = HKDF_Expand(evp_md, prk, prk_len, info, info_len, okm, okm_len);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(prk, sizeof(prk));
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
- * Section 2.2 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.2).
- *
- * 2.2. Step 1: Extract
- *
- * HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK
- *
- * Options:
- * Hash a hash function; HashLen denotes the length of the
- * hash function output in octets
- *
- * Inputs:
- * salt optional salt value (a non-secret random value);
- * if not provided, it is set to a string of HashLen zeros.
- * IKM input keying material
- *
- * Output:
- * PRK a pseudorandom key (of HashLen octets)
- *
- * The output PRK is calculated as follows:
- *
- * PRK = HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM)
- */
-static int HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
- const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
- const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
- unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len)
-{
- int sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
-
- if (sz < 0)
- return 0;
- if (prk_len != (size_t)sz) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_HKDF_EXTRACT, KDF_R_WRONG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE);
- return 0;
- }
- /* calc: PRK = HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM) */
- return HMAC(evp_md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk, NULL) != NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
- * Section 2.3 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.3).
- *
- * 2.3. Step 2: Expand
- *
- * HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM
- *
- * Options:
- * Hash a hash function; HashLen denotes the length of the
- * hash function output in octets
- *
- * Inputs:
- * PRK a pseudorandom key of at least HashLen octets
- * (usually, the output from the extract step)
- * info optional context and application specific information
- * (can be a zero-length string)
- * L length of output keying material in octets
- * (<= 255*HashLen)
- *
- * Output:
- * OKM output keying material (of L octets)
- *
- * The output OKM is calculated as follows:
- *
- * N = ceil(L/HashLen)
- * T = T(1) | T(2) | T(3) | ... | T(N)
- * OKM = first L octets of T
- *
- * where:
- * T(0) = empty string (zero length)
- * T(1) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(0) | info | 0x01)
- * T(2) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(1) | info | 0x02)
- * T(3) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(2) | info | 0x03)
- * ...
- *
- * (where the constant concatenated to the end of each T(n) is a
- * single octet.)
- */
-static int HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
- const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
- const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
- unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
-{
- HMAC_CTX *hmac;
- int ret = 0, sz;
- unsigned int i;
- unsigned char prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- size_t done_len = 0, dig_len, n;
-
- sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
- if (sz <= 0)
- return 0;
- dig_len = (size_t)sz;
-
- /* calc: N = ceil(L/HashLen) */
- n = okm_len / dig_len;
- if (okm_len % dig_len)
- n++;
-
- if (n > 255 || okm == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if ((hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, prk, prk_len, evp_md, NULL))
- goto err;
-
- for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) {
- size_t copy_len;
- const unsigned char ctr = i;
-
- /* calc: T(i) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(i - 1) | info | i) */
- if (i > 1) {
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
- goto err;
-
- if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, prev, dig_len))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, info, info_len))
- goto err;
-
- if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, &ctr, 1))
- goto err;
-
- if (!HMAC_Final(hmac, prev, NULL))
- goto err;
-
- copy_len = (done_len + dig_len > okm_len) ?
- okm_len - done_len :
- dig_len;
-
- memcpy(okm + done_len, prev, copy_len);
-
- done_len += copy_len;
- }
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(prev, sizeof(prev));
- HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
- return ret;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/kdf/pbkdf2.c b/crypto/kdf/pbkdf2.c
deleted file mode 100644
index d41689773c..0000000000
--- a/crypto/kdf/pbkdf2.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,324 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 2018-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/kdf.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include "internal/evp_int.h"
-#include "kdf_local.h"
-
-/* Constants specified in SP800-132 */
-#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS 112
-#define KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO 0xFFFFFFFF
-#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS 1000
-#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN (128 / 8)
-/*
- * For backwards compatibility reasons,
- * Extra checks are done by default in fips mode only.
- */
-#ifdef FIPS_MODE
-# define KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS 1
-#else
-# define KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS 0
-#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
-
-static void kdf_pbkdf2_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
-static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
-static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
- const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
- const EVP_MD *digest, unsigned char *key,
- size_t keylen, int extra_checks);
-
-struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
- unsigned char *pass;
- size_t pass_len;
- unsigned char *salt;
- size_t salt_len;
- int iter;
- const EVP_MD *md;
- int lower_bound_checks;
-};
-
-static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_pbkdf2_new(void)
-{
- EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
-
- impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl));
- if (impl == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- kdf_pbkdf2_init(impl);
- return impl;
-}
-
-static void kdf_pbkdf2_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- kdf_pbkdf2_reset(impl);
- OPENSSL_free(impl);
-}
-
-static void kdf_pbkdf2_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->pass, impl->pass_len);
- memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
- kdf_pbkdf2_init(impl);
-}
-
-static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- impl->iter = PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER;
- impl->md = EVP_sha1();
- impl->lower_bound_checks = KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS;
-}
-
-static int pbkdf2_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
- const unsigned char *new_buffer,
- size_t new_buflen)
-{
- if (new_buffer == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
-
- if (new_buflen > 0) {
- *buffer = OPENSSL_memdup(new_buffer, new_buflen);
- } else {
- *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
- }
- if (*buffer == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_SET_MEMBUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- *buflen = new_buflen;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
-{
- int iter, pkcs5, min_iter;
- const unsigned char *p;
- size_t len;
- const EVP_MD *md;
-
- switch (cmd) {
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PBKDF2_PKCS5_MODE:
- pkcs5 = va_arg(args, int);
- impl->lower_bound_checks = (pkcs5 == 0) ? 1 : 0;
- return 1;
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS:
- p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
- len = va_arg(args, size_t);
- return pbkdf2_set_membuf(&impl->pass, &impl->pass_len, p, len);
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
- p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
- len = va_arg(args, size_t);
- if (impl->lower_bound_checks != 0 && len < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, KDF_R_INVALID_SALT_LEN);
- return 0;
- }
- return pbkdf2_set_membuf(&impl->salt, &impl->salt_len, p, len);
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_ITER:
- iter = va_arg(args, int);
- min_iter = impl->lower_bound_checks != 0 ? KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS : 1;
- if (iter < min_iter) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, KDF_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
- return 0;
- }
- impl->iter = iter;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
- md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
- if (md == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
- return 0;
- }
-
- impl->md = md;
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return -2;
- }
-}
-
-static int kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
- const char *value)
-{
- if (value == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (strcmp(type, "pass") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexpass") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "iter") == 0)
- return call_ctrl(kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_ITER,
- atoi(value));
-
- if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
- return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "pkcs5") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl,
- EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PBKDF2_PKCS5_MODE, value);
- return -2;
-}
-
-static int kdf_pbkdf2_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
- size_t keylen)
-{
- if (impl->pass == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_PASS);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (impl->salt == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SALT);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return pbkdf2_derive((char *)impl->pass, impl->pass_len,
- impl->salt, impl->salt_len, impl->iter,
- impl->md, key, keylen, impl->lower_bound_checks);
-}
-
-const EVP_KDF pbkdf2_kdf_meth = {
- EVP_KDF_PBKDF2,
- kdf_pbkdf2_new,
- kdf_pbkdf2_free,
- kdf_pbkdf2_reset,
- kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl,
- kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl_str,
- NULL,
- kdf_pbkdf2_derive
-};
-
-/*
- * This is an implementation of PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption key
- * derivation function PBKDF2. SHA1 version verified against test vectors
- * posted by Peter Gutmann to the PKCS-TNG mailing list.
- *
- * The constraints specified by SP800-132 have been added i.e.
- * - Check the range of the key length.
- * - Minimum iteration count of 1000.
- * - Randomly-generated portion of the salt shall be at least 128 bits.
- */
-static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
- const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
- const EVP_MD *digest, unsigned char *key,
- size_t keylen, int lower_bound_checks)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- unsigned char digtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *p, itmp[4];
- int cplen, j, k, tkeylen, mdlen;
- unsigned long i = 1;
- HMAC_CTX *hctx_tpl = NULL, *hctx = NULL;
-
- mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest);
- if (mdlen <= 0)
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * This check should always be done because keylen / mdlen >= (2^32 - 1)
- * results in an overflow of the loop counter 'i'.
- */
- if ((keylen / mdlen) >= KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (lower_bound_checks) {
- if ((keylen * 8) < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
- return 0;
- }
- if (saltlen < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_SALT_LEN);
- return 0;
- }
- if (iter < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- hctx_tpl = HMAC_CTX_new();
- if (hctx_tpl == NULL)
- return 0;
- p = key;
- tkeylen = keylen;
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx_tpl, pass, passlen, digest, NULL))
- goto err;
- hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
- if (hctx == NULL)
- goto err;
- while (tkeylen) {
- if (tkeylen > mdlen)
- cplen = mdlen;
- else
- cplen = tkeylen;
- /*
- * We are unlikely to ever use more than 256 blocks (5120 bits!) but
- * just in case...
- */
- itmp[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 0xff);
- itmp[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 0xff);
- itmp[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8) & 0xff);
- itmp[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 0xff);
- if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(hctx, hctx_tpl))
- goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, salt, saltlen)
- || !HMAC_Update(hctx, itmp, 4)
- || !HMAC_Final(hctx, digtmp, NULL))
- goto err;
- memcpy(p, digtmp, cplen);
- for (j = 1; j < iter; j++) {
- if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(hctx, hctx_tpl))
- goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, digtmp, mdlen)
- || !HMAC_Final(hctx, digtmp, NULL))
- goto err;
- for (k = 0; k < cplen; k++)
- p[k] ^= digtmp[k];
- }
- tkeylen -= cplen;
- i++;
- p += cplen;
- }
- ret = 1;
-
-err:
- HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
- HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
- return ret;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/kdf/scrypt.c b/crypto/kdf/scrypt.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 29ceeb3ad9..0000000000
--- a/crypto/kdf/scrypt.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,506 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/kdf.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include "internal/evp_int.h"
-#include "internal/numbers.h"
-#include "kdf_local.h"
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
-
-static void kdf_scrypt_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
-static void kdf_scrypt_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
-static int atou64(const char *nptr, uint64_t *result);
-static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
- const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
- uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
- unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);
-
-struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
- unsigned char *pass;
- size_t pass_len;
- unsigned char *salt;
- size_t salt_len;
- uint64_t N;
- uint32_t r, p;
- uint64_t maxmem_bytes;
-};
-
-/* Custom uint64_t parser since we do not have strtoull */
-static int atou64(const char *nptr, uint64_t *result)
-{
- uint64_t value = 0;
-
- while (*nptr) {
- unsigned int digit;
- uint64_t new_value;
-
- if ((*nptr < '0') || (*nptr > '9')) {
- return 0;
- }
- digit = (unsigned int)(*nptr - '0');
- new_value = (value * 10) + digit;
- if ((new_value < digit) || ((new_value - digit) / 10 != value)) {
- /* Overflow */
- return 0;
- }
- value = new_value;
- nptr++;
- }
- *result = value;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_scrypt_new(void)
-{
- EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
-
- impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl));
- if (impl == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- kdf_scrypt_init(impl);
- return impl;
-}
-
-static void kdf_scrypt_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- kdf_scrypt_reset(impl);
- OPENSSL_free(impl);
-}
-
-static void kdf_scrypt_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->pass, impl->pass_len);
- memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
- kdf_scrypt_init(impl);
-}
-
-static void kdf_scrypt_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
-{
- /* Default values are the most conservative recommendation given in the
- * original paper of C. Percival. Derivation uses roughly 1 GiB of memory
- * for this parameter choice (approx. 128 * r * N * p bytes).
- */
- impl->N = 1 << 20;
- impl->r = 8;
- impl->p = 1;
- impl->maxmem_bytes = 1025 * 1024 * 1024;
-}
-
-static int scrypt_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
- const unsigned char *new_buffer,
- size_t new_buflen)
-{
- if (new_buffer == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
-
- if (new_buflen > 0) {
- *buffer = OPENSSL_memdup(new_buffer, new_buflen);
- } else {
- *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
- }
- if (*buffer == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_SCRYPT_SET_MEMBUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- *buflen = new_buflen;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int is_power_of_two(uint64_t value)
-{
- return (value != 0) && ((value & (value - 1)) == 0);
-}
-
-static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
-{
- uint64_t u64_value;
- uint32_t value;
- const unsigned char *p;
- size_t len;
-
- switch (cmd) {
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS:
- p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
- len = va_arg(args, size_t);
- return scrypt_set_membuf(&impl->pass, &impl->pass_len, p, len);
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
- p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
- len = va_arg(args, size_t);
- return scrypt_set_membuf(&impl->salt, &impl->salt_len, p, len);
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_N:
- u64_value = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
- if ((u64_value <= 1) || !is_power_of_two(u64_value))
- return 0;
-
- impl->N = u64_value;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_R:
- value = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
- if (value < 1)
- return 0;
-
- impl->r = value;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_P:
- value = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
- if (value < 1)
- return 0;
-
- impl->p = value;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAXMEM_BYTES:
- u64_value = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
- if (u64_value < 1)
- return 0;
-
- impl->maxmem_bytes = u64_value;
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return -2;
- }
-}
-
-static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd,
- const char *value)
-{
- int int_value = atoi(value);
-
- if (int_value < 0 || (uint64_t)int_value > UINT32_MAX) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_UINT32, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- return call_ctrl(kdf_scrypt_ctrl, impl, cmd, (uint32_t)int_value);
-}
-
-static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd,
- const char *value)
-{
- uint64_t u64_value;
-
- if (!atou64(value, &u64_value)) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_UINT64, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- return call_ctrl(kdf_scrypt_ctrl, impl, cmd, u64_value);
-}
-
-static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
- const char *value)
-{
- if (value == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (strcmp(type, "pass") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexpass") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
- return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
- return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
- value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "N") == 0)
- return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_N, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "r") == 0)
- return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_R, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "p") == 0)
- return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_P, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "maxmem_bytes") == 0)
- return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAXMEM_BYTES,
- value);
-
- return -2;
-}
-
-static int kdf_scrypt_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
- size_t keylen)
-{
- if (impl->pass == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_PASS);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (impl->salt == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSI