CTR, HASH and HMAC DRBGs in provider

Move the three different DRBGs to the provider.

As part of the move, the DRBG specific data was pulled out of a common
structure and into their own structures.  Only these smaller structures are
securely allocated.  This saves quite a bit of secure memory:

    +-------------------------------+
    | DRBG         | Bytes | Secure |
    +--------------+-------+--------+
    | HASH         |  376  |   512  |
    | HMAC         |  168  |   256  |
    | CTR          |  176  |   256  |
    | Common (new) |  320  |     0  |
    | Common (old) |  592  |  1024  |
    +--------------+-------+--------+

Bytes is the structure size on the X86/64.
Secure is the number of bytes of secure memory used (power of two allocator).

Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11682)

3 files changed, 130 insertions, 87 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/evp/build.info b/crypto/evp/build.info
index edef4930cb..ccd8357453 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/build.info
+++ b/crypto/evp/build.info
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ LIBS=../../libcrypto
 $COMMON=digest.c evp_enc.c evp_lib.c evp_fetch.c cmeth_lib.c evp_utils.c \
         mac_lib.c mac_meth.c keymgmt_meth.c keymgmt_lib.c kdf_lib.c kdf_meth.c \
         m_sigver.c pmeth_lib.c signature.c p_lib.c pmeth_gn.c exchange.c \
-        pmeth_check.c rand_meth.c
+        pmeth_check.c evp_rand.c
 
 SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON\
         encode.c evp_key.c evp_cnf.c \
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_local.h b/crypto/evp/evp_local.h
index 03a1f36e1b..132534464f 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_local.h
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_local.h
@@ -69,16 +69,18 @@ struct evp_kdf_ctx_st {
 struct evp_rand_ctx_st {
     EVP_RAND *meth;             /* Method structure */
     void *data;                 /* Algorithm-specific data */
-    EVP_RAND_CTX *parent;       /* Parent seed source */
-    size_t max_request;         /* Cached: maximum number of bytes generated */
-    unsigned int strength;      /* Cache: bit strenght of generator */
+    size_t max_request;         /*
+                                 * Cached: maximum number of bytes generated 
+                                 * in a single call to the generate function
+                                 */
+    unsigned int strength;      /* Cached: bit strength of generator */
 } /* EVP_RAND_CTX */ ;
 
 struct evp_rand_st {
     OSSL_PROVIDER *prov;
     int name_id;
     CRYPTO_REF_COUNT refcnt;
-    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *refcnt_lock;
 
     const OSSL_DISPATCH *dispatch;
     OSSL_OP_rand_newctx_fn *newctx;
@@ -88,16 +90,16 @@ struct evp_rand_st {
     OSSL_OP_rand_generate_fn *generate;
     OSSL_OP_rand_reseed_fn *reseed;
     OSSL_OP_rand_nonce_fn *nonce;
-    OSSL_OP_rand_set_callbacks_fn *set_callbacks;
-    OSSL_OP_rand_enable_locking_fn *enable_prov_locking;
-    OSSL_OP_rand_lock_fn *prov_lock;
-    OSSL_OP_rand_unlock_fn *prov_unlock;
+    OSSL_OP_rand_enable_locking_fn *enable_locking;
+    OSSL_OP_rand_lock_fn *lock;
+    OSSL_OP_rand_unlock_fn *unlock;
     OSSL_OP_rand_gettable_params_fn *gettable_params;
     OSSL_OP_rand_gettable_ctx_params_fn *gettable_ctx_params;
     OSSL_OP_rand_settable_ctx_params_fn *settable_ctx_params;
     OSSL_OP_rand_get_params_fn *get_params;
     OSSL_OP_rand_get_ctx_params_fn *get_ctx_params;
     OSSL_OP_rand_set_ctx_params_fn *set_ctx_params;
+    OSSL_OP_rand_set_callbacks_fn *set_callbacks;
     OSSL_OP_rand_verify_zeroization_fn *verify_zeroization;
 } /* EVP_RAND */ ;
 
diff --git a/crypto/evp/rand_meth.c b/crypto/evp/evp_rand.c
index 0f1745411d..f7bc321f29 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/rand_meth.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_rand.c
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/engine.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
@@ -21,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include "crypto/asn1.h"
 #include "crypto/evp.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include "internal/numbers.h"
 #include "internal/provider.h"
 #include "evp_local.h"
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ static int evp_rand_up_ref(void *vrand)
     int ref = 0;
 
     if (rand != NULL)
-        return CRYPTO_UP_REF(&rand->refcnt, &ref, rand->lock);
+        return CRYPTO_UP_REF(&rand->refcnt, &ref, rand->refcnt_lock);
     return 1;
 }
 
@@ -40,10 +40,10 @@ static void evp_rand_free(void *vrand){
     int ref = 0;
 
     if (rand != NULL) {
-        CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&rand->refcnt, &ref, rand->lock);
+        CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&rand->refcnt, &ref, rand->refcnt_lock);
         if (ref <= 0) {
             ossl_provider_free(rand->prov);
-            CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand->lock);
+            CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand->refcnt_lock);
             OPENSSL_free(rand);
         }
     }
@@ -51,11 +51,11 @@ static void evp_rand_free(void *vrand){
 
 static void *evp_rand_new(void)
 {
-    EVP_RAND *rand = NULL;
+    EVP_RAND *rand = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rand));
 
-    if ((rand = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rand))) == NULL
-        || (rand->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new()) == NULL) {
-        evp_rand_free(rand);
+    if (rand == NULL
+            || (rand->refcnt_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new()) == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(rand);
         return NULL;
     }
     rand->refcnt = 1;
@@ -63,26 +63,27 @@ static void *evp_rand_new(void)
 }
 
 /* Enable locking of the underlying DRBG/RAND if available */
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_enable_locking(EVP_RAND_CTX *rand)
+int EVP_RAND_enable_locking(EVP_RAND_CTX *rand)
 {
-    if (rand->meth->enable_prov_locking != NULL)
-        return rand->meth->enable_prov_locking(rand->data);
-    return 1;
+    if (rand->meth->enable_locking != NULL)
+        return rand->meth->enable_locking(rand->data);
+    EVPerr(0, EVP_R_LOCKING_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+    return 0;
 }
 
 /* Lock the underlying DRBG/RAND if available */
 static int evp_rand_lock(EVP_RAND_CTX *rand)
 {
-    if (rand->meth->prov_lock != NULL)
-        return rand->meth->prov_lock(rand->data);
+    if (rand->meth->lock != NULL)
+        return rand->meth->lock(rand->data);
     return 1;
 }
 
 /* Unlock the underlying DRBG/RAND if available */
 static void evp_rand_unlock(EVP_RAND_CTX *rand)
 {
-    if (rand->meth->prov_unlock != NULL)
-        rand->meth->prov_unlock(rand->data);
+    if (rand->meth->unlock != NULL)
+        rand->meth->unlock(rand->data);
 }
 
 static void *evp_rand_from_dispatch(int name_id,
@@ -90,9 +91,9 @@ static void *evp_rand_from_dispatch(int name_id,
                                     OSSL_PROVIDER *prov)
 {
     EVP_RAND *rand = NULL;
-    int fnrandcnt = 0, fnctxcnt = 0;
+    int fnrandcnt = 0, fnctxcnt = 0, fnlockcnt = 0;
 #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
-    int fnfipscnt = 0;
+    int fnzeroizecnt = 0;
 #endif
 
     if ((rand = evp_rand_new()) == NULL) {
@@ -149,19 +150,22 @@ static void *evp_rand_from_dispatch(int name_id,
             rand->set_callbacks = OSSL_get_OP_rand_set_callbacks(fns);
             break;
         case OSSL_FUNC_RAND_ENABLE_LOCKING:
-            if (rand->enable_prov_locking != NULL)
+            if (rand->enable_locking != NULL)
                 break;
-            rand->enable_prov_locking = OSSL_get_OP_rand_enable_locking(fns);
+            rand->enable_locking = OSSL_get_OP_rand_enable_locking(fns);
+            fnlockcnt++;
             break;
         case OSSL_FUNC_RAND_LOCK:
-            if (rand->prov_lock != NULL)
+            if (rand->lock != NULL)
                 break;
-            rand->prov_lock = OSSL_get_OP_rand_lock(fns);
+            rand->lock = OSSL_get_OP_rand_lock(fns);
+            fnlockcnt++;
             break;
         case OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNLOCK:
-            if (rand->prov_unlock != NULL)
+            if (rand->unlock != NULL)
                 break;
-            rand->prov_unlock = OSSL_get_OP_rand_unlock(fns);
+            rand->unlock = OSSL_get_OP_rand_unlock(fns);
+            fnlockcnt++;
             break;
         case OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GETTABLE_PARAMS:
             if (rand->gettable_params != NULL)
@@ -201,36 +205,44 @@ static void *evp_rand_from_dispatch(int name_id,
                 break;
             rand->verify_zeroization = OSSL_get_OP_rand_verify_zeroization(fns);
 #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
-            fnfipscnt++;
+            fnzeroizecnt++;
 #endif
             break;
         }
     }
+    /*
+     * In order to be a consistent set of functions we must have at least
+     * a complete set of "rand" functions and a complete set of context
+     * management functions.  In FIPS mode, we also require the zeroization
+     * verification function.
+     *
+     * In addition, if locking can be enabled, we need a complete set of
+     * locking functions.
+     */
     if (fnrandcnt != 3
             || fnctxcnt != 2
+            || (fnlockcnt != 0 && fnlockcnt != 3)
 #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
-            || fnfipscnt != 1
+            || fnzeroizecnt != 1
 #endif
        ) {
-        /*
-         * In order to be a consistent set of functions we must have at least
-         * a complete set of "rand" functions and a complete set of context
-         * management functions.  In FIPS mode, we also require the zeroization
-         * verification function.
-         */
         evp_rand_free(rand);
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PROVIDER_FUNCTIONS);
         return NULL;
     }
+
+    if (prov != NULL && !ossl_provider_up_ref(prov)) {
+        evp_rand_free(rand);
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return NULL;
+    }
     rand->prov = prov;
-    if (prov != NULL)
-        ossl_provider_up_ref(prov);
 
     return rand;
 }
 
 EVP_RAND *EVP_RAND_fetch(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const char *algorithm,
-                       const char *properties)
+                         const char *properties)
 {
     return evp_generic_fetch(libctx, OSSL_OP_RAND, algorithm, properties,
                              evp_rand_from_dispatch, evp_rand_up_ref,
@@ -274,25 +286,33 @@ int EVP_RAND_get_params(EVP_RAND *rand, OSSL_PARAM params[])
     return 1;
 }
 
-EVP_RAND_CTX *EVP_RAND_CTX_new(EVP_RAND *rand, int secure, EVP_RAND_CTX *parent)
+EVP_RAND_CTX *EVP_RAND_CTX_new(EVP_RAND *rand, EVP_RAND_CTX *parent)
 {
     EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx;
     void *parent_ctx = NULL;
     const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_dispatch = NULL;
 
-    if (rand == NULL)
+    if (rand == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(0, EVP_R_INVALID_NULL_ALGORITHM);
         return NULL;
+    }
 
-    ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_RAND_CTX));
-    if (ctx == NULL)
+    ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return NULL;
+    }
     if (parent != NULL) {
-        EVP_RAND_CTX_enable_locking(parent);
+        if (!EVP_RAND_enable_locking(parent)) {
+            EVPerr(0, EVP_R_UNABLE_TO_ENABLE_PARENT_LOCKING);
+            OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+            return NULL;
+        }
         parent_ctx = parent->data;
         parent_dispatch = parent->meth->dispatch;
     }
-    if ((ctx->data = rand->newctx(ossl_provider_ctx(rand->prov), secure,
-                                  parent_ctx, parent_dispatch)) == NULL
+    if ((ctx->data = rand->newctx(ossl_provider_ctx(rand->prov), parent_ctx,
+                                  parent_dispatch)) == NULL
             || !EVP_RAND_up_ref(rand)) {
         EVPerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         rand->freectx(ctx->data);
@@ -308,7 +328,6 @@ void EVP_RAND_CTX_free(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
     if (ctx != NULL) {
         ctx->meth->freectx(ctx->data);
         ctx->data = NULL;
-        EVP_RAND_CTX_free(ctx->parent);
         EVP_RAND_free(ctx->meth);
         OPENSSL_free(ctx);
     }
@@ -319,7 +338,7 @@ EVP_RAND *EVP_RAND_CTX_rand(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
     return ctx->meth;
 }
 
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_get_params(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+int EVP_RAND_get_ctx_params(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     int res = 1;
 
@@ -332,7 +351,7 @@ int EVP_RAND_CTX_get_params(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
     return res;
 }
 
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_set_params(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+int EVP_RAND_set_ctx_params(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     int res = 1;
 
@@ -350,23 +369,19 @@ int EVP_RAND_CTX_set_params(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 
 const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_RAND_gettable_params(const EVP_RAND *rand)
 {
-    if (rand->gettable_params == NULL)
-        return NULL;
-    return rand->gettable_params();
+    return rand->gettable_params == NULL ? NULL : rand->gettable_params();
 }
 
 const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_RAND_gettable_ctx_params(const EVP_RAND *rand)
 {
-    if (rand->gettable_ctx_params == NULL)
-        return NULL;
-    return rand->gettable_ctx_params();
+    return rand->gettable_ctx_params == NULL ? NULL
+                                             : rand->gettable_ctx_params();
 }
 
 const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_RAND_settable_ctx_params(const EVP_RAND *rand)
 {
-    if (rand->settable_ctx_params == NULL)
-        return NULL;
-    return rand->settable_ctx_params();
+    return rand->settable_ctx_params == NULL ? NULL
+                                             :rand->settable_ctx_params();
 }
 
 void EVP_RAND_do_all_provided(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx,
@@ -386,9 +401,9 @@ void EVP_RAND_names_do_all(const EVP_RAND *rand,
         evp_names_do_all(rand->prov, rand->name_id, fn, data);
 }
 
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_instantiate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned int strength,
-                             int prediction_resistance,
-                             const unsigned char *pstr, size_t pstr_len)
+int EVP_RAND_instantiate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned int strength,
+                         int prediction_resistance,
+                         const unsigned char *pstr, size_t pstr_len)
 {
     int res;
 
@@ -400,7 +415,7 @@ int EVP_RAND_CTX_instantiate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned int strength,
     return res;
 }
 
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_uninstantiate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
+int EVP_RAND_uninstantiate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
 {
     int res;
 
@@ -411,9 +426,9 @@ int EVP_RAND_CTX_uninstantiate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
     return res;
 }
 
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_generate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
-                          unsigned int strength, int prediction_resistance,
-                          const unsigned char *addin, size_t addin_len)
+int EVP_RAND_generate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+                      unsigned int strength, int prediction_resistance,
+                      const unsigned char *addin, size_t addin_len)
 {
     size_t chunk;
     OSSL_PARAM params[2];
@@ -423,17 +438,26 @@ int EVP_RAND_CTX_generate(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
         return 0;
     if (ctx->max_request == 0) {
         params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_REQUEST,
-                                                &ctx->max_request);
+                                                &chunk);
         params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
-        if (!EVP_RAND_CTX_get_params(ctx, params)
-                || ctx->max_request == 0)
+        if (!EVP_RAND_get_ctx_params(ctx, params) || chunk == 0) {
+            EVPerr(0, EVP_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_MAXIMUM_REQUEST_SIZE);
             goto err;
+        }
+        ctx->max_request = chunk;
     }
     for (; outlen > 0; outlen -= chunk, out += chunk) {
         chunk = outlen > ctx->max_request ? ctx->max_request : outlen;
         if (!ctx->meth->generate(ctx->data, out, chunk, strength,
-                                 prediction_resistance, addin, addin_len))
+                                 prediction_resistance, addin, addin_len)) {
+            EVPerr(0, EVP_R_GENERATE_ERROR);
             goto err;
+        }
+        /*
+         * Prediction resistance is only relevant the first time around,
+         * subsequently, the DRBG has already been properly reseeded.
+         */
+        prediction_resistance = 0;
     }
     res = 1;
 err:
@@ -441,9 +465,9 @@ err:
     return res;
 }
 
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_reseed(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, int prediction_resistance,
-                        const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
-                        const unsigned char *addin, size_t addin_len)
+int EVP_RAND_reseed(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, int prediction_resistance,
+                    const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
+                    const unsigned char *addin, size_t addin_len)
 {
     int res = 1;
 
@@ -456,39 +480,41 @@ int EVP_RAND_CTX_reseed(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, int prediction_resistance,
     return res;
 }
 
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_nonce(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+int EVP_RAND_nonce(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
 {
     int res = 1;
+    unsigned int str = EVP_RAND_strength(ctx);
 
     if (!evp_rand_lock(ctx))
         return 0;
     if (ctx->meth->nonce == NULL
-            || !ctx->meth->nonce(ctx->data, out, 0, outlen, outlen))
-        res = ctx->meth->generate(ctx->data, out, outlen, 0, 0, NULL, 0);
+            || !ctx->meth->nonce(ctx->data, out, str, outlen, outlen))
+        res = ctx->meth->generate(ctx->data, out, outlen, str, 0, NULL, 0);
     evp_rand_unlock(ctx);
     return res;
 }
 
-unsigned int EVP_RAND_CTX_strength(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
+unsigned int EVP_RAND_strength(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
 {
     OSSL_PARAM params[2];
+    unsigned int t;
     int res;
 
     if (ctx->strength == 0) {
-        params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_STRENGTH,
-                                              &ctx->strength);
+        params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_STRENGTH, &t);
         params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
         if (!evp_rand_lock(ctx))
             return 0;
-        res = EVP_RAND_CTX_get_params(ctx, params);
+        res = EVP_RAND_get_ctx_params(ctx, params);
         evp_rand_unlock(ctx);
         if (!res)
             return 0;
+        ctx->strength = t;
     }
     return ctx->strength;
 }
 
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_state(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
+int EVP_RAND_state(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
 {
     OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
     int status, res;
@@ -497,14 +523,29 @@ int EVP_RAND_CTX_state(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
                                          &status);
     if (!evp_rand_lock(ctx))
         return 0;
-    res = EVP_RAND_CTX_get_params(ctx, params);
+    res = EVP_RAND_get_ctx_params(ctx, params);
     evp_rand_unlock(ctx);
     if (!res)
         status = EVP_RAND_STATE_ERROR;
     return status;
 }
 
-int EVP_RAND_CTX_verify_zeroization(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
+int EVP_RAND_set_callbacks(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx,
+                           OSSL_INOUT_CALLBACK *get_entropy,
+                           OSSL_CALLBACK *cleanup_entropy,
+                           OSSL_INOUT_CALLBACK *get_nonce,
+                           OSSL_CALLBACK *cleanup_nonce, void *arg)
+{
+    if (ctx->meth->set_callbacks == NULL) {
+        EVPerr(0, EVP_R_UNABLE_TO_SET_CALLBACKS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ctx->meth->set_callbacks(ctx->data, get_entropy, cleanup_entropy,
+                             get_nonce, cleanup_nonce, arg);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_RAND_verify_zeroization(EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
 {
     int res = 0;