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authorAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>2017-11-11 22:15:33 +0100
committerAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>2017-11-13 10:58:14 +0100
commitb4c0e4dff6c84a3cdf464587923eaa0f789168b8 (patch)
tree50c086907a976fb4cc65198e9d150c48bc816928 /crypto/evp/pbe_scrypt.c
parent372463103917fcc2b68bd2ba3db55b29ce325705 (diff)
evp/pbe_scrypt.c: add boundary condition for implicit cast.
Even though |Blen| is declared uint64_t it was casted implicitly to int. [Caught by VC warning subsytem.] Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4721)
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/evp/pbe_scrypt.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/pbe_scrypt.c16
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/evp/pbe_scrypt.c b/crypto/evp/pbe_scrypt.c
index b30e6d5719..fddabc9a32 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/pbe_scrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/pbe_scrypt.c
@@ -191,6 +191,14 @@ int EVP_PBE_scrypt(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
* p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX
*/
Blen = p * 128 * r;
+ /*
+ * Yet we pass it as integer to PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC... [This would
+ * have to be revised when/if PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC accepts size_t.]
+ */
+ if (Blen > INT_MAX) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_SCRYPT, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
+ return 0;
+ }
/*
* Check 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t) fits in uint64_t
@@ -221,25 +229,25 @@ int EVP_PBE_scrypt(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
if (key == NULL)
return 1;
- B = OPENSSL_malloc(Blen + Vlen);
+ B = OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
if (B == NULL)
return 0;
X = (uint32_t *)(B + Blen);
T = X + 32 * r;
V = T + 32 * r;
if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, 1, EVP_sha256(),
- Blen, B) == 0)
+ (int)Blen, B) == 0)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < p; i++)
scryptROMix(B + 128 * r * i, r, N, X, T, V);
- if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, B, Blen, 1, EVP_sha256(),
+ if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, B, (int)Blen, 1, EVP_sha256(),
keylen, key) == 0)
goto err;
rv = 1;
err:
- OPENSSL_clear_free(B, Blen + Vlen);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(B, (size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
return rv;
}
#endif