The EVP_MAC functions have been renamed for consistency. The EVP_MAC_CTX_*

functions are now EVP_MAC functions, usually with ctx in their names.

Before 3.0 is released, the names are mutable and this prevents more
inconsistencies being introduced.

There are no functional or code changes.
Just the renaming and a little reformatting.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11997)

1 files changed, 10 insertions, 10 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/evp/mac_lib.c b/crypto/evp/mac_lib.c
index b7bfe8921f..8fe9708797 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/mac_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/mac_lib.c
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
 #include "internal/provider.h"
 #include "evp_local.h"
 
-EVP_MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_CTX_new(EVP_MAC *mac)
+EVP_MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_new_ctx(EVP_MAC *mac)
 {
     EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_MAC_CTX));
 
     if (ctx == NULL
         || (ctx->data = mac->newctx(ossl_provider_ctx(mac->prov))) == NULL
         || !EVP_MAC_up_ref(mac)) {
-        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MAC_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        EVPerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         if (ctx != NULL)
             mac->freectx(ctx->data);
         OPENSSL_free(ctx);
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ EVP_MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_CTX_new(EVP_MAC *mac)
     return ctx;
 }
 
-void EVP_MAC_CTX_free(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx)
+void EVP_MAC_free_ctx(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx)
 {
     if (ctx != NULL) {
         ctx->meth->freectx(ctx->data);
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ void EVP_MAC_CTX_free(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx)
     OPENSSL_free(ctx);
 }
 
-EVP_MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(const EVP_MAC_CTX *src)
+EVP_MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(const EVP_MAC_CTX *src)
 {
     EVP_MAC_CTX *dst;
 
@@ -57,27 +57,27 @@ EVP_MAC_CTX *EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(const EVP_MAC_CTX *src)
 
     dst = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*dst));
     if (dst == NULL) {
-        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MAC_CTX_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        EVPerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return NULL;
     }
 
     *dst = *src;
     if (!EVP_MAC_up_ref(dst->meth)) {
-        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MAC_CTX_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        EVPerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         OPENSSL_free(dst);
         return NULL;
     }
 
     dst->data = src->meth->dupctx(src->data);
     if (dst->data == NULL) {
-        EVP_MAC_CTX_free(dst);
+        EVP_MAC_free_ctx(dst);
         return NULL;
     }
 
     return dst;
 }
 
-EVP_MAC *EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx)
+EVP_MAC *EVP_MAC_get_ctx_mac(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx)
 {
     return ctx->meth;
 }
@@ -144,14 +144,14 @@ int EVP_MAC_get_params(EVP_MAC *mac, OSSL_PARAM params[])
     return 1;
 }
 
-int EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+int EVP_MAC_get_ctx_params(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     if (ctx->meth->get_ctx_params != NULL)
         return ctx->meth->get_ctx_params(ctx->data, params);
     return 1;
 }
 
-int EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+int EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     if (ctx->meth->set_ctx_params != NULL)
         return ctx->meth->set_ctx_params(ctx->data, params);