summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/crypto/dsa
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>1999-08-22 17:57:38 +0000
committerDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>1999-08-22 17:57:38 +0000
commitc0711f7f0fc026ab87fe6607bb5136ab790e2334 (patch)
tree8db64939a0e30e6c1d6375b13de3e9190d00c13f /crypto/dsa
parent8484721adb154f47de28e64d581b40adca6c5e68 (diff)
Initial support for DSA_METHOD...
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/dsa')
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/Makefile.ssl6
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/dsa.h48
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c67
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c319
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c123
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c68
6 files changed, 431 insertions, 200 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/Makefile.ssl b/crypto/dsa/Makefile.ssl
index 6d80ce77be..aa771ba5d1 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/Makefile.ssl
+++ b/crypto/dsa/Makefile.ssl
@@ -22,8 +22,10 @@ TEST=dsatest.c
APPS=
LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a
-LIBSRC= dsa_gen.c dsa_key.c dsa_lib.c dsa_asn1.c dsa_vrf.c dsa_sign.c dsa_err.c
-LIBOBJ= dsa_gen.o dsa_key.o dsa_lib.o dsa_asn1.o dsa_vrf.o dsa_sign.o dsa_err.o
+LIBSRC= dsa_gen.c dsa_key.c dsa_lib.c dsa_asn1.c dsa_vrf.c dsa_sign.c \
+ dsa_err.c dsa_ossl.c
+LIBOBJ= dsa_gen.o dsa_key.o dsa_lib.o dsa_asn1.o dsa_vrf.o dsa_sign.o \
+ dsa_err.o dsa_ossl.o
SRC= $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa.h b/crypto/dsa/dsa.h
index 20b3f8d90a..6b5a24149e 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa.h
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa.h
@@ -74,13 +74,41 @@ extern "C" {
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#ifndef NO_DH
# include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#define DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P 0x01
-typedef struct dsa_st
+typedef struct dsa_st DSA;
+
+typedef struct DSA_SIG_st
+ {
+ BIGNUM *r;
+ BIGNUM *s;
+ } DSA_SIG;
+
+typedef struct dsa_method {
+ const char *name;
+ DSA_SIG * (*dsa_do_sign)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa);
+ int (*dsa_sign_setup)(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+ BIGNUM **rp);
+ int (*dsa_do_verify)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+ DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
+ int (*dsa_mod_exp)(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, BIGNUM *a1, BIGNUM *p1,
+ BIGNUM *a2, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont);
+ int (*bn_mod_exp)(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); /* Can be null */
+ int (*init)(DSA *dsa);
+ int (*finish)(DSA *dsa);
+ int flags;
+ char *app_data;
+} DSA_METHOD;
+
+struct dsa_st
{
/* This first variable is used to pick up errors where
* a DSA is passed instead of of a EVP_PKEY */
@@ -100,15 +128,10 @@ typedef struct dsa_st
int flags;
/* Normally used to cache montgomery values */
char *method_mont_p;
-
int references;
- } DSA;
-
-typedef struct DSA_SIG_st
- {
- BIGNUM *r;
- BIGNUM *s;
- } DSA_SIG;
+ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+ DSA_METHOD *meth;
+ };
#define DSAparams_dup(x) (DSA *)ASN1_dup((int (*)())i2d_DSAparams, \
(char *(*)())d2i_DSAparams,(char *)(x))
@@ -131,7 +154,10 @@ DSA_SIG * DSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst,int dlen,DSA *dsa);
int DSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst,int dgst_len,
DSA_SIG *sig,DSA *dsa);
+DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void);
+
DSA * DSA_new(void);
+DSA * DSA_new_method(DSA_METHOD *meth);
int DSA_size(DSA *);
/* next 4 return -1 on error */
int DSA_sign_setup( DSA *dsa,BN_CTX *ctx_in,BIGNUM **kinvp,BIGNUM **rp);
@@ -140,6 +166,10 @@ int DSA_sign(int type,const unsigned char *dgst,int dlen,
int DSA_verify(int type,const unsigned char *dgst,int dgst_len,
unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa);
void DSA_free (DSA *r);
+int DSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func)(),
+ int (*dup_func)(), void (*free_func)());
+int DSA_set_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx, char *arg);
+char *DSA_get_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx);
void ERR_load_DSA_strings(void );
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c
index ce8e204f7e..ff8b254b40 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c
@@ -66,11 +66,45 @@
const char *DSA_version="DSA" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+static DSA_METHOD *default_DSA_method;
+static int dsa_meth_num = 0;
+static STACK *dsa_meth = NULL;
+
+void DSA_set_default_method(DSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+ default_DSA_method = meth;
+}
+
+DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_default_method(void)
+{
+ if(!default_DSA_method) default_DSA_method = DSA_OpenSSL();
+ return default_DSA_method;
+}
+
DSA *DSA_new(void)
+{
+ return DSA_new_method(NULL);
+}
+
+DSA_METHOD *DSA_set_method(DSA *dsa, DSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+ DSA_METHOD *mtmp;
+ mtmp = dsa->meth;
+ if (mtmp->finish) mtmp->finish(dsa);
+ dsa->meth = meth;
+ if (meth->init) meth->init(dsa);
+ return mtmp;
+}
+
+
+DSA *DSA_new_method(DSA_METHOD *meth)
{
DSA *ret;
ret=(DSA *)Malloc(sizeof(DSA));
+ if(!default_DSA_method) default_DSA_method = DSA_OpenSSL();
+ if(meth) ret->meth = meth;
+ else ret->meth = default_DSA_method;
if (ret == NULL)
{
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -82,7 +116,6 @@ DSA *DSA_new(void)
ret->p=NULL;
ret->q=NULL;
ret->g=NULL;
- ret->flags=DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P;
ret->pub_key=NULL;
ret->priv_key=NULL;
@@ -92,6 +125,16 @@ DSA *DSA_new(void)
ret->method_mont_p=NULL;
ret->references=1;
+ /* ret->flags=DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P; */
+ ret->flags=ret->meth->flags;
+ if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret))
+ {
+ Free(ret);
+ ret=NULL;
+ }
+ else
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(dsa_meth,(char *)ret,&ret->ex_data);
+
return(ret);
}
@@ -114,6 +157,10 @@ void DSA_free(DSA *r)
}
#endif
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(dsa_meth, (char *)r, &r->ex_data);
+
+ if(r->meth->finish) r->meth->finish(r);
+
if (r->p != NULL) BN_clear_free(r->p);
if (r->q != NULL) BN_clear_free(r->q);
if (r->g != NULL) BN_clear_free(r->g);
@@ -145,6 +192,24 @@ int DSA_size(DSA *r)
return(ret);
}
+int DSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func)(),
+ int (*dup_func)(), void (*free_func)())
+ {
+ dsa_meth_num++;
+ return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(dsa_meth_num-1,
+ &dsa_meth,argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func));
+ }
+
+int DSA_set_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx, char *arg)
+ {
+ return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data,idx,arg));
+ }
+
+char *DSA_get_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx)
+ {
+ return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data,idx));
+ }
+
#ifndef NO_DH
DH *DSA_dup_DH(DSA *r)
{
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..06575bdc98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
+/* crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+/* Original version from Steven Schoch <schoch@sheba.arc.nasa.gov> */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa);
+int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp);
+static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
+ DSA *dsa);
+static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa);
+static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa);
+static int dsa_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, BIGNUM *a1, BIGNUM *p1,
+ BIGNUM *a2, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont);
+static int dsa_bn_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+
+static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = {
+"OpenSSL DSA method",
+dsa_do_sign,
+dsa_sign_setup,
+dsa_do_verify,
+dsa_mod_exp,
+dsa_bn_mod_exp,
+dsa_init,
+dsa_finish,
+0,
+NULL
+};
+
+DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void)
+{
+ return &openssl_dsa_meth;
+}
+
+static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
+ {
+ BIGNUM *kinv=NULL,*r=NULL,*s=NULL;
+ BIGNUM m;
+ BIGNUM xr;
+ BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
+ int i,reason=ERR_R_BN_LIB;
+ DSA_SIG *ret=NULL;
+
+ BN_init(&m);
+ BN_init(&xr);
+ s=BN_new();
+ if (s == NULL) goto err;
+
+ i=BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
+ if ((dlen > i) || (dlen > 50))
+ {
+ reason=DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ctx=BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if ((dsa->kinv == NULL) || (dsa->r == NULL))
+ {
+ if (!DSA_sign_setup(dsa,ctx,&kinv,&r)) goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ kinv=dsa->kinv;
+ dsa->kinv=NULL;
+ r=dsa->r;
+ dsa->r=NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(dgst,dlen,&m) == NULL) goto err;
+
+ /* Compute s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(&xr,dsa->priv_key,r,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;/* s = xr */
+ if (!BN_add(s, &xr, &m)) goto err; /* s = m + xr */
+ if (BN_cmp(s,dsa->q) > 0)
+ BN_sub(s,s,dsa->q);
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(s,s,kinv,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+
+ ret=DSA_SIG_new();
+ if (ret == NULL) goto err;
+ ret->r = r;
+ ret->s = s;
+
+err:
+ if (!ret)
+ {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN,reason);
+ BN_free(r);
+ BN_free(s);
+ }
+ if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ BN_clear_free(&m);
+ BN_clear_free(&xr);
+ if (kinv != NULL) /* dsa->kinv is NULL now if we used it */
+ BN_clear_free(kinv);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
+ {
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
+ BIGNUM k,*kinv=NULL,*r=NULL;
+ int ret=0;
+
+ if (ctx_in == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ ctx=ctx_in;
+
+ BN_init(&k);
+ if ((r=BN_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ kinv=NULL;
+
+ /* Get random k */
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ if (!BN_rand(&k, BN_num_bits(dsa->q), 1, 0)) goto err;
+ if (BN_cmp(&k,dsa->q) >= 0)
+ BN_sub(&k,&k,dsa->q);
+ if (!BN_is_zero(&k)) break;
+ }
+
+ if ((dsa->method_mont_p == NULL) && (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P))
+ {
+ if ((dsa->method_mont_p=(char *)BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set((BN_MONT_CTX *)dsa->method_mont_p,
+ dsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
+ if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r,dsa->g,&k,dsa->p,ctx,
+ (BN_MONT_CTX *)dsa->method_mont_p)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(r,r,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+
+ /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
+ if ((kinv=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,&k,dsa->q,ctx)) == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if (*kinvp != NULL) BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
+ *kinvp=kinv;
+ kinv=NULL;
+ if (*rp != NULL) BN_clear_free(*rp);
+ *rp=r;
+ ret=1;
+err:
+ if (!ret)
+ {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ if (kinv != NULL) BN_clear_free(kinv);
+ if (r != NULL) BN_clear_free(r);
+ }
+ if (ctx_in == NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ if (kinv != NULL) BN_clear_free(kinv);
+ BN_clear_free(&k);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
+ DSA *dsa)
+ {
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
+ BIGNUM u1,u2,t1;
+ BN_MONT_CTX *mont=NULL;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ BN_init(&u1);
+ BN_init(&u2);
+ BN_init(&t1);
+
+ /* Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q
+ * save W in u2 */
+ if ((BN_mod_inverse(&u2,sig->s,dsa->q,ctx)) == NULL) goto err;
+
+ /* save M in u1 */
+ if (BN_bin2bn(dgst,dgst_len,&u1) == NULL) goto err;
+
+ /* u1 = M * w mod q */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1,&u1,&u2,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+
+ /* u2 = r * w mod q */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(&u2,sig->r,&u2,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+
+ if ((dsa->method_mont_p == NULL) && (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P))
+ {
+ if ((dsa->method_mont_p=(char *)BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set((BN_MONT_CTX *)dsa->method_mont_p,
+ dsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+ }
+ mont=(BN_MONT_CTX *)dsa->method_mont_p;
+
+#if 0
+ {
+ BIGNUM t2;
+
+ BN_init(&t2);
+ /* v = ( g^u1 * y^u2 mod p ) mod q */
+ /* let t1 = g ^ u1 mod p */
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(&t1,dsa->g,&u1,dsa->p,ctx,mont)) goto err;
+ /* let t2 = y ^ u2 mod p */
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(&t2,dsa->pub_key,&u2,dsa->p,ctx,mont)) goto err;
+ /* let u1 = t1 * t2 mod p */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1,&t1,&t2,dsa->p,ctx)) goto err_bn;
+ BN_free(&t2);
+ }
+ /* let u1 = u1 mod q */
+ if (!BN_mod(&u1,&u1,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+#else
+ {
+ if (!dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp(dsa, &t1,dsa->g,&u1,dsa->pub_key,&u2,
+ dsa->p,ctx,mont)) goto err;
+ /* BN_copy(&u1,&t1); */
+ /* let u1 = u1 mod q */
+ if (!BN_mod(&u1,&t1,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* V is now in u1. If the signature is correct, it will be
+ * equal to R. */
+ ret=(BN_ucmp(&u1, sig->r) == 0);
+
+ err:
+ if (ret != 1) DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ BN_free(&u1);
+ BN_free(&u2);
+ BN_free(&t1);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa)
+{
+ dsa->flags=DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P;
+ return(1);
+}
+
+static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa)
+{
+ return(1);
+}
+
+static int dsa_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, BIGNUM *a1, BIGNUM *p1,
+ BIGNUM *a2, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
+{
+ return BN_mod_exp2_mont(rr, a1, p1, a2, p2, m, ctx, in_mont);
+}
+
+static int dsa_bn_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+ return BN_mod_exp_mont(r, a, p, m, ctx, m_ctx);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c
index 774c161964..89205026f0 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c
@@ -67,73 +67,9 @@
DSA_SIG * DSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
{
- BIGNUM *kinv=NULL,*r=NULL,*s=NULL;
- BIGNUM m;
- BIGNUM xr;
- BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- int i,reason=ERR_R_BN_LIB;
- DSA_SIG *ret=NULL;
-
- BN_init(&m);
- BN_init(&xr);
- s=BN_new();
- if (s == NULL) goto err;
-
- i=BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
- if ((dlen > i) || (dlen > 50))
- {
- reason=DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE;
- goto err;
- }
-
- ctx=BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
-
- if ((dsa->kinv == NULL) || (dsa->r == NULL))
- {
- if (!DSA_sign_setup(dsa,ctx,&kinv,&r)) goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- kinv=dsa->kinv;
- dsa->kinv=NULL;
- r=dsa->r;
- dsa->r=NULL;
- }
-
- if (BN_bin2bn(dgst,dlen,&m) == NULL) goto err;
-
- /* Compute s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */
- if (!BN_mod_mul(&xr,dsa->priv_key,r,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;/* s = xr */
- if (!BN_add(s, &xr, &m)) goto err; /* s = m + xr */
- if (BN_cmp(s,dsa->q) > 0)
- BN_sub(s,s,dsa->q);
- if (!BN_mod_mul(s,s,kinv,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
-
- ret=DSA_SIG_new();
- if (ret == NULL) goto err;
- ret->r = r;
- ret->s = s;
-
-err:
- if (!ret)
- {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN,reason);
- BN_free(r);
- BN_free(s);
- }
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(&m);
- BN_clear_free(&xr);
- if (kinv != NULL) /* dsa->kinv is NULL now if we used it */
- BN_clear_free(kinv);
- return(ret);
+ return dsa->meth->dsa_do_sign(dgst, dlen, dsa);
}
-/* data has already been hashed (probably with SHA or SHA-1). */
-
-/* unsigned char *sig: out */
-/* unsigned int *siglen: out */
int DSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig,
unsigned int *siglen, DSA *dsa)
{
@@ -151,61 +87,6 @@ int DSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig,
int DSA_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
{
- BN_CTX *ctx;
- BIGNUM k,*kinv=NULL,*r=NULL;
- int ret=0;
-
- if (ctx_in == NULL)
- {
- if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- }
- else
- ctx=ctx_in;
-
- BN_init(&k);
- if ((r=BN_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- kinv=NULL;
-
- /* Get random k */
- for (;;)
- {
- if (!BN_rand(&k, BN_num_bits(dsa->q), 1, 0)) goto err;
- if (BN_cmp(&k,dsa->q) >= 0)
- BN_sub(&k,&k,dsa->q);
- if (!BN_is_zero(&k)) break;
- }
-
- if ((dsa->method_mont_p == NULL) && (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P))
- {
- if ((dsa->method_mont_p=(char *)BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set((BN_MONT_CTX *)dsa->method_mont_p,
- dsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
- }
-
- /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
- if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r,dsa->g,&k,dsa->p,ctx,
- (BN_MONT_CTX *)dsa->method_mont_p)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(r,r,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
-
- /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
- if ((kinv=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,&k,dsa->q,ctx)) == NULL) goto err;
-
- if (*kinvp != NULL) BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
- *kinvp=kinv;
- kinv=NULL;
- if (*rp != NULL) BN_clear_free(*rp);
- *rp=r;
- ret=1;
-err:
- if (!ret)
- {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- if (kinv != NULL) BN_clear_free(kinv);
- if (r != NULL) BN_clear_free(r);
- }
- if (ctx_in == NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (kinv != NULL) BN_clear_free(kinv);
- BN_clear_free(&k);
- return(ret);
+ return dsa->meth->dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx_in, kinvp, rp);
}
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c
index ff552208aa..03277f80fd 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c
@@ -69,73 +69,7 @@
int DSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
DSA *dsa)
{
- BN_CTX *ctx;
- BIGNUM u1,u2,t1;
- BN_MONT_CTX *mont=NULL;
- int ret = -1;
-
- if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- BN_init(&u1);
- BN_init(&u2);
- BN_init(&t1);
-
- /* Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q
- * save W in u2 */
- if ((BN_mod_inverse(&u2,sig->s,dsa->q,ctx)) == NULL) goto err;
-
- /* save M in u1 */
- if (BN_bin2bn(dgst,dgst_len,&u1) == NULL) goto err;
-
- /* u1 = M * w mod q */
- if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1,&u1,&u2,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
-
- /* u2 = r * w mod q */
- if (!BN_mod_mul(&u2,sig->r,&u2,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
-
- if ((dsa->method_mont_p == NULL) && (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P))
- {
- if ((dsa->method_mont_p=(char *)BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set((BN_MONT_CTX *)dsa->method_mont_p,
- dsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
- }
- mont=(BN_MONT_CTX *)dsa->method_mont_p;
-
-#if 0
- {
- BIGNUM t2;
-
- BN_init(&t2);
- /* v = ( g^u1 * y^u2 mod p ) mod q */
- /* let t1 = g ^ u1 mod p */
- if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(&t1,dsa->g,&u1,dsa->p,ctx,mont)) goto err;
- /* let t2 = y ^ u2 mod p */
- if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(&t2,dsa->pub_key,&u2,dsa->p,ctx,mont)) goto err;
- /* let u1 = t1 * t2 mod p */
- if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1,&t1,&t2,dsa->p,ctx)) goto err_bn;
- BN_free(&t2);
- }
- /* let u1 = u1 mod q */
- if (!BN_mod(&u1,&u1,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
-#else
- {
- if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(&t1,dsa->g,&u1,dsa->pub_key,&u2,dsa->p,ctx,mont))
- goto err;
- /* BN_copy(&u1,&t1); */
- /* let u1 = u1 mod q */
- if (!BN_mod(&u1,&t1,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- }
-#endif
- /* V is now in u1. If the signature is correct, it will be
- * equal to R. */
- ret=(BN_ucmp(&u1, sig->r) == 0);
-
- err:
- if (ret != 1) DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_free(&u1);
- BN_free(&u2);
- BN_free(&t1);
- return(ret);
+ return dsa->meth->dsa_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, sig, dsa);
}
/* data has already been hashed (probably with SHA or SHA-1). */