Make BUF_strndup() read-safe on arbitrary inputs

BUF_strndup was calling strlen through BUF_strlcpy, and ended up reading
past the input if the input was not a C string.

Make it explicitly part of BUF_strndup's contract to never read more
than |siz| input bytes. This augments the standard strndup contract to
be safer.

The commit also adds a check for siz overflow and some brief documentation
for BUF_strndup().

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

1 files changed, 8 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c b/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c
index 1e8d7f6f10..bca363c28e 100644
--- a/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c
+++ b/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 
@@ -85,12 +86,18 @@ char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz)
 
     siz = BUF_strnlen(str, siz);
 
+    if (siz >= INT_MAX)
+        return (NULL);
+
     ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz + 1);
     if (ret == NULL) {
         BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_STRNDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return (NULL);
     }
-    BUF_strlcpy(ret, str, siz + 1);
+
+    memcpy(ret, str, siz);
+    ret[siz] = '\0';
+
     return (ret);
 }