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authorShane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>2018-07-05 09:28:51 +1000
committerMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>2019-03-12 12:00:52 +0000
commit8240d5fa6535fb20e24fbe7eadbb3d6452a8d305 (patch)
tree3e785e20a83324c8dab559a5e3da6d533bb82f33 /crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c
parentd1229190bfbb19439589557e4d65f9bccab09b2d (diff)
FIPS 186-4 RSA Generation & Validation
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6652)
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c346
1 files changed, 346 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c b/crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c
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+/*
+ * Copyright 2018-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2018-2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * According to NIST SP800-131A "Transitioning the use of cryptographic
+ * algorithms and key lengths" Generation of 1024 bit RSA keys are no longer
+ * allowed for signatures (Table 2) or key transport (Table 5). In the code
+ * below any attempt to generate 1024 bit RSA keys will result in an error (Note
+ * that digital signature verification can still use deprecated 1024 bit keys).
+ *
+ * Also see FIPS1402IG A.14
+ * FIPS 186-4 relies on the use of the auxiliary primes p1, p2, q1 and q2 that
+ * must be generated before the module generates the RSA primes p and q.
+ * Table B.1 in FIPS 186-4 specifies, for RSA modulus lengths of 2048 and
+ * 3072 bits only, the min/max total length of the auxiliary primes.
+ * When implementing the RSA signature generation algorithm
+ * with other approved RSA modulus sizes, the vendor shall use the limitations
+ * from Table B.1 that apply to the longest RSA modulus shown in Table B.1 of
+ * FIPS 186-4 whose length does not exceed that of the implementation's RSA
+ * modulus. In particular, when generating the primes for the 4096-bit RSA
+ * modulus the limitations stated for the 3072-bit modulus shall apply.
+ */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
+
+/*
+ * FIPS 186-4 Table B.1. "Min length of auxiliary primes p1, p2, q1, q2".
+ *
+ * Params:
+ * nbits The key size in bits.
+ * Returns:
+ * The minimum size of the auxiliary primes or 0 if nbits is invalid.
+ */
+static int bn_rsa_fips186_4_aux_prime_min_size(int nbits)
+{
+ if (nbits >= 3072)
+ return 171;
+ if (nbits == 2048)
+ return 141;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * FIPS 186-4 Table B.1 "Maximum length of len(p1) + len(p2) and
+ * len(q1) + len(q2) for p,q Probable Primes".
+ *
+ * Params:
+ * nbits The key size in bits.
+ * Returns:
+ * The maximum length or 0 if nbits is invalid.
+ */
+static int bn_rsa_fips186_4_aux_prime_max_sum_size_for_prob_primes(int nbits)
+{
+ if (nbits >= 3072)
+ return 1518;
+ if (nbits == 2048)
+ return 1007;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * FIPS 186-4 Table C.3 for error probability of 2^-100
+ * Minimum number of Miller Rabin Rounds for p1, p2, q1 & q2.
+ *
+ * Params:
+ * aux_prime_bits The auxiliary prime size in bits.
+ * Returns:
+ * The minimum number of Miller Rabin Rounds for an auxiliary prime, or
+ * 0 if aux_prime_bits is invalid.
+ */
+static int bn_rsa_fips186_4_aux_prime_MR_min_checks(int aux_prime_bits)
+{
+ if (aux_prime_bits > 170)
+ return 27;
+ if (aux_prime_bits > 140)
+ return 32;
+ return 0; /* Error case */
+}
+
+/*
+ * FIPS 186-4 Table C.3 for error probability of 2^-100
+ * Minimum number of Miller Rabin Rounds for p, q.
+ *
+ * Params:
+ * nbits The key size in bits.
+ * Returns:
+ * The minimum number of Miller Rabin Rounds required,
+ * or 0 if nbits is invalid.
+ */
+int bn_rsa_fips186_4_prime_MR_min_checks(int nbits)
+{
+ if (nbits >= 3072) /* > 170 */
+ return 3;
+ if (nbits == 2048) /* > 140 */
+ return 4;
+ return 0; /* Error case */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find the first odd integer that is a probable prime.
+ *
+ * See section FIPS 186-4 B.3.6 (Steps 4.2/5.2).
+ *
+ * Params:
+ * Xp1 The passed in starting point to find a probably prime.
+ * p1 The returned probable prime (first odd integer >= Xp1)
+ * ctx A BN_CTX object.
+ * cb An optional BIGNUM callback.
+ * Returns: 1 on success otherwise it returns 0.
+ */
+static int bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(const BIGNUM *Xp1,
+ BIGNUM *p1, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i = 0;
+ int checks = bn_rsa_fips186_4_aux_prime_MR_min_checks(BN_num_bits(Xp1));
+
+ if (checks == 0 || BN_copy(p1, Xp1) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Find the first odd number >= Xp1 that is probably prime */
+ for(;;) {
+ i++;
+ BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, i);
+ /* MR test with trial division */
+ if (BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p1, checks, ctx, 1, cb))
+ break;
+ /* Get next odd number */
+ if (!BN_add_word(p1, 2))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, i);
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate a probable prime (p or q).
+ *
+ * See FIPS 186-4 B.3.6 (Steps 4 & 5)
+ *
+ * Params:
+ * p The returned probable prime.
+ * Xpout An optionally returned random number used during generation of p.
+ * p1, p2 The returned auxiliary primes. If NULL they are not returned.
+ * Xp An optional passed in value (that is random number used during
+ * generation of p).
+ * Xp1, Xp2 Optional passed in values that are normally generated
+ * internally. Used to find p1, p2.
+ * nlen The bit length of the modulus (the key size).
+ * e The public exponent.
+ * ctx A BN_CTX object.
+ * cb An optional BIGNUM callback.
+ * Returns: 1 on success otherwise it returns 0.
+ */
+int bn_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *Xpout,
+ BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2,
+ const BIGNUM *Xp, const BIGNUM *Xp1,
+ const BIGNUM *Xp2, int nlen,
+ const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BIGNUM *p1i = NULL, *p2i = NULL, *Xp1i = NULL, *Xp2i = NULL;
+ int bitlen;
+
+ if (p == NULL || Xpout == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+ p1i = (p1 != NULL) ? p1 : BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ p2i = (p2 != NULL) ? p2 : BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ Xp1i = (Xp1 != NULL) ? (BIGNUM *)Xp1 : BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ Xp2i = (Xp2 != NULL) ? (BIGNUM *)Xp2 : BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (p1i == NULL || p2i == NULL || Xp1i == NULL || Xp2i == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ bitlen = bn_rsa_fips186_4_aux_prime_min_size(nlen);
+ if (bitlen == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* (Steps 4.1/5.1): Randomly generate Xp1 if it is not passed in */
+ if (Xp1 == NULL) {
+ /* Set the top and bottom bits to make it odd and the correct size */
+ if (!BN_priv_rand(Xp1i, bitlen, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* (Steps 4.1/5.1): Randomly generate Xp2 if it is not passed in */
+ if (Xp2 == NULL) {
+ /* Set the top and bottom bits to make it odd and the correct size */
+ if (!BN_priv_rand(Xp2i, bitlen, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* (Steps 4.2/5.2) - find first auxiliary probable primes */
+ if (!bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(Xp1i, p1i, ctx, cb)
+ || !bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(Xp2i, p2i, ctx, cb))
+ goto err;
+ /* (Table B.1) auxiliary prime Max length check */
+ if ((BN_num_bits(p1i) + BN_num_bits(p2i)) >=
+ bn_rsa_fips186_4_aux_prime_max_sum_size_for_prob_primes(nlen))
+ goto err;
+ /* (Steps 4.3/5.3) - generate prime */
+ if (!bn_rsa_fips186_4_derive_prime(p, Xpout, Xp, p1i, p2i, nlen, e, ctx, cb))
+ goto err;
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ /* Zeroize any internally generated values that are not returned */
+ if (p1 == NULL)
+ BN_clear(p1i);
+ if (p2 == NULL)
+ BN_clear(p2i);
+ if (Xp1 == NULL)
+ BN_clear(Xp1i);
+ if (Xp2 == NULL)
+ BN_clear(Xp2i);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Constructs a probable prime (a candidate for p or q) using 2 auxiliary
+ * prime numbers and the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
+ *
+ * See FIPS 186-4 C.9 "Compute a Probable Prime Factor Based on Auxiliary
+ * Primes". Used by FIPS 186-4 B.3.6 Section (4.3) for p and Section (5.3) for q.
+ *
+ * Params:
+ * Y The returned prime factor (private_prime_factor) of the modulus n.
+ * X The returned random number used during generation of the prime factor.
+ * Xin An optional passed in value for X used for testing purposes.
+ * r1 An auxiliary prime.
+ * r2 An auxiliary prime.
+ * nlen The desired length of n (the RSA modulus).
+ * e The public exponent.
+ * ctx A BN_CTX object.
+ * cb An optional BIGNUM callback object.
+ * Returns: 1 on success otherwise it returns 0.
+ * Assumptions:
+ * Y, X, r1, r2, e are not NULL.
+ */
+int bn_rsa_fips186_4_derive_prime(BIGNUM *Y, BIGNUM *X, const BIGNUM *Xin,
+ const BIGNUM *r1, const BIGNUM *r2, int nlen,
+ const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i, imax;
+ int bits = nlen >> 1;
+ int checks = bn_rsa_fips186_4_prime_MR_min_checks(nlen);
+ BIGNUM *tmp, *R, *r1r2x2, *y1, *r1x2;
+
+ if (checks == 0)
+ return 0;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+ R = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r1r2x2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ y1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r1x2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (r1x2 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (Xin != NULL && BN_copy(X, Xin) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!(BN_lshift1(r1x2, r1)
+ /* (Step 1) GCD(2r1, r2) = 1 */
+ && BN_gcd(tmp, r1x2, r2, ctx)
+ && BN_is_one(tmp)
+ /* (Step 2) R = ((r2^-1 mod 2r1) * r2) - ((2r1^-1 mod r2)*2r1) */
+ && BN_mod_inverse(R, r2, r1x2, ctx)
+ && BN_mul(R, R, r2, ctx) /* R = (r2^-1 mod 2r1) * r2 */
+ && BN_mod_inverse(tmp, r1x2, r2, ctx)
+ && BN_mul(tmp, tmp, r1x2, ctx) /* tmp = (2r1^-1 mod r2)*2r1 */
+ && BN_sub(R, R, tmp)
+ /* Calculate 2r1r2 */
+ && BN_mul(r1r2x2, r1x2, r2, ctx)))
+ goto err;
+ /* Make positive by adding the modulus */
+ if (BN_is_negative(R) && !BN_add(R, R, r1r2x2))
+ goto err;
+
+ imax = 5 * bits; /* max = 5/2 * nbits */
+ for (;;) {
+ if (Xin == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * (Step 3) Choose Random X such that
+ * sqrt(2) * 2^(nlen/2-1) < Random X < (2^(nlen/2)) - 1.
+ *
+ * For the lower bound:
+ * sqrt(2) * 2^(nlen/2 - 1) == sqrt(2)/2 * 2^(nlen/2)
+ * where sqrt(2)/2 = 0.70710678.. = 0.B504FC33F9DE...
+ * so largest number will have B5... as the top byte
+ * Setting the top 2 bits gives 0xC0.
+ */
+ if (!BN_priv_rand(X, bits, BN_RAND_TOP_TWO, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
+ goto end;
+ }
+ /* (Step 4) Y = X + ((R - X) mod 2r1r2) */
+ if (!BN_mod_sub(Y, R, X, r1r2x2, ctx) || !BN_add(Y, Y, X))
+ goto err;
+ /* (Step 5) */
+ i = 0;
+ for (;;) {
+ /* (Step 6) */
+ if (BN_num_bits(Y) > bits) {
+ if (Xin == NULL)
+ break; /* Randomly Generated X so Go back to Step 3 */
+ else
+ goto err; /* X is not random so it will always fail */
+ }
+ BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, 2);
+
+ /* (Step 7) If GCD(Y-1) == 1 & Y is probably prime then return Y */
+ if (BN_copy(y1, Y) == NULL
+ || !BN_sub_word(y1, 1)
+ || !BN_gcd(tmp, y1, e, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_is_one(tmp)
+ && BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(Y, checks, ctx, 1, cb))
+ goto end;
+ /* (Step 8-10) */
+ if (++i >= imax || !BN_add(Y, Y, r1r2x2))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+end:
+ ret = 1;
+ BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0);
+err:
+ BN_clear(y1);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}