diff options
author | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2000-12-08 19:09:35 +0000 |
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committer | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2000-12-08 19:09:35 +0000 |
commit | 9d6b1ce6441c7cc6aed344f02d9f676ab5e04217 (patch) | |
tree | 7329435a21d3289cb3caad6d3d6c065f484373e1 /crypto/asn1/x_req.c | |
parent | 66ebbb6a56bc1688fa37878e4feec985b0c260d7 (diff) |
Merge from the ASN1 branch of new ASN1 code
to main trunk.
Lets see if the makes it to openssl-cvs :-)
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/asn1/x_req.c')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asn1/x_req.c | 230 |
1 files changed, 42 insertions, 188 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_req.c b/crypto/asn1/x_req.c index 6dddd4f653..84a5ca65df 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/x_req.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/x_req.c @@ -58,200 +58,54 @@ #include <stdio.h> #include "cryptlib.h" -#include <openssl/asn1_mac.h> +#include <openssl/asn1t.h> #include <openssl/x509.h> -int i2d_X509_REQ_INFO(X509_REQ_INFO *a, unsigned char **pp) - { - M_ASN1_I2D_vars(a); - - if(a->asn1) { - if(pp) { - memcpy(*pp, a->asn1, a->length); - *pp += a->length; - } - return a->length; - } - - M_ASN1_I2D_len(a->version, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER); - M_ASN1_I2D_len(a->subject, i2d_X509_NAME); - M_ASN1_I2D_len(a->pubkey, i2d_X509_PUBKEY); - - /* this is a *nasty* hack reported to be required to - * allow some CA Software to accept the cert request. - * It is not following the PKCS standards ... - * PKCS#10 pg 5 - * attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes - * NOTE: no OPTIONAL ... so it *must* be there - */ - if (a->req_kludge) - { - M_ASN1_I2D_len_IMP_SET_opt_type(X509_ATTRIBUTE,a->attributes,i2d_X509_ATTRIBUTE,0); - } - else - { - M_ASN1_I2D_len_IMP_SET_type(X509_ATTRIBUTE,a->attributes, - i2d_X509_ATTRIBUTE,0); - } - - M_ASN1_I2D_seq_total(); - M_ASN1_I2D_put(a->version, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER); - M_ASN1_I2D_put(a->subject, i2d_X509_NAME); - M_ASN1_I2D_put(a->pubkey, i2d_X509_PUBKEY); +/* X509_REQ_INFO is handled in an unusual way to get round + * invalid encodings. Some broken certificate requests don't + * encode the attributes field if it is empty. This is in + * violation of PKCS#10 but we need to tolerate it. We do + * this by making the attributes field OPTIONAL then using + * the callback to initialise it to an empty STACK. + * + * This means that the field will be correctly encoded unless + * we NULL out the field. + * + * As a result we no longer need the req_kludge field because + * the information is now contained in the attributes field: + * 1. If it is NULL then it's the invalid omission. + * 2. If it is empty it is the correct encoding. + * 3. If it is not empty then some attributes are present. + * + */ - /* this is a *nasty* hack reported to be required by some CA's. - * It is not following the PKCS standards ... - * PKCS#10 pg 5 - * attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes - * NOTE: no OPTIONAL ... so it *must* be there - */ - if (a->req_kludge) - { - M_ASN1_I2D_put_IMP_SET_opt_type(X509_ATTRIBUTE,a->attributes, - i2d_X509_ATTRIBUTE,0); - } - else - { - M_ASN1_I2D_put_IMP_SET_type(X509_ATTRIBUTE,a->attributes, - i2d_X509_ATTRIBUTE,0); - } +static int rinf_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) +{ + X509_REQ_INFO *rinf = (X509_REQ_INFO *)*pval; - M_ASN1_I2D_finish(); + if(operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_POST) { + rinf->attributes = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_new_null(); + if(!rinf->attributes) return 0; } - -X509_REQ_INFO *d2i_X509_REQ_INFO(X509_REQ_INFO **a, unsigned char **pp, - long length) - { - M_ASN1_D2I_vars(a,X509_REQ_INFO *,X509_REQ_INFO_new); - - M_ASN1_D2I_Init(); - M_ASN1_D2I_start_sequence(); - M_ASN1_D2I_get(ret->version,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER); - M_ASN1_D2I_get(ret->subject,d2i_X509_NAME); - M_ASN1_D2I_get(ret->pubkey,d2i_X509_PUBKEY); - - /* this is a *nasty* hack to allow for some CA's that - * have been reported as requiring it. - * It is not following the PKCS standards ... - * PKCS#10 pg 5 - * attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes - * NOTE: no OPTIONAL ... so it *must* be there + return 1; +} + +ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_REQ_INFO, enc, rinf_cb) = { + ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER), + ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ_INFO, subject, X509_NAME), + ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ_INFO, pubkey, X509_PUBKEY), + /* This isn't really OPTIONAL but it gets round invalid + * encodings */ - if (asn1_Finish(&c)) - ret->req_kludge=1; - else - { - M_ASN1_D2I_get_IMP_set_type(X509_ATTRIBUTE,ret->attributes, - d2i_X509_ATTRIBUTE, - X509_ATTRIBUTE_free,0); - } - - M_ASN1_D2I_Finish(a,X509_REQ_INFO_free,ASN1_F_D2I_X509_REQ_INFO); - } - -X509_REQ_INFO *X509_REQ_INFO_new(void) - { - X509_REQ_INFO *ret=NULL; - ASN1_CTX c; - - M_ASN1_New_Malloc(ret,X509_REQ_INFO); - M_ASN1_New(ret->version,M_ASN1_INTEGER_new); - M_ASN1_New(ret->subject,X509_NAME_new); - M_ASN1_New(ret->pubkey,X509_PUBKEY_new); - M_ASN1_New(ret->attributes,sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_new_null); - ret->req_kludge=0; - ret->asn1 = NULL; - return(ret); - M_ASN1_New_Error(ASN1_F_X509_REQ_INFO_NEW); - } - -void X509_REQ_INFO_free(X509_REQ_INFO *a) - { - if (a == NULL) return; - if(a->asn1) OPENSSL_free(a->asn1); - M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(a->version); - X509_NAME_free(a->subject); - X509_PUBKEY_free(a->pubkey); - sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_pop_free(a->attributes,X509_ATTRIBUTE_free); - OPENSSL_free(a); - } + ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(X509_REQ_INFO, attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 0) +} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_REQ_INFO, X509_REQ_INFO); -int i2d_X509_REQ(X509_REQ *a, unsigned char **pp) - { - M_ASN1_I2D_vars(a); - M_ASN1_I2D_len(a->req_info, i2d_X509_REQ_INFO); - M_ASN1_I2D_len(a->sig_alg, i2d_X509_ALGOR); - M_ASN1_I2D_len(a->signature, i2d_ASN1_BIT_STRING); - - M_ASN1_I2D_seq_total(); - - M_ASN1_I2D_put(a->req_info, i2d_X509_REQ_INFO); - M_ASN1_I2D_put(a->sig_alg, i2d_X509_ALGOR); - M_ASN1_I2D_put(a->signature, i2d_ASN1_BIT_STRING); - - M_ASN1_I2D_finish(); - } - -X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ(X509_REQ **a, unsigned char **pp, long length) - { - M_ASN1_D2I_vars(a,X509_REQ *,X509_REQ_new); - - M_ASN1_D2I_Init(); - M_ASN1_D2I_start_sequence(); - M_ASN1_D2I_get(ret->req_info,d2i_X509_REQ_INFO); - - /* Keep a copy of the original encoding for signature checking */ - ret->req_info->length = c.p - c.q; - if(!(ret->req_info->asn1 = OPENSSL_malloc(ret->req_info->length))) { - c.line=__LINE__; - c.error = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; - goto err; - } - - memcpy(ret->req_info->asn1, c.q, ret->req_info->length); - - M_ASN1_D2I_get(ret->sig_alg,d2i_X509_ALGOR); - M_ASN1_D2I_get(ret->signature,d2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING); - M_ASN1_D2I_Finish(a,X509_REQ_free,ASN1_F_D2I_X509_REQ); - } - -X509_REQ *X509_REQ_new(void) - { - X509_REQ *ret=NULL; - ASN1_CTX c; - - M_ASN1_New_Malloc(ret,X509_REQ); - ret->references=1; - M_ASN1_New(ret->req_info,X509_REQ_INFO_new); - M_ASN1_New(ret->sig_alg,X509_ALGOR_new); - M_ASN1_New(ret->signature,M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_new); - return(ret); - M_ASN1_New_Error(ASN1_F_X509_REQ_NEW); - } - -void X509_REQ_free(X509_REQ *a) - { - int i; - - if (a == NULL) return; - - i=CRYPTO_add(&a->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_REQ); -#ifdef REF_PRINT - REF_PRINT("X509_REQ",a); -#endif - if (i > 0) return; -#ifdef REF_CHECK - if (i < 0) - { - fprintf(stderr,"X509_REQ_free, bad reference count\n"); - abort(); - } -#endif - - X509_REQ_INFO_free(a->req_info); - X509_ALGOR_free(a->sig_alg); - M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(a->signature); - OPENSSL_free(a); - } +IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REQ_INFO) +ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509_REQ, 0, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_INFO) = { + ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ, req_info, X509_REQ_INFO), + ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR), + ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING) +} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509_REQ, X509_REQ); +IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REQ) |