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authorDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>2016-07-03 21:41:57 +0100
committerDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>2016-07-11 23:30:04 +0100
commit5bd5dcd49605ca2aa7931599894302a3ac4b0b04 (patch)
tree6a0b8a29f6688a2e97b098ee29f690f7b10ed041 /crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
parent1d03b7b893223b1b049cb992e5c57c9a10f5846c (diff)
Add nameConstraints commonName checking.
New hostname checking function asn1_valid_host() Check commonName entries against nameConstraints: any CN components in EE certificate which look like hostnames are checked against nameConstraints. Note that RFC5280 et al only require checking subject alt name against DNS name constraints. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/asn1/a_strex.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/a_strex.c51
1 files changed, 51 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c b/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
index d419e9d2ce..eb55c6b5d7 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
@@ -592,3 +593,53 @@ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in)
*out = stmp.data;
return stmp.length;
}
+
+/* Return 1 if host is a valid hostname and 0 otherwise */
+int asn1_valid_host(const ASN1_STRING *host)
+{
+ int hostlen = host->length;
+ const unsigned char *hostptr = host->data;
+ int type = host->type;
+ int i;
+ char width = -1;
+ unsigned short chflags = 0, prevchflags;
+
+ if (type > 0 && type < 31)
+ width = tag2nbyte[type];
+ if (width == -1 || hostlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* Treat UTF8String as width 1 as any MSB set is invalid */
+ if (width == 0)
+ width = 1;
+ for (i = 0 ; i < hostlen; i+= width) {
+ prevchflags = chflags;
+ /* Value must be <= 0x7F: check upper bytes are all zeroes */
+ if (width == 4) {
+ if (*hostptr++ != 0 || *hostptr++ != 0 || *hostptr++ != 0)
+ return 0;
+ } else if (width == 2) {
+ if (*hostptr++ != 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (*hostptr > 0x7f)
+ return 0;
+ chflags = char_type[*hostptr++];
+ if (!(chflags & (CHARTYPE_HOST_ANY | CHARTYPE_HOST_WILD))) {
+ /* Nothing else allowed at start or end of string */
+ if (i == 0 || i == hostlen - 1)
+ return 0;
+ /* Otherwise invalid if not dot or hyphen */
+ if (!(chflags & (CHARTYPE_HOST_DOT | CHARTYPE_HOST_HYPHEN)))
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * If previous is dot or hyphen then illegal unless both
+ * are hyphens: as .- -. .. are all illegal
+ */
+ if (prevchflags & (CHARTYPE_HOST_DOT | CHARTYPE_HOST_HYPHEN)
+ && ((prevchflags & CHARTYPE_HOST_DOT)
+ || (chflags & CHARTYPE_HOST_DOT)))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}