diff options
| author | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2018-05-17 12:53:07 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2018-05-24 17:26:03 +0100 |
| commit | a0abb6a10f4c5fc6dd20c487aa0db085fbfb3562 (patch) | |
| tree | 711cca97bea1c2b1a25d66496c246e1592332282 /apps/pkeyutl.c | |
| parent | 07824f304a220ea09ec369bad60f4fcfd01d5d14 (diff) | |
Add a sanity check on the length of pkeyutl inputs
When signing or verifying a file using pkeyutl the input is supposed to
be a hash. Some algorithms sanity check the length of the input, while
others don't and silently truncate. To avoid accidents we check that the
length of the input looks sane.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6284)
Diffstat (limited to 'apps/pkeyutl.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | apps/pkeyutl.c | 12 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/apps/pkeyutl.c b/apps/pkeyutl.c index 911cc57642..2c4e524b69 100644 --- a/apps/pkeyutl.c +++ b/apps/pkeyutl.c @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv) buf_inlen = bio_to_mem(&buf_in, keysize * 10, in); if (buf_inlen < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading input Data\n"); - exit(1); + goto end; } if (rev) { size_t i; @@ -296,6 +296,16 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv) } } + /* Sanity check the input */ + if (buf_inlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + && (pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN + || pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY + || pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER)) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, + "Error: The input data looks too long to be a hash\n"); + goto end; + } + if (pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) { rv = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, sig, (size_t)siglen, buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen); |