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authorMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>2019-01-27 11:00:16 +0000
committerMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>2019-02-14 16:17:34 +0000
commit4af5836b55442f31795eff6c8c81ea7a1b8cf94b (patch)
tree9c0e2318753afbc715e71ad91dbf557205a2e4a5 /CHANGES
parent3c83c5ba4f6502c708b7a5f55c98a10e312668da (diff)
Don't signal SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START for TLSv1.3 post-handshake messages
The original 1.1.1 design was to use SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal start/end of a post-handshake message exchange in TLSv1.3. Unfortunately experience has shown that this confuses some applications who mistake it for a TLSv1.2 renegotiation. This means that KeyUpdate messages are not handled properly. This commit removes the use of SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal the start/end of a post-handshake message exchange. Individual post-handshake messages are still signalled in the normal way. This is a potentially breaking change if there are any applications already written that expect to see these TLSv1.3 events. However, without it, KeyUpdate is not currently usable for many applications. Fixes #8069 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8096)
Diffstat (limited to 'CHANGES')
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1 files changed, 13 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index d9a2e1be03..2fbe89f382 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -119,6 +119,19 @@
applications with zero-copy system calls such as sendfile and splice.
[Boris Pismenny]
+ Changes between 1.1.1a and 1.1.1b [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *) Change the info callback signals for the start and end of a post-handshake
+ message exchange in TLSv1.3. In 1.1.1/1.1.1a we used SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
+ and SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE. Experience has shown that many applications get
+ confused by this and assume that a TLSv1.2 renegotiation has started. This
+ can break KeyUpdate handling. Instead we no longer signal the start and end
+ of a post handshake message exchange (although the messages themselves are
+ still signalled). This could break some applications that were expecting
+ the old signals. However without this KeyUpdate is not usable for many
+ applications.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
Changes between 1.1.1 and 1.1.1a [20 Nov 2018]
*) Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation