diff options
| author | Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org> | 2014-11-19 17:01:36 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org> | 2014-11-20 14:57:15 +0100 |
| commit | e94a6c0ede623960728415b68650a595e48f5a43 (patch) | |
| tree | 9ac092e0c94be7bbaeab1a766d4015dbe65896ca /CHANGES | |
| parent | de2c7504ebd4ec15334ae151a31917753468f86f (diff) | |
Ensure SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK (or d1->change_cipher_spec_ok for DTLS) is reset
once the ChangeCipherSpec message is received. Previously, the server would
set the flag once at SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY and again at SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED.
This would allow a second CCS to arrive and would corrupt the server state.
(Because the first CCS would latch the correct keys and subsequent CCS
messages would have to be encrypted, a MitM attacker cannot exploit this,
though.)
Thanks to Joeri de Ruiter for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'CHANGES')
| -rw-r--r-- | CHANGES | 10 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 0 deletions
@@ -305,6 +305,11 @@ Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx] + *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject + early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because + renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.) + [Emilia Käsper] + *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation: ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would @@ -638,6 +643,11 @@ Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [xx XXX xxxx] + *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject + early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because + renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.) + [Emilia Käsper] + *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation: ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would |