diff options
author | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2019-09-10 10:26:07 +0100 |
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committer | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2019-09-10 10:51:54 +0100 |
commit | 7ff84d88036237dc36f4c2cf2dc814e4bf611084 (patch) | |
tree | e3020ecbcc9e1680fa9a3804383ff1d10818a179 /CHANGES | |
parent | 79f5e2f4b9d9886d1b0da09c2eb3e397bcf82876 (diff) |
Update CHANGES and NEWS for the new release
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9841)
Diffstat (limited to 'CHANGES')
-rw-r--r-- | CHANGES | 28 |
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 0 deletions
@@ -9,6 +9,33 @@ Changes between 1.1.1c and 1.1.1d [xx XXX xxxx] + *) Fixed a fork protection issue. OpenSSL 1.1.1 introduced a rewritten random + number generator (RNG). This was intended to include protection in the + event of a fork() system call in order to ensure that the parent and child + processes did not share the same RNG state. However this protection was not + being used in the default case. + + A partial mitigation for this issue is that the output from a high + precision timer is mixed into the RNG state so the likelihood of a parent + and child process sharing state is significantly reduced. + + If an application already calls OPENSSL_init_crypto() explicitly using + OPENSSL_INIT_ATFORK then this problem does not occur at all. + (CVE-2019-1549) + [Matthias St. Pierre] + + *) Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_decrypt() and CMS_decrypt(). In situations + where an attacker receives automated notification of the success or failure + of a decryption attempt an attacker, after sending a very large number of + messages to be decrypted, can recover a CMS/PKCS7 transported encryption + key or decrypt any RSA encrypted message that was encrypted with the public + RSA key, using a Bleichenbacher padding oracle attack. Applications are not + affected if they use a certificate together with the private RSA key to the + CMS_decrypt or PKCS7_decrypt functions to select the correct recipient info + to decrypt. + (CVE-2019-1563) + [Bernd Edlinger] + *) For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is used even when parsing explicit parameters, when loading a serialized key or calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`/ @@ -70,6 +97,7 @@ was decided to revert this feature and leave it up to the OS resp. the platform maintainer to ensure a proper initialization during early boot time. + [Matthias St. Pierre] Changes between 1.1.1b and 1.1.1c [28 May 2019] |