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authorMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>2022-03-14 16:34:55 +0000
committerMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>2022-03-15 13:41:24 +0000
commitf22896a2ee674a59facbd51a9a2744703a5a7308 (patch)
treeef5bac0427f25429c83cc741b5092ebadc42767d /CHANGES
parent3ef5c3034e5c545f34d6929568f3f2b10ac4bdf0 (diff)
Update CHANGES/NEWS for new release
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'CHANGES')
-rw-r--r--CHANGES29
1 files changed, 29 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index ca60f359c9..a455201f52 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -9,6 +9,35 @@
Changes between 1.1.1m and 1.1.1n [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) Fixed a bug in the BN_mod_sqrt() function that can cause it to loop forever
+ for non-prime moduli.
+
+ Internally this function is used when parsing certificates that contain
+ elliptic curve public keys in compressed form or explicit elliptic curve
+ parameters with a base point encoded in compressed form.
+
+ It is possible to trigger the infinite loop by crafting a certificate that
+ has invalid explicit curve parameters.
+
+ Since certificate parsing happens prior to verification of the certificate
+ signature, any process that parses an externally supplied certificate may
+ thus be subject to a denial of service attack. The infinite loop can also
+ be reached when parsing crafted private keys as they can contain explicit
+ elliptic curve parameters.
+
+ Thus vulnerable situations include:
+
+ - TLS clients consuming server certificates
+ - TLS servers consuming client certificates
+ - Hosting providers taking certificates or private keys from customers
+ - Certificate authorities parsing certification requests from subscribers
+ - Anything else which parses ASN.1 elliptic curve parameters
+
+ Also any other applications that use the BN_mod_sqrt() where the attacker
+ can control the parameter values are vulnerable to this DoS issue.
+ (CVE-2022-0778)
+ [Tomáš Mráz]
+
*) Add ciphersuites based on DHE_PSK (RFC 4279) and ECDHE_PSK (RFC 5489)
to the list of ciphersuites providing Perfect Forward Secrecy as
required by SECLEVEL >= 3.