diff options
author | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2023-07-13 16:14:49 +0100 |
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committer | Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> | 2023-07-19 11:24:06 +0200 |
commit | 97b4f2b515ffd3ce91c6d5cd6d04614a4a15d7df (patch) | |
tree | ec49d15adb8b19a4f213f7dbd146c52d25fecb43 /CHANGES | |
parent | e9ddae17e302a7e6a0daf00f25efed7c70f114d4 (diff) |
Update CHANGES/NEWS for CVE-2023-3446
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21452)
Diffstat (limited to 'CHANGES')
-rw-r--r-- | CHANGES | 17 |
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 1 deletions
@@ -9,7 +9,22 @@ Changes between 1.1.1u and 1.1.1v [xx XXX xxxx] - *) + *) Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus + + The function DH_check() performs various checks on DH parameters. One of + those checks confirms that the modulus ("p" parameter) is not too large. + Trying to use a very large modulus is slow and OpenSSL will not normally use + a modulus which is over 10,000 bits in length. + + However the DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or + parameters that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied + modulus value even if it has already been found to be too large. + + A new limit has been added to DH_check of 32,768 bits. Supplying a + key/parameters with a modulus over this size will simply cause DH_check() + to fail. + (CVE-2023-3446) + [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.1.1t and 1.1.1u [30 May 2023] |