diff options
author | Mark J. Cox <mark@openssl.org> | 2005-10-19 10:51:36 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Mark J. Cox <mark@openssl.org> | 2005-10-19 10:51:36 +0000 |
commit | 802c0146560b9efbeeaa68d5a0127d508d9df343 (patch) | |
tree | 5a179278655ae983d01fa3170228afa1275c75ad /CHANGES | |
parent | 860841794dbf07dde6de19efc9b516c1b7710c22 (diff) |
One time CAN->CVE change
Diffstat (limited to 'CHANGES')
-rw-r--r-- | CHANGES | 30 |
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 15 deletions
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad - idea. (CAN-2005-2969) + idea. (CVE-2005-2969) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial @@ -1040,11 +1040,11 @@ Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004] *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed - by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CAN-2004-0079) + by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] *) Fix flaw in SSL/TLS handshaking when using Kerberos ciphersuites - (CAN-2004-0112) + (CVE-2004-0112) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same @@ -1087,9 +1087,9 @@ *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite: Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with - invalid tags (CAN-2003-0543 and CAN-2003-0544). + invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544). - Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CAN-2003-0545). + Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CVE-2003-0545). If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check certificate signature with the NULL public key. @@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@ via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish - between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CAN-2003-0078) + between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL), Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and @@ -1391,7 +1391,7 @@ Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions. - (CAN-2002-0657) + (CVE-2002-0657) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Change the SSL kerb5 codes to match RFC 2712. @@ -3075,7 +3075,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k Changes between 0.9.6l and 0.9.6m [17 Mar 2004] *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed - by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CAN-2004-0079) + by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6k and 0.9.6l [04 Nov 2003] @@ -3083,7 +3083,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k *) Fix additional bug revealed by the NISCC test suite: Stop bug triggering large recursion when presented with - certain ASN.1 tags (CAN-2003-0851) + certain ASN.1 tags (CVE-2003-0851) [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003] @@ -3091,7 +3091,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite: Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with - invalid tags (CAN-2003-0543 and CAN-2003-0544). + invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544). If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check certificate signature with the NULL public key. @@ -3143,7 +3143,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish - between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CAN-2003-0078) + between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL), Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and @@ -3276,7 +3276,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the - supplied buffer. (CAN-2002-0659) + supplied buffer. (CVE-2002-0659) [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>] *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to @@ -3284,15 +3284,15 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were - too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655) + too small for 64 bit platforms. (CVE-2002-0655) [Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)> *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could - supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656) + supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CVE-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could - supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656) + supply an oversized client master key. (CVE-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002] |