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authorRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>2023-05-12 10:00:13 +0200
committerTomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>2023-05-29 15:37:30 +0200
commit9e209944b35cf82368071f160a744b6178f9b098 (patch)
treebbb7631fb1ce91194476fa05d0bb66e431466d78
parent3cc6933555a0c66328ec659b5bb86c57b6402e1e (diff)
Restrict the size of OBJECT IDENTIFIERs that OBJ_obj2txt will translate
OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that sub-identifier. To mitigate this, a restriction on the size that OBJ_obj2txt() will translate to canonical numeric text form is added, based on RFC 2578 (STD 58), which says this: > 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values > > An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative numbers. > For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a sub-identifier, > there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value, and each sub-identifier > has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal). Fixes otc/security#96 Fixes CVE-2023-2650 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-rw-r--r--CHANGES26
-rw-r--r--NEWS2
-rw-r--r--crypto/objects/obj_dat.c19
3 files changed, 47 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 430e32e624..945a68b1b8 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -9,6 +9,32 @@
Changes between 1.1.1t and 1.1.1u [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) Mitigate for the time it takes for `OBJ_obj2txt` to translate gigantic
+ OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identifiers to canonical numeric text form.
+
+ OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical
+ numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very
+ long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that
+ sub-identifier. (CVE-2023-2650)
+
+ To mitigitate this, `OBJ_obj2txt()` will only translate an OBJECT
+ IDENTIFIER to canonical numeric text form if the size of that OBJECT
+ IDENTIFIER is 586 bytes or less, and fail otherwise.
+
+ The basis for this restriction is RFC 2578 (STD 58), section 3.5. OBJECT
+ IDENTIFIER values, which stipulates that OBJECT IDENTIFIERS may have at
+ most 128 sub-identifiers, and that the maximum value that each sub-
+ identifier may have is 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal).
+
+ For each byte of every sub-identifier, only the 7 lower bits are part of
+ the value, so the maximum amount of bytes that an OBJECT IDENTIFIER with
+ these restrictions may occupy is 32 * 128 / 7, which is approximately 586
+ bytes.
+
+ Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5
+
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
*) Reworked the Fix for the Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption (CVE-2022-4304).
The previous fix for this timing side channel turned out to cause
a severe 2-3x performance regression in the typical use case
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 62615693fa..d17b45ecc0 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1t and OpenSSL 1.1.1u [under development]
+ o Mitigate for very slow `OBJ_obj2txt()` performance with gigantic
+ OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identities. (CVE-2023-2650)
o Fixed documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() (CVE-2023-0466)
o Fixed handling of invalid certificate policies in leaf certificates
(CVE-2023-0465)
diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
index 7e8de727f3..d699915b20 100644
--- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
+++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
@@ -428,6 +428,25 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
first = 1;
bl = NULL;
+ /*
+ * RFC 2578 (STD 58) says this about OBJECT IDENTIFIERs:
+ *
+ * > 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values
+ * >
+ * > An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative
+ * > numbers. For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a
+ * > sub-identifier, there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value,
+ * > and each sub-identifier has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295
+ * > decimal).
+ *
+ * So a legitimate OID according to this RFC is at most (32 * 128 / 7),
+ * i.e. 586 bytes long.
+ *
+ * Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5
+ */
+ if (len > 586)
+ goto err;
+
while (len > 0) {
l = 0;
use_bn = 0;