diff options
author | Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 2023-05-12 10:00:13 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> | 2023-05-29 15:37:30 +0200 |
commit | 9e209944b35cf82368071f160a744b6178f9b098 (patch) | |
tree | bbb7631fb1ce91194476fa05d0bb66e431466d78 | |
parent | 3cc6933555a0c66328ec659b5bb86c57b6402e1e (diff) |
Restrict the size of OBJECT IDENTIFIERs that OBJ_obj2txt will translate
OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical
numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very
long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that
sub-identifier.
To mitigate this, a restriction on the size that OBJ_obj2txt() will
translate to canonical numeric text form is added, based on RFC 2578
(STD 58), which says this:
> 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values
>
> An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative numbers.
> For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a sub-identifier,
> there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value, and each sub-identifier
> has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal).
Fixes otc/security#96
Fixes CVE-2023-2650
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-rw-r--r-- | CHANGES | 26 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | NEWS | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/objects/obj_dat.c | 19 |
3 files changed, 47 insertions, 0 deletions
@@ -9,6 +9,32 @@ Changes between 1.1.1t and 1.1.1u [xx XXX xxxx] + *) Mitigate for the time it takes for `OBJ_obj2txt` to translate gigantic + OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identifiers to canonical numeric text form. + + OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical + numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very + long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that + sub-identifier. (CVE-2023-2650) + + To mitigitate this, `OBJ_obj2txt()` will only translate an OBJECT + IDENTIFIER to canonical numeric text form if the size of that OBJECT + IDENTIFIER is 586 bytes or less, and fail otherwise. + + The basis for this restriction is RFC 2578 (STD 58), section 3.5. OBJECT + IDENTIFIER values, which stipulates that OBJECT IDENTIFIERS may have at + most 128 sub-identifiers, and that the maximum value that each sub- + identifier may have is 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal). + + For each byte of every sub-identifier, only the 7 lower bits are part of + the value, so the maximum amount of bytes that an OBJECT IDENTIFIER with + these restrictions may occupy is 32 * 128 / 7, which is approximately 586 + bytes. + + Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5 + + [Richard Levitte] + *) Reworked the Fix for the Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption (CVE-2022-4304). The previous fix for this timing side channel turned out to cause a severe 2-3x performance regression in the typical use case @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1t and OpenSSL 1.1.1u [under development] + o Mitigate for very slow `OBJ_obj2txt()` performance with gigantic + OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identities. (CVE-2023-2650) o Fixed documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() (CVE-2023-0466) o Fixed handling of invalid certificate policies in leaf certificates (CVE-2023-0465) diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c index 7e8de727f3..d699915b20 100644 --- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c +++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c @@ -428,6 +428,25 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name) first = 1; bl = NULL; + /* + * RFC 2578 (STD 58) says this about OBJECT IDENTIFIERs: + * + * > 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values + * > + * > An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative + * > numbers. For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a + * > sub-identifier, there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value, + * > and each sub-identifier has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295 + * > decimal). + * + * So a legitimate OID according to this RFC is at most (32 * 128 / 7), + * i.e. 586 bytes long. + * + * Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5 + */ + if (len > 586) + goto err; + while (len > 0) { l = 0; use_bn = 0; |