diff options
author | slontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> | 2022-08-26 11:54:35 +1000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> | 2022-09-23 09:24:47 +0100 |
commit | 78c44b05945be07eae86f0164b9b777e2de2295b (patch) | |
tree | 1c2f721a3bc8405b86f6aac30326265609de7968 | |
parent | 257cade411ef9217305c5db47f40e5dacdb99c71 (diff) |
Add HPKE DHKEM provider support for EC, X25519 and X448.
The code is derived from @sftcd's work in PR #17172.
This PR puts the DHKEM algorithms into the provider layer as
KEM algorithms for EC and ECX.
This PR only implements the DHKEM component of HPKE as specified in
RFC 9180.
crypto/hpke/hpke_util.c has been added for fuctions that will
be shared between DHKEM and HPKE.
API's for EVP_PKEY_auth_encapsulate_init() and EVP_PKEY_auth_decapsulate_init()
have been added to support authenticated encapsulation. auth_init() functions
were chosen rather that a EVP_PKEY_KEM_set_auth() interface to support
future algorithms that could possibly need different init functions.
Internal code has been refactored, so that it can be shared between the DHKEM
and other systems. Since DHKEM operates on low level keys it needs to be
able to do low level ECDH and ECXDH calls without converting the keys
back into EVP_PKEY/EVP_PKEY_CTX form. See ossl_ecx_compute_key(),
ossl_ec_public_from_private()
DHKEM requires API's to derive a key using a seed (IKM). This did not sit
well inside the DHKEM itself as dispatch functions. This functionality
fits better inside the EC and ECX keymanagers keygen, since
they are just variations of keygen where the private key is generated
in a different manner. This should mainly be used for testing purposes.
See ossl_ec_generate_key_dhkem().
It supports this by allowing a settable param to be passed to keygen
(See OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DHKEM_IKM).
The keygen calls code within ec and ecx dhkem implementation to handle this.
See ossl_ecx_dhkem_derive_private() and ossl_ec_dhkem_derive_private().
These 2 functions are also used by the EC/ECX DHKEM implementations to generate
the sender ephemeral keys.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19068)
39 files changed, 3982 insertions, 122 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/build.info b/crypto/build.info index 35e012d5d2..1c9ca3a809 100644 --- a/crypto/build.info +++ b/crypto/build.info @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ SUBDIRS=objects buffer bio stack lhash rand evp asn1 pem x509 conf \ siphash sm3 des aes rc2 rc4 rc5 idea aria bf cast camellia \ seed sm4 chacha modes bn ec rsa dsa dh sm2 dso engine \ err comp http ocsp cms ts srp cmac ct async ess crmf cmp encode_decode \ - ffc + ffc hpke LIBS=../libcrypto diff --git a/crypto/ec/build.info b/crypto/ec/build.info index a511e887a9..e4799ad37a 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/build.info +++ b/crypto/ec/build.info @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ INCLUDE[ecp_nistz256-sparcv9.o]=.. INCLUDE[ecp_s390x_nistp.o]=.. INCLUDE[ecx_s390x.o]=.. INCLUDE[ecx_meth.o]=.. +INCLUDE[ecx_key.o]=.. GENERATE[ecp_nistz256-armv4.S]=asm/ecp_nistz256-armv4.pl INCLUDE[ecp_nistz256-armv4.o]=.. diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_key.c b/crypto/ec/ec_key.c index 1bbca360e2..44bac9afa7 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_key.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_key.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #endif #include <openssl/self_test.h> #include "prov/providercommon.h" +#include "prov/ecx.h" #include "crypto/bn.h" static int ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(EC_KEY *eckey, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb, @@ -350,6 +351,43 @@ err: return ok; } +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE +/* + * This is similar to ec_generate_key(), except it uses an ikm to + * derive the private key. + */ +int ossl_ec_generate_key_dhkem(EC_KEY *eckey, + const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikmlen) +{ + int ok = 0; + + if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) { + eckey->priv_key = BN_secure_new(); + if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) + goto err; + } + if (ossl_ec_dhkem_derive_private(eckey, eckey->priv_key, ikm, ikmlen) <= 0) + goto err; + if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) { + eckey->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group); + if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) + goto err; + } + if (!ossl_ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(eckey)) + goto err; + + ok = 1; +err: + if (!ok) { + BN_clear_free(eckey->priv_key); + eckey->priv_key = NULL; + if (eckey->pub_key != NULL) + EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key); + } + return ok; +} +#endif + int ossl_ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey) { return ec_generate_key(eckey, 0); diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecx_key.c b/crypto/ec/ecx_key.c index dcec26c2e9..8cf7f1708c 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ecx_key.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ecx_key.c @@ -9,7 +9,13 @@ #include <string.h> #include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/proverr.h> #include "crypto/ecx.h" +#include "internal/common.h" /* for ossl_assert() */ + +#ifdef S390X_EC_ASM +# include "s390x_arch.h" +#endif ECX_KEY *ossl_ecx_key_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, ECX_KEY_TYPE type, int haspubkey, const char *propq) @@ -96,3 +102,61 @@ unsigned char *ossl_ecx_key_allocate_privkey(ECX_KEY *key) return key->privkey; } + +int ossl_ecx_compute_key(ECX_KEY *peer, ECX_KEY *priv, size_t keylen, + unsigned char *secret, size_t *secretlen, size_t outlen) +{ + if (priv == NULL + || priv->privkey == NULL + || peer == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_KEY); + return 0; + } + + if (!ossl_assert(keylen == X25519_KEYLEN + || keylen == X448_KEYLEN)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + + if (secret == NULL) { + *secretlen = keylen; + return 1; + } + if (outlen < keylen) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); + return 0; + } + + if (keylen == X25519_KEYLEN) { +#ifdef S390X_EC_ASM + if (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.pcc[1] + & S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SCALAR_MULTIPLY_X25519)) { + if (s390x_x25519_mul(secret, peer->pubkey, priv->privkey) == 0) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_DURING_DERIVATION); + return 0; + } + } else +#endif + if (ossl_x25519(secret, priv->privkey, peer->pubkey) == 0) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_DURING_DERIVATION); + return 0; + } + } else { +#ifdef S390X_EC_ASM + if (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.pcc[1] + & S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SCALAR_MULTIPLY_X448)) { + if (s390x_x448_mul(secret, peer->pubkey, priv->privkey) == 0) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_DURING_DERIVATION); + return 0; + } + } else +#endif + if (ossl_x448(secret, priv->privkey, peer->pubkey) == 0) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_DURING_DERIVATION); + return 0; + } + } + *secretlen = keylen; + return 1; +} diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_local.h b/crypto/evp/evp_local.h index a853174452..8c26e8fd6d 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/evp_local.h +++ b/crypto/evp/evp_local.h @@ -228,6 +228,8 @@ struct evp_kem_st { OSSL_FUNC_kem_gettable_ctx_params_fn *gettable_ctx_params; OSSL_FUNC_kem_set_ctx_params_fn *set_ctx_params; OSSL_FUNC_kem_settable_ctx_params_fn *settable_ctx_params; + OSSL_FUNC_kem_auth_encapsulate_init_fn *auth_encapsulate_init; + OSSL_FUNC_kem_auth_decapsulate_init_fn *auth_decapsulate_init; } /* EVP_KEM */; int PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, diff --git a/crypto/evp/kem.c b/crypto/evp/kem.c index bd28ede7ae..8c0c35b54b 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/kem.c +++ b/crypto/evp/kem.c @@ -18,13 +18,13 @@ #include "evp_local.h" static int evp_kem_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int operation, - const OSSL_PARAM params[]) + const OSSL_PARAM params[], EVP_PKEY *authkey) { int ret = 0; EVP_KEM *kem = NULL; EVP_KEYMGMT *tmp_keymgmt = NULL; const OSSL_PROVIDER *tmp_prov = NULL; - void *provkey = NULL; + void *provkey = NULL, *provauthkey = NULL; const char *supported_kem = NULL; int iter; @@ -40,7 +40,10 @@ static int evp_kem_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int operation, ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_NO_KEY_SET); goto err; } - + if (authkey != NULL && authkey->type != ctx->pkey->type) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_KEY_TYPES); + return 0; + } /* * Try to derive the supported kem from |ctx->keymgmt|. */ @@ -114,16 +117,26 @@ static int evp_kem_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int operation, * same property query as when fetching the kem method. * With the keymgmt we found (if we did), we try to export |ctx->pkey| * to it (evp_pkey_export_to_provider() is smart enough to only actually - * export it if |tmp_keymgmt| is different from |ctx->pkey|'s keymgmt) */ tmp_keymgmt_tofree = tmp_keymgmt = evp_keymgmt_fetch_from_prov((OSSL_PROVIDER *)tmp_prov, EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_name(ctx->keymgmt), ctx->propquery); - if (tmp_keymgmt != NULL) + if (tmp_keymgmt != NULL) { provkey = evp_pkey_export_to_provider(ctx->pkey, ctx->libctx, &tmp_keymgmt, ctx->propquery); + if (provkey != NULL && authkey != NULL) { + provauthkey = evp_pkey_export_to_provider(authkey, ctx->libctx, + &tmp_keymgmt, + ctx->propquery); + if (provauthkey == NULL) { + EVP_KEM_free(kem); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + } if (tmp_keymgmt == NULL) EVP_KEYMGMT_free(tmp_keymgmt_tofree); } @@ -144,20 +157,28 @@ static int evp_kem_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int operation, switch (operation) { case EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE: - if (kem->encapsulate_init == NULL) { + if (provauthkey != NULL && kem->auth_encapsulate_init != NULL) { + ret = kem->auth_encapsulate_init(ctx->op.encap.algctx, provkey, + provauthkey, params); + } else if (provauthkey == NULL && kem->encapsulate_init != NULL) { + ret = kem->encapsulate_init(ctx->op.encap.algctx, provkey, params); + } else { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); ret = -2; goto err; } - ret = kem->encapsulate_init(ctx->op.encap.algctx, provkey, params); break; case EVP_PKEY_OP_DECAPSULATE: - if (kem->decapsulate_init == NULL) { + if (provauthkey != NULL && kem->auth_decapsulate_init != NULL) { + ret = kem->auth_decapsulate_init(ctx->op.encap.algctx, provkey, + provauthkey, params); + } else if (provauthkey == NULL && kem->encapsulate_init != NULL) { + ret = kem->decapsulate_init(ctx->op.encap.algctx, provkey, params); + } else { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); ret = -2; goto err; } - ret = kem->decapsulate_init(ctx->op.encap.algctx, provkey, params); break; default: ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); @@ -178,9 +199,17 @@ static int evp_kem_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int operation, return ret; } +int EVP_PKEY_auth_encapsulate_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *authpriv, + const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + if (authpriv == NULL) + return 0; + return evp_kem_init(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE, params, authpriv); +} + int EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) { - return evp_kem_init(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE, params); + return evp_kem_init(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE, params, NULL); } int EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, @@ -209,7 +238,15 @@ int EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) { - return evp_kem_init(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECAPSULATE, params); + return evp_kem_init(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECAPSULATE, params, NULL); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_auth_decapsulate_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *authpub, + const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + if (authpub == NULL) + return 0; + return evp_kem_init(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECAPSULATE, params, authpub); } int EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, @@ -288,6 +325,12 @@ static void *evp_kem_from_algorithm(int name_id, const OSSL_ALGORITHM *algodef, kem->encapsulate_init = OSSL_FUNC_kem_encapsulate_init(fns); encfncnt++; break; + case OSSL_FUNC_KEM_AUTH_ENCAPSULATE_INIT: + if (kem->auth_encapsulate_init != NULL) + break; + kem->auth_encapsulate_init = OSSL_FUNC_kem_auth_encapsulate_init(fns); + encfncnt++; + break; case OSSL_FUNC_KEM_ENCAPSULATE: if (kem->encapsulate != NULL) break; @@ -300,6 +343,12 @@ static void *evp_kem_from_algorithm(int name_id, const OSSL_ALGORITHM *algodef, kem->decapsulate_init = OSSL_FUNC_kem_decapsulate_init(fns); decfncnt++; break; + case OSSL_FUNC_KEM_AUTH_DECAPSULATE_INIT: + if (kem->auth_decapsulate_init != NULL) + break; + kem->auth_decapsulate_init = OSSL_FUNC_kem_auth_decapsulate_init(fns); + decfncnt++; + break; case OSSL_FUNC_KEM_DECAPSULATE: if (kem->decapsulate != NULL) break; @@ -348,19 +397,21 @@ static void *evp_kem_from_algorithm(int name_id, const OSSL_ALGORITHM *algodef, } } if (ctxfncnt != 2 - || (encfncnt != 0 && encfncnt != 2) - || (decfncnt != 0 && decfncnt != 2) - || (encfncnt != 2 && decfncnt != 2) + || (encfncnt != 0 && encfncnt != 2 && encfncnt != 3) + || (decfncnt != 0 && decfncnt != 2 && decfncnt != 3) + || (encfncnt != decfncnt) || (gparamfncnt != 0 && gparamfncnt != 2) || (sparamfncnt != 0 && sparamfncnt != 2)) { /* * In order to be a consistent set of functions we must have at least - * a set of context functions (newctx and freectx) as well as a pair of - * "kem" functions: (encapsulate_init, encapsulate) or - * (decapsulate_init, decapsulate). set_ctx_params and settable_ctx_params are - * optional, but if one of them is present then the other one must also - * be present. The same applies to get_ctx_params and - * gettable_ctx_params. The dupctx function is optional. + * a set of context functions (newctx and freectx) as well as a pair + * (or triplet) of "kem" functions: + * (encapsulate_init, (and/or auth_encapsulate_init), encapsulate) or + * (decapsulate_init, (and/or auth_decapsulate_init), decapsulate). + * set_ctx_params and settable_ctx_params are optional, but if one of + * them is present then the other one must also be present. The same + * applies to get_ctx_params and gettable_ctx_params. + * The dupctx function is optional. */ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PROVIDER_FUNCTIONS); goto err; diff --git a/crypto/hpke/build.info b/crypto/hpke/build.info new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f096cf170b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/hpke/build.info @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +LIBS=../../libcrypto + +$COMMON=hpke_util.c + +SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON diff --git a/crypto/hpke/hpke_util.c b/crypto/hpke/hpke_util.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..92f9892a41 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/hpke/hpke_util.c @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include <openssl/core_names.h> +#include <openssl/kdf.h> +#include <openssl/params.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/proverr.h> +#include "crypto/hpke.h" +#include "internal/packet.h" + +/* + * The largest value happens inside dhkem_extract_and_expand + * Which consists of a max dkmlen of 2*privkeylen + suiteid + small label + */ +#define LABELED_EXTRACT_SIZE (10 + 12 + 2 * OSSL_HPKE_MAX_PRIVATE) + +/* + * The largest value happens inside dhkem_extract_and_expand + * Which consists of a prklen of secretlen + contextlen of 3 encoded public keys + * + suiteid + small label + */ +#define LABELED_EXPAND_SIZE (LABELED_EXTRACT_SIZE + 3 * OSSL_HPKE_MAX_PUBLIC) + +/* ASCII: "HPKE-v1", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ +static const char LABEL_HPKEV1[] = "\x48\x50\x4B\x45\x2D\x76\x31"; + +static int kdf_derive(EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx, + unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int mode, + const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen, + const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikmlen, + const unsigned char *info, size_t infolen) +{ + int ret; + OSSL_PARAM params[5], *p = params; + + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode); + if (salt != NULL) + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, + (char *)salt, saltlen); + if (ikm != NULL) + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, + (char *)ikm, ikmlen); + if (info != NULL) + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, + (char *)info, infolen); + *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + ret = EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, outlen, params) > 0; + if (!ret) + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_DURING_DERIVATION); + return ret; +} + +int ossl_hpke_kdf_extract(EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx, + unsigned char *prk, size_t prklen, + const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen, + const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikmlen) +{ + return kdf_derive(kctx, prk, prklen, EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY, + salt, saltlen, ikm, ikmlen, NULL, 0); +} + +/* Common code to perform a HKDF expand */ +int ossl_hpke_kdf_expand(EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx, + unsigned char *okm, size_t okmlen, + const unsigned char *prk, size_t prklen, + const unsigned char *info, size_t infolen) +{ + return kdf_derive(kctx, okm, okmlen, EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY, + NULL, 0, prk, prklen, info, infolen); +} + +/* + * See RFC 9180 Section 4 LabelExtract() + */ +int ossl_hpke_labeled_extract(EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx, + unsigned char *prk, size_t prklen, + const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen, + const unsigned char *suiteid, size_t suiteidlen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikmlen) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t labeled_ikmlen = 0; + unsigned char labeled_ikm[LABELED_EXTRACT_SIZE]; + WPACKET pkt; + + /* labeled_ikm = concat("HPKE-v1", suiteid, label, ikm) */ + if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt, labeled_ikm, sizeof(labeled_ikm), 0) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, LABEL_HPKEV1, strlen(LABEL_HPKEV1)) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, suiteid, suiteidlen) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, label, strlen(label)) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, ikm, ikmlen) + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &labeled_ikmlen) + || !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); + goto end; + } + + ret = ossl_hpke_kdf_extract(kctx, prk, prklen, salt, saltlen, + labeled_ikm, labeled_ikmlen); +end: + WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); + OPENSSL_cleanse(labeled_ikm, labeled_ikmlen); + return ret; +} + +/* + * See RFC 9180 Section 4 LabelExpand() + */ +int ossl_hpke_labeled_expand(EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx, + unsigned char *okm, size_t okmlen, + const unsigned char *prk, size_t prklen, + const unsigned char *suiteid, size_t suiteidlen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *info, size_t infolen) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t labeled_infolen = 0; + unsigned char labeled_info[LABELED_EXPAND_SIZE]; + WPACKET pkt; + + /* labeled_info = concat(okmlen, "HPKE-v1", suiteid, label, info) */ + if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt, labeled_info, sizeof(labeled_info), 0) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&pkt, okmlen) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, LABEL_HPKEV1, strlen(LABEL_HPKEV1)) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, suiteid, suiteidlen) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, label, strlen(label)) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, info, infolen) + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &labeled_infolen) + || !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); + goto end; + } + + ret = ossl_hpke_kdf_expand(kctx, okm, okmlen, + prk, prklen, labeled_info, labeled_infolen); +end: + WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); + return ret; +} + +/* Common code to create a HKDF ctx */ +EVP_KDF_CTX *ossl_kdf_ctx_create(const char *kdfname, const char *mdname, + OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) +{ + EVP_KDF *kdf; + EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx = NULL; + + kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(libctx, kdfname, propq); + kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf); + EVP_KDF_free(kdf); + if (kctx != NULL && mdname != NULL) { + OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params; + + if (mdname != NULL) + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, + (char *)mdname, 0); + if (propq != NULL) + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, + (char *)propq, 0); + *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + if (EVP_KDF_CTX_set_params(kctx, params) <= 0) { + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); + return NULL; + } + } + return kctx; +} diff --git a/doc/build.info b/doc/build.info index b90ad11eae..8b55bcdbc7 100644 --- a/doc/build.info +++ b/doc/build.info @@ -4209,10 +4209,18 @@ DEPEND[html/man7/EVP_KDF-X963.html]=man7/EVP_KDF-X963.pod GENERATE[html/man7/EVP_KDF-X963.html]=man7/EVP_KDF-X963.pod DEPEND[man/man7/EVP_KDF-X963.7]=man7/EVP_KDF-X963.pod GENERATE[man/man7/EVP_KDF-X963.7]=man7/EVP_KDF-X963.pod +DEPEND[html/man7/EVP_KEM-EC.html]=man7/EVP_KEM-EC.pod +GENERATE[html/man7/EVP_KEM-EC.html]=man7/EVP_KEM-EC.pod +DEPEND[man/man7/EVP_KEM-EC.7]=man7/EVP_KEM-EC.pod +GENERATE[man/man7/EVP_KEM-EC.7]=man7/EVP_KEM-EC.pod DEPEND[html/man7/EVP_KEM-RSA.html]=man7/EVP_KEM-RSA.pod GENERATE[html/man7/EVP_KEM-RSA.html]=man7/EVP_KEM-RSA.pod DEPEND[man/man7/EVP_KEM-RSA.7]=man7/EVP_KEM-RSA.pod GENERATE[man/man7/EVP_KEM-RSA.7]=man7/EVP_KEM-RSA.pod +DEPEND[html/man7/EVP_KEM-X25519.html]=man7/EVP_KEM-X25519.pod +GENERATE[html/man7/EVP_KEM-X25519.html]=man7/EVP_KEM-X25519.pod +DEPEND[man/man7/EVP_KEM-X25519.7]=man7/EVP_KEM-X25519.pod +GENERATE[man/man7/EVP_KEM-X25519.7]=man7/EVP_KEM-X25519.pod DEPEND[html/man7/EVP_KEYEXCH-DH.html]=man7/EVP_KEYEXCH-DH.pod GENERATE[html/man7/EVP_KEYEXCH-DH.html]=man7/EVP_KEYEXCH-DH.pod DEPEND[man/man7/EVP_KEYEXCH-DH.7]=man7/EVP_KEYEXCH-DH.pod @@ -4630,7 +4638,9 @@ html/man7/EVP_KDF-TLS1_PRF.html \ html/man7/EVP_KDF-X942-ASN1.html \ html/man7/EVP_KDF-X942-CONCAT.html \ html/man7/EVP_KDF-X963.html \ +html/man7/EVP_KEM-EC.html \ html/man7/EVP_KEM-RSA.html \ +html/man7/EVP_KEM-X25519.html \ html/man7/EVP_KEYEXCH-DH.html \ html/man7/EVP_KEYEXCH-ECDH.html \ html/man7/EVP_KEYEXCH-X25519.html \ @@ -4755,7 +4765,9 @@ man/man7/EVP_KDF-TLS1_PRF.7 \ man/man7/EVP_KDF-X942-ASN1.7 \ man/man7/EVP_KDF-X942-CONCAT.7 \ man/man7/EVP_KDF-X963.7 \ +man/man7/EVP_KEM-EC.7 \ man/man7/EVP_KEM-RSA.7 \ +man/man7/EVP_KEM-X25519.7 \ man/man7/EVP_KEYEXCH-DH.7 \ man/man7/EVP_KEYEXCH-ECDH.7 \ man/man7/EVP_KEYEXCH-X25519.7 \ diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decapsulate.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decapsulate.pod index 529e318f9e..cdda54d12f 100644 --- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decapsulate.pod +++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decapsulate.pod @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME -EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init, EVP_PKEY_decapsulate +EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init, EVP_PKEY_auth_decapsulate_init, EVP_PKEY_decapsulate - Key decapsulation using a private key algorithm =head1 SYNOPSIS @@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init, EVP_PKEY_decapsulate #include <openssl/evp.h> int EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]); + int EVP_PKEY_auth_decapsulate_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *authpub, + const OSSL_PARAM params[]); int EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *secret, size_t *secretlen, |