diff options
author | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2015-01-03 00:54:35 +0000 |
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committer | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2015-01-08 15:46:19 +0000 |
commit | fb73f12a9cfc377e3046228cc69351a40716c396 (patch) | |
tree | 65cf4b4a1699841023671d061529058faba3fcee | |
parent | 25d738c3a46339730e990391ca6399158636473e (diff) |
Follow on from CVE-2014-3571. This fixes the code that was the original source
of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/d1_pkt.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c index b76703a5e0..2851add08a 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c +++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c @@ -679,7 +679,8 @@ again: * would be dropped unnecessarily. */ if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && - *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && + s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH && + s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) { rr->length = 0; |