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authorShane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>2020-09-19 18:08:46 +1000
committerShane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>2020-09-19 18:08:46 +1000
commit80f4fd18f72c0d3faae864da6979b83acc4f89a2 (patch)
tree0882ccf31406c4f9948674913f51e3c46efff64d
parent28833f1465a2dd197f8df80a69095d1913e6e85e (diff)
Add KEM (Key encapsulation mechanism) support to providers
SP800-56Br2 requires support for the RSA primitives for RSASVE generate and recover. As these are simple KEM operations another operation type has been added that can support future extensions. Added public functions EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(), EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(), EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init() and EVP_PKEY_decapsulate() Added EVP_KEM_* functions. Added OSSL_FUNC_kem_* dispatch functions Added EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_kem_op() so that different types of KEM can be added in the future. This value must currently be set to "RSASVE" after EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init() & EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init() as there is no default value. This allows the existing RSA key types, keymanagers, and encoders to be used with the encapsulation operations. The design of the public API's resulted from contributions from @romen & @levitte. Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12750)
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/build.info2
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/evp_local.h19
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/kem.c359
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c76
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_KEM_free.pod82
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod13
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decapsulate.pod99
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_encapsulate.pod101
-rw-r--r--doc/man7/EVP_KEM-RSA.pod66
-rw-r--r--doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod8
-rw-r--r--doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-default.pod8
-rw-r--r--doc/man7/provider-kem.pod207
-rw-r--r--doc/man7/provider.pod6
-rw-r--r--include/crypto/evp.h8
-rw-r--r--include/openssl/core_dispatch.h32
-rw-r--r--include/openssl/core_names.h8
-rw-r--r--include/openssl/evp.h25
-rw-r--r--include/openssl/types.h2
-rw-r--r--providers/defltprov.c7
-rw-r--r--providers/fips/fipsprov.c7
-rw-r--r--providers/implementations/build.info2
-rw-r--r--providers/implementations/include/prov/implementations.h3
-rw-r--r--providers/implementations/kem/build.info6
-rw-r--r--providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c341
-rw-r--r--providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c6
-rw-r--r--test/evp_libctx_test.c181
-rw-r--r--util/libcrypto.num13
27 files changed, 1677 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/evp/build.info b/crypto/evp/build.info
index 36fac11683..7f1459a15c 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/build.info
+++ b/crypto/evp/build.info
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ LIBS=../../libcrypto
$COMMON=digest.c evp_enc.c evp_lib.c evp_fetch.c cmeth_lib.c evp_utils.c \
mac_lib.c mac_meth.c keymgmt_meth.c keymgmt_lib.c kdf_lib.c kdf_meth.c \
m_sigver.c pmeth_lib.c signature.c p_lib.c pmeth_gn.c exchange.c \
- pmeth_check.c evp_rand.c asymcipher.c
+ pmeth_check.c evp_rand.c asymcipher.c kem.c
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON\
encode.c evp_key.c evp_cnf.c \
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_local.h b/crypto/evp/evp_local.h
index e7f7643d83..3268aa4109 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_local.h
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_local.h
@@ -181,6 +181,25 @@ struct evp_asym_cipher_st {
OSSL_FUNC_asym_cipher_settable_ctx_params_fn *settable_ctx_params;
} /* EVP_ASYM_CIPHER */;
+struct evp_kem_st {
+ int name_id;
+ OSSL_PROVIDER *prov;
+ CRYPTO_REF_COUNT refcnt;
+ CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+
+ OSSL_FUNC_kem_newctx_fn *newctx;
+ OSSL_FUNC_kem_encapsulate_init_fn *encapsulate_init;
+ OSSL_FUNC_kem_encapsulate_fn *encapsulate;
+ OSSL_FUNC_kem_decapsulate_init_fn *decapsulate_init;
+ OSSL_FUNC_kem_decapsulate_fn *decapsulate;
+ OSSL_FUNC_kem_freectx_fn *freectx;
+ OSSL_FUNC_kem_dupctx_fn *dupctx;
+ OSSL_FUNC_kem_get_ctx_params_fn *get_ctx_params;
+ OSSL_FUNC_kem_gettable_ctx_params_fn *gettable_ctx_params;
+ OSSL_FUNC_kem_set_ctx_params_fn *set_ctx_params;
+ OSSL_FUNC_kem_settable_ctx_params_fn *settable_ctx_params;
+} /* EVP_KEM */;
+
int PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass,
int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param,
const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md,
diff --git a/crypto/evp/kem.c b/crypto/evp/kem.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6f0424075a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/evp/kem.c
@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "crypto/evp.h"
+#include "internal/provider.h"
+#include "evp_local.h"
+
+static int evp_kem_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int operation)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ EVP_KEM *kem = NULL;
+ EVP_KEYMGMT *tmp_keymgmt = NULL;
+ void *provkey = NULL;
+ const char *supported_kem = NULL;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->keytype == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ evp_pkey_ctx_free_old_ops(ctx);
+ ctx->operation = operation;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure that the key is provided, either natively, or as a cached export.
+ */
+ tmp_keymgmt = ctx->keymgmt;
+ provkey = evp_pkey_export_to_provider(ctx->pkey, ctx->libctx,
+ &tmp_keymgmt, ctx->propquery);
+ if (provkey == NULL
+ || !EVP_KEYMGMT_up_ref(tmp_keymgmt)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_KEYMGMT_free(ctx->keymgmt);
+ ctx->keymgmt = tmp_keymgmt;
+
+ if (ctx->keymgmt->query_operation_name != NULL)
+ supported_kem = ctx->keymgmt->query_operation_name(OSSL_OP_KEM);
+
+ /*
+ * If we didn't get a supported kem, assume there is one with the
+ * same name as the key type.
+ */
+ if (supported_kem == NULL)
+ supported_kem = ctx->keytype;
+
+ kem = EVP_KEM_fetch(ctx->libctx, supported_kem, ctx->propquery);
+ if (kem == NULL
+ || (EVP_KEYMGMT_provider(ctx->keymgmt) != EVP_KEM_provider(kem))) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+ ret = -2;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ctx->op.encap.kem = kem;
+ ctx->op.encap.kemprovctx = kem->newctx(ossl_provider_ctx(kem->prov));
+ if (ctx->op.encap.kemprovctx == NULL) {
+ /* The provider key can stay in the cache */
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ switch (operation) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE:
+ if (kem->encapsulate_init == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+ ret = -2;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = kem->encapsulate_init(ctx->op.encap.kemprovctx, provkey);
+ break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_OP_DECAPSULATE:
+ if (kem->decapsulate_init == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+ ret = -2;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = kem->decapsulate_init(ctx->op.encap.kemprovctx, provkey);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ret > 0)
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ evp_pkey_ctx_free_old_ops(ctx);
+ ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return evp_kem_init(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+ unsigned char *secret, size_t *secretlen)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE) {
+ EVPerr(0, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->op.encap.kemprovctx == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(0, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ if (out != NULL && secret == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return ctx->op.encap.kem->encapsulate(ctx->op.encap.kemprovctx,
+ out, outlen, secret, secretlen);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return evp_kem_init(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECAPSULATE);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *secret, size_t *secretlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL
+ || (in == NULL || inlen == 0)
+ || (secret == NULL && secretlen == NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_DECAPSULATE) {
+ EVPerr(0, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->op.encap.kemprovctx == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(0, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ return ctx->op.encap.kem->decapsulate(ctx->op.encap.kemprovctx,
+ secret, secretlen, in, inlen);
+}
+
+static EVP_KEM *evp_kem_new(OSSL_PROVIDER *prov)
+{
+ EVP_KEM *kem = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_KEM));
+
+ if (kem == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ kem->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (kem->lock == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ OPENSSL_free(kem);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ kem->prov = prov;
+ ossl_provider_up_ref(prov);
+ kem->refcnt = 1;
+
+ return kem;
+}
+
+static void *evp_kem_from_dispatch(int name_id, const OSSL_DISPATCH *fns,
+ OSSL_PROVIDER *prov)
+{
+ EVP_KEM *kem = NULL;
+ int ctxfncnt = 0, encfncnt = 0, decfncnt = 0;
+ int gparamfncnt = 0, sparamfncnt = 0;
+
+ if ((kem = evp_kem_new(prov)) == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ kem->name_id = name_id;
+
+ for (; fns->function_id != 0; fns++) {
+ switch (fns->function_id) {
+ case OSSL_FUNC_KEM_NEWCTX:
+ if (kem->newctx != NULL)
+ break;
+ kem->newctx = OSSL_FUNC_kem_newctx(fns);
+ ctxfncnt++;
+ break;
+ case OSSL_FUNC_KEM_ENCAPSULATE_INIT:
+ if (kem->encapsulate_init != NULL)
+ break;
+ kem->encapsulate_init = OSSL_FUNC_kem_encapsulate_init(fns);
+ encfncnt++;
+ break;
+ case OSSL_FUNC_KEM_ENCAPSULATE:
+ if (kem->encapsulate != NULL)
+ break;
+ kem->encapsulate = OSSL_FUNC_kem_encapsulate(fns);
+ encfncnt++;
+ break;
+ case OSSL_FUNC_KEM_DECAPSULATE_INIT:
+ if (kem->decapsulate_init != NULL)
+ break;
+ kem->decapsulate_init = OSSL_FUNC_kem_decapsulate_init(fns);
+ decfncnt++;
+ break;
+ case OSSL_FUNC_KEM_DECAPSULATE:
+ if (kem->decapsulate != NULL)
+ break;
+ kem->decapsulate = OSSL_FUNC_kem_decapsulate(fns);
+ decfncnt++;
+ break;
+ case OSSL_FUNC_KEM_FREECTX:
+ if (kem->freectx != NULL)
+ break;
+ kem->freectx = OSSL_FUNC_kem_freectx(fns);
+ ctxfncnt++;
+ break;
+ case OSSL_FUNC_KEM_DUPCTX:
+ if (kem->dupctx != NULL)
+ break;
+ kem->dupctx = OSSL_FUNC_kem_dupctx(fns);
+ break;
+ case OSSL_FUNC_KEM_GET_CTX_PARAMS:
+ if (kem->get_ctx_params != NULL)
+ break;
+ kem->get_ctx_params
+ = OSSL_FUNC_kem_get_ctx_params(fns);
+ gparamfncnt++;
+ break;
+ case OSSL_FUNC_KEM_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS:
+ if (kem->gettable_ctx_params != NULL)
+ break;
+ kem->gettable_ctx_params
+ = OSSL_FUNC_kem_gettable_ctx_params(fns);
+ gparamfncnt++;
+ break;
+ case OSSL_FUNC_KEM_SET_CTX_PARAMS:
+ if (kem->set_ctx_params != NULL)
+ break;
+ kem->set_ctx_params
+ = OSSL_FUNC_kem_set_ctx_params(fns);
+ sparamfncnt++;
+ break;
+ case OSSL_FUNC_KEM_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS:
+ if (kem->settable_ctx_params != NULL)
+ break;
+ kem->settable_ctx_params
+ = OSSL_FUNC_kem_settable_ctx_params(fns);
+ sparamfncnt++;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ctxfncnt != 2
+ || (encfncnt != 0 && encfncnt != 2)
+ || (decfncnt != 0 && decfncnt != 2)
+ || (encfncnt != 2 && decfncnt != 2)
+ || (gparamfncnt != 0 && gparamfncnt != 2)
+ || (sparamfncnt != 0 && sparamfncnt != 2)) {
+ /*
+ * In order to be a consistent set of functions we must have at least
+ * a set of context functions (newctx and freectx) as well as a pair of
+ * "kem" functions: (encapsulate_init, encapsulate) or
+ * (decapsulate_init, decapsulate). set_ctx_params and settable_ctx_params are
+ * optional, but if one of them is present then the other one must also
+ * be present. The same applies to get_ctx_params and
+ * gettable_ctx_params. The dupctx function is optional.
+ */
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PROVIDER_FUNCTIONS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return kem;
+ err:
+ EVP_KEM_free(kem);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void EVP_KEM_free(EVP_KEM *kem)
+{
+ if (kem != NULL) {
+ int i;
+
+ CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&kem->refcnt, &i, kem->lock);
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
+ ossl_provider_free(kem->prov);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(kem->lock);
+ OPENSSL_free(kem);
+ }
+}
+
+int EVP_KEM_up_ref(EVP_KEM *kem)
+{
+ int ref = 0;
+
+ CRYPTO_UP_REF(&kem->refcnt, &ref, kem->lock);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+OSSL_PROVIDER *EVP_KEM_provider(const EVP_KEM *kem)
+{
+ return kem->prov;
+}
+
+EVP_KEM *EVP_KEM_fetch(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, const char *algorithm,
+ const char *properties)
+{
+ return evp_generic_fetch(ctx, OSSL_OP_KEM, algorithm, properties,
+ evp_kem_from_dispatch,
+ (int (*)(void *))EVP_KEM_up_ref,
+ (void (*)(void *))EVP_KEM_free);
+}
+
+int EVP_KEM_is_a(const EVP_KEM *kem, const char *name)
+{
+ return evp_is_a(kem->prov, kem->name_id, NULL, name);
+}
+
+int EVP_KEM_number(const EVP_KEM *kem)
+{
+ return kem->name_id;
+}
+
+void EVP_KEM_do_all_provided(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx,
+ void (*fn)(EVP_KEM *kem, void *arg),
+ void *arg)
+{
+ evp_generic_do_all(libctx, OSSL_OP_KEM, (void (*)(void *, void *))fn, arg,
+ evp_kem_from_dispatch,
+ (void (*)(void *))EVP_KEM_free);
+}
+
+
+void EVP_KEM_names_do_all(const EVP_KEM *kem,
+ void (*fn)(const char *name, void *data),
+ void *data)
+{
+ if (kem->prov != NULL)
+ evp_names_do_all(kem->prov, kem->name_id, fn, data);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
index 38f42eca7d..fcd7266975 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
@@ -148,7 +148,9 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_state(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
|| (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)
&& ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx != NULL)
|| (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)
- && ctx->op.keymgmt.genctx != NULL))
+ && ctx->op.keymgmt.genctx != NULL)
+ || (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_KEM_OP(ctx)
+ && ctx->op.encap.kemprovctx != NULL))
return EVP_PKEY_STATE_PROVIDER;
return EVP_PKEY_STATE_LEGACY;
@@ -396,7 +398,14 @@ void evp_pkey_ctx_free_old_ops(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
EVP_KEYEXCH_free(ctx->op.kex.exchange);
ctx->op.kex.exchprovctx = NULL;
ctx->op.kex.exchange = NULL;
- } else if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) {
+ } else if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_KEM_OP(ctx)) {
+ if (ctx->op.encap.kemprovctx != NULL && ctx->op.encap.kem != NULL)
+ ctx->op.encap.kem->freectx(ctx->op.encap.kemprovctx);
+ EVP_KEM_free(ctx->op.encap.kem);
+ ctx->op.encap.kemprovctx = NULL;
+ ctx->op.encap.kem = NULL;
+ }
+ else if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) {
if (ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx != NULL && ctx->op.ciph.cipher != NULL)
ctx->op.ciph.cipher->freectx(ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx);
EVP_ASYM_CIPHER_free(ctx->op.ciph.cipher);
@@ -559,6 +568,26 @@ EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(const EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx)
}
return rctx;
}
+ } else if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_KEM_OP(pctx)) {
+ if (pctx->op.encap.kem != NULL) {
+ rctx->op.encap.kem = pctx->op.encap.kem;
+ if (!EVP_KEM_up_ref(rctx->op.encap.kem)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(rctx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (pctx->op.encap.kemprovctx != NULL) {
+ if (!ossl_assert(pctx->op.encap.kem != NULL))
+ return NULL;
+ rctx->op.encap.kemprovctx
+ = pctx->op.encap.kem->dupctx(pctx->op.encap.kemprovctx);
+ if (rctx->op.encap.kemprovctx == NULL) {
+ EVP_KEM_free(rctx->op.encap.kem);
+ OPENSSL_free(rctx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return rctx;
+ }
}
rctx->pmeth = pctx->pmeth;
@@ -659,6 +688,12 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
&& ctx->keymgmt->gen_set_params != NULL)
return evp_keymgmt_gen_set_params(ctx->keymgmt, ctx->op.keymgmt.genctx,
params);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_KEM_OP(ctx)
+ && ctx->op.encap.kemprovctx != NULL
+ && ctx->op.encap.kem != NULL
+ && ctx->op.encap.kem->set_ctx_params != NULL)
+ return ctx->op.encap.kem->set_ctx_params(ctx->op.encap.kemprovctx,
+ params);
return 0;
}
@@ -682,6 +717,12 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
&& ctx->op.ciph.cipher->get_ctx_params != NULL)
return ctx->op.ciph.cipher->get_ctx_params(ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx,
params);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_KEM_OP(ctx)
+ && ctx->op.encap.kemprovctx != NULL
+ && ctx->op.encap.kem != NULL
+ && ctx->op.encap.kem->get_ctx_params != NULL)
+ return ctx->op.encap.kem->get_ctx_params(ctx->op.encap.kemprovctx,
+ params);
return 0;
}
@@ -710,6 +751,12 @@ const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_PKEY_CTX_gettable_params(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
EVP_ASYM_CIPHER_provider(ctx->op.ciph.cipher));
return ctx->op.ciph.cipher->gettable_ctx_params(provctx);
}
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_KEM_OP(ctx)
+ && ctx->op.encap.kem != NULL
+ && ctx->op.encap.kem->gettable_ctx_params != NULL) {
+ provctx = ossl_provider_ctx(EVP_KEM_provider(ctx->op.encap.kem));
+ return ctx->op.encap.kem->gettable_ctx_params(provctx);
+ }
return NULL;
}
@@ -740,7 +787,12 @@ const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_PKEY_CTX_settable_params(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)
&& ctx->keymgmt != NULL)
return EVP_KEYMGMT_gen_settable_params(ctx->keymgmt);
-
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_KEM_OP(ctx)
+ && ctx->op.encap.kem != NULL
+ && ctx->op.encap.kem->settable_ctx_params != NULL) {
+ provctx = ossl_provider_ctx(EVP_KEM_provider(ctx->op.encap.kem));
+ return ctx->op.encap.kem->settable_ctx_params(provctx);
+ }
return NULL;
}
@@ -1096,6 +1148,24 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
key, keylen);
}
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_kem_op(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *op)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || op == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_VALUE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_KEM_OP(ctx)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KEM_PARAM_OPERATION,
+ (char *)op, 0);
+ *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params);
+}
+
int evp_pkey_ctx_set1_id_prov(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const void *id, int len)
{
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_KEM_free.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_KEM_free.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0e3ca12ae3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_KEM_free.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_KEM_fetch, EVP_KEM_free, EVP_KEM_up_ref,
+EVP_KEM_number, EVP_KEM_is_a, EVP_KEM_provider,
+EVP_KEM_do_all_provided, EVP_KEM_names_do_all
+- Functions to manage EVP_KEM algorithm objects
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ EVP_KEM *EVP_KEM_fetch(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, const char *algorithm,
+ const char *properties);
+ void EVP_KEM_free(EVP_KEM *kem);
+ int EVP_KEM_up_ref(EVP_KEM *kem);
+ int EVP_KEM_number(const EVP_KEM *kem);
+ int EVP_KEM_is_a(const EVP_KEM *kem, const char *name);
+ OSSL_PROVIDER *EVP_KEM_provider(const EVP_KEM *kem);
+ void EVP_KEM_do_all_provided(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx,
+ void (*fn)(EVP_KEM *kem, void *arg), void *arg);
+ void EVP_KEM_names_do_all(const EVP_KEM *kem,
+ void (*fn)(const char *name, void *data), void *data);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+EVP_KEM_fetch() fetches the implementation for the given B<algorithm> from any
+provider offering it, within the criteria given by the B<properties> and in the
+scope of the given library context B<ctx> (see L<OPENSSL_CTX(3)>). The algorithm
+will be one offering functions for performing asymmetric kem related tasks such
+as key encapsulation and decapsulation.
+See L<provider(7)/Fetching algorithms> for further information.
+
+The returned value must eventually be freed with EVP_KEM_free().
+
+EVP_KEM_free() decrements the reference count for the B<EVP_KEM> structure.
+Typically this structure will have been obtained from an earlier call to
+EVP_KEM_fetch(). If the reference count drops to 0 then the structure is freed.
+
+EVP_KEM_up_ref() increments the reference count for an B<EVP_KEM> structure.
+
+EVP_KEM_is_a() returns 1 if I<kem> is an implementation of an
+algorithm that's identifiable with I<name>, otherwise 0.
+
+EVP_KEM_provider() returns the provider that I<kem> was fetched from.
+
+EVP_KEM_do_all_provided() traverses all EVP_KEMs implemented by all activated
+providers in the given library context I<libctx>, and for each of the
+implementations, calls the given function I<fn> with the implementation method
+and the given I<arg> as argument.
+
+EVP_KEM_number() returns the internal dynamic number assigned to I<kem>.
+
+EVP_KEM_names_do_all() traverses all names for I<kem>, and calls I<fn> with
+each name and I<data>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_KEM_fetch() returns a pointer to an B<EVP_KEM> for success or B<NULL> for
+failure.
+
+EVP_KEM_up_ref() returns 1 for success or 0 otherwise.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<provider(7)/Fetching algorithms>, L<OSSL_PROVIDER(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 3.0.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
index 794ad2053a..e5c187d950 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
@@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_outlen,
EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_outlen,
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_ecdh_kdf_ukm,
EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_ecdh_kdf_ukm,
-EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id, EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id, EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id_len
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id, EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id, EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id_len,
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_kem_op
- algorithm specific control operations
=head1 SYNOPSIS
@@ -91,6 +92,8 @@ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id, EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id, EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id_len
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_group_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *name);
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_group_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name, size_t namelen);
+ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_kem_op(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *op);
+
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pad);
@@ -606,6 +609,12 @@ memory for further calls to EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id(). EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id()
returns the previously set ID value to caller in I<id>. The caller should
allocate adequate memory space for the I<id> before calling EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id().
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_kem_op() sets the KEM operation to run. This can be set after
+EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init() or EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init() to select the
+kem operation. RSA is the only key type that supports encapsulation currently,
+and as there is no default operation for the RSA type, this function must be
+called before EVP_PKEY_encapsulate() or EVP_PKEY_decapsulate().
+
=head1 RETURN VALUES
All other functions described on this page return a positive value for success
@@ -623,6 +632,8 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_keygen(3)>
+L<EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(3)>
+L<EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decapsulate.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decapsulate.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7dd47a1e58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decapsulate.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init, EVP_PKEY_decapsulate
+- Key decapsulation using a private key algorithm
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *secret, size_t *secretlen,
+ const unsigned char *wrapped, size_t wrappedlen);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init() function initializes a private key algorithm
+context I<ctx> for a decapsulation operation.
+
+The EVP_PKEY_decapsulate() function performs a private key decapsulation
+operation using I<ctx>. The data to be decapsulated is specified using the
+I<wrapped> and I<wrappedlen> parameters.
+If I<secret> is I<NULL> then the maximum size of the output secret buffer
+is written to the I<*secretlen> parameter. If I<secret> is not B<NULL> and the
+call is successful then the decapsulated secret data is written to I<secret> and
+the amount of data written to I<secretlen>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+After the call to EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init() algorithm specific parameters
+for the operation may be set using L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(3)>. There are no
+settable parameters currently.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init() and EVP_PKEY_decapsulate() return 1 for
+success and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2
+indicates the operation is not supported by the private key algorithm.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Decapsulate data using RSA:
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ /*
+ * NB: assumes rsa_priv_key is an RSA private key,
+ * and that in, inlen are already set up to contain encapsulated data.
+ */
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ size_t secretlen = 0;
+ unsigned char *secret = NULL;;
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, rsa_priv_key, NULL);
+ if (ctx = NULL)
+ /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(ctx) <= 0)
+ /* Error */
+
+ /* Set the mode - only 'RSASVE' is currently supported */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_kem_op(ctx, "RSASVE") <= 0)
+ /* Error */
+
+ /* Determine buffer length */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, NULL, &secretlen, in, inlen) <= 0)
+ /* Error */
+
+ secret = OPENSSL_malloc(secretlen);
+ if (secret == NULL)
+ /* malloc failure */
+
+ /* Decapsulated secret data is secretlen bytes long */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decapsulaterctx, secret, &secretlen, in, inlen) <= 0)
+ /* Error */
+
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(3)>,
+L<EVP_KEM-RSA(7)>,
+
+=head1 HISTORY