diff options
author | Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org> | 2007-02-17 06:45:38 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org> | 2007-02-17 06:45:38 +0000 |
commit | 52b8dad8ec6eb0dcada52851af5f9498af7a91be (patch) | |
tree | ea3f77d4784d2d5faf4c1e31f1b28dcece2fdcae | |
parent | cc684e330b61975a4c478e01a46ca687106eebbf (diff) |
Reorganize the data used for SSL ciphersuite pattern matching.
This change resolves a number of problems and obviates multiple kludges.
A new feature is that you can now say "AES256" or "AES128" (not just
"AES", which enables both).
In some cases the ciphersuite list generated from a given string is
affected by this change. I hope this is just in those cases where the
previous behaviour did not make sense.
-rw-r--r-- | CHANGES | 34 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | LICENSE | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | README | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/opensslv.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/d1_clnt.c | 19 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/d1_srvr.c | 68 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/s2_lib.c | 144 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_clnt.c | 110 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_enc.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_lib.c | 1503 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_srvr.c | 233 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/ssl.h | 92 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/ssl_cert.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/ssl_ciph.c | 572 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/ssl_lib.c | 225 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/ssl_locl.h | 106 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/t1_enc.c | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/t1_lib.c | 68 |
18 files changed, 1838 insertions, 1368 deletions
@@ -4,6 +4,28 @@ Changes between 0.9.8e and 0.9.9 [xx XXX xxxx] + *) Split the SSL/TLS algorithm mask (as used for ciphersuite string + processing) into multiple integers instead of setting + "SSL_MKEY_MASK" bits, "SSL_AUTH_MASK" bits, "SSL_ENC_MASK", + "SSL_MAC_MASK", and "SSL_SSL_MASK" bits all in a single integer. + (These masks as well as the individual bit definitions are hidden + away into the non-exported interface ssl/ssl_locl.h, so this + change to the definition of the SSL_CIPHER structure shouldn't + affect applications.) This give us more bits for each of these + categories, so there is no longer a need to coagulate AES128 and + AES256 into a single algorithm bit, and to coagulate Camellia128 + and Camellia256 into a single algorithm bit, which has led to all + kinds of kludges. + + Thus, among other things, the kludge introduced in 0.9.7m and + 0.9.8e for masking out AES256 independently of AES128 or masking + out Camellia256 independently of AES256 is not needed here in 0.9.9. + + With the change, we also introduce new ciphersuite aliases that + so far were missing: "AES128", "AES256", "CAMELLIA128", and + "CAMELLIA256". + [Bodo Moeller] + *) Add support for dsa-with-SHA224 and dsa-with-SHA256. Use the leftmost N bytes of the signature input if the input is larger than the prime q (with N being the size in bytes of q). @@ -430,6 +452,13 @@ Changes between 0.9.8d and 0.9.8e [XX xxx XXXX] + *) Since AES128 and AES256 (and similarly Camellia128 and + Camellia256) share a single mask bit in the logic of + ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a + kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't + (or if Camellia128 is available and Camellia256 isn't). + [Victor Duchovni] + *) Fix the BIT STRING encoding generated by crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c (within i2d_ECPrivateKey, i2d_ECPKParameters, i2d_ECParameters): When a point or a seed is encoded in a BIT STRING, we need to @@ -1459,6 +1488,11 @@ Changes between 0.9.7l and 0.9.7m [xx XXX xxxx] + *) Since AES128 and AES256 share a single mask bit in the logic of + ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a + kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't. + [Victor Duchovni] + *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the ClientHello is fragmented. (The server can't insist on the @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ --------------- /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ OpenSSL 0.9.9-dev XX xxx XXXX - Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project + Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson All rights reserved. diff --git a/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/opensslv.h index dc3a89ad4e..3d665b803b 100644 --- a/crypto/opensslv.h +++ b/crypto/opensslv.h @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ * should only keep the versions that are binary compatible with the current. */ #define SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY "" -#define SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "0.9.8" +#define SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "0.9.9" #endif /* HEADER_OPENSSLV_H */ diff --git a/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/ssl/d1_clnt.c index 2dd9da2fda..0f3dd708a6 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/d1_clnt.c @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: /* Check if it is anon DH */ - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)) + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) { ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; @@ -335,7 +335,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: ret=dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; - l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; /* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert * sent back */ /* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain @@ -684,7 +683,7 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p,*d; int n; - unsigned long l; + unsigned long alg_k; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char *q; EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; @@ -697,13 +696,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); - - l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; + + alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* Fool emacs indentation */ if (0) {} #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - else if (l & SSL_kRSA) + else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { RSA *rsa; unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; @@ -762,7 +761,7 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - else if (l & SSL_kKRB5) + else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { krb5_error_code krb5rc; KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; @@ -781,7 +780,7 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n", - l, SSL_kKRB5); + alg_k, SSL_kKRB5); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ authp = NULL; @@ -894,7 +893,7 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - else if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) + else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) { DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt; diff --git a/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/ssl/d1_srvr.c index 67baf80dc2..450524a5e9 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/d1_srvr.c @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; long num1; + unsigned long alg_k; int ret= -1; int new_state,state,skip=0; @@ -237,11 +238,11 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; } - if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) - s->d1->send_cookie = 1; - else - s->d1->send_cookie = 0; - + if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) + s->d1->send_cookie = 1; + else + s->d1->send_cookie = 0; + break; case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: @@ -270,7 +271,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->new_session = 2; - if ( s->d1->send_cookie) + if (s->d1->send_cookie) s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; else s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; @@ -303,7 +304,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: /* Check if it is anon DH */ - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)) + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) { ret=dtls1_send_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; @@ -316,13 +317,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: - l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* clear this, it may get reset by * send_server_key_exchange */ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - && !(l & SSL_KRB5) + && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ ) /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key @@ -336,8 +337,8 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) /* only send if a DH key exchange or * RSA but we have a sign only certificate */ if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp - || (l & SSL_DH) - || ((l & SSL_kRSA) + || (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) + || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) @@ -367,12 +368,12 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts * and in RFC 2246): */ - ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) && + ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && /* ... except when the application insists on verification * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || - /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ - (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5)) + /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) { /* no cert request */ skip=1; @@ -625,15 +626,15 @@ int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s) *(p++) = s->version & 0xFF; *(p++) = (unsigned char) s->d1->cookie_len; - if ( s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb != NULL && - s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, - &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } - /* else the cookie is assumed to have - * been initialized by the application */ + if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb != NULL && + s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, + &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + /* else the cookie is assumed to have + * been initialized by the application */ memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); p += s->d1->cookie_len; @@ -784,7 +785,7 @@ int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { - type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK; + type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; cert=s->cert; buf=s->init_buf; @@ -889,7 +890,7 @@ int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) n+=2+nr[i]; } - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)) + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) { if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) == NULL) @@ -1107,14 +1108,15 @@ int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); - if (x == NULL && - /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ - (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms - & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK)) - != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5)) + if (x == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return(0); + /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ + if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kKRB5) || + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return(0); + } } l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,x); diff --git a/ssl/s2_lib.c b/ssl/s2_lib.c index debaece1d2..30ca8606e4 100644 --- a/ssl/s2_lib.c +++ b/ssl/s2_lib.c @@ -55,6 +55,59 @@ * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ #include "ssl_locl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 @@ -69,131 +122,158 @@ const char ssl2_version_str[]="SSLv2" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; /* list of available SSLv2 ciphers (sorted by id) */ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[]={ -/* NULL_WITH_MD5 v3 */ #if 0 +/* NULL_WITH_MD5 v3 */ { 1, SSL2_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5, SSL2_CK_NULL_WITH_MD5, - SSL_kRSA|SSL_aRSA|SSL_eNULL|SSL_MD5|SSL_SSLV2, + SSL_kRSA, + SSL_aRSA, + SSL_eNULL, + SSL_MD5, + SSL_SSLV2, SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40|SSL_STRONG_NONE, 0, 0, 0, - SSL_ALL_CIPHERS, - SSL_ALL_STRENGTHS, }, #endif + /* RC4_128_WITH_MD5 */ { 1, SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5, SSL2_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5, - SSL_kRSA|SSL_aRSA|SSL_RC4|SSL_MD5|SSL_SSLV2, + SSL_kRSA, + SSL_aRSA, + SSL_RC4, + SSL_MD5, + SSL_SSLV2, SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM, 0, 128, 128, - SSL_ALL_CIPHERS, - SSL_ALL_STRENGTHS, }, + /* RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 */ { 1, SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5, SSL2_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5, - SSL_kRSA|SSL_aRSA|SSL_RC4|SSL_MD5|SSL_SSLV2, + SSL_kRSA, + SSL_aRSA, + SSL_RC4, + SSL_MD5, + SSL_SSLV2, SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40, SSL2_CF_5_BYTE_ENC, 40, 128, - SSL_ALL_CIPHERS, - SSL_ALL_STRENGTHS, }, + /* RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 */ { 1, SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5, SSL2_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5, - SSL_kRSA|SSL_aRSA|SSL_RC2|SSL_MD5|SSL_SSLV2, + SSL_kRSA, + SSL_aRSA, + SSL_RC2, + SSL_MD5, + SSL_SSLV2, SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM, 0, 128, 128, - SSL_ALL_CIPHERS, - SSL_ALL_STRENGTHS, }, + /* RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 */ { 1, SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5, SSL2_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5, - SSL_kRSA|SSL_aRSA|SSL_RC2|SSL_MD5|SSL_SSLV2, + SSL_kRSA, + SSL_aRSA, + SSL_RC2, + SSL_MD5, + SSL_SSLV2, SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40, SSL2_CF_5_BYTE_ENC, 40, 128, - SSL_ALL_CIPHERS, - SSL_ALL_STRENGTHS, }, -/* IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 */ + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA +/* IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 */ { 1, SSL2_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5, SSL2_CK_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5, - SSL_kRSA|SSL_aRSA|SSL_IDEA|SSL_MD5|SSL_SSLV2, + SSL_kRSA, + SSL_aRSA, + SSL_IDEA, + SSL_MD5, + SSL_SSLV2, SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM, 0, 128, 128, - SSL_ALL_CIPHERS, - SSL_ALL_STRENGTHS, }, #endif + /* DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 */ { 1, SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5, SSL2_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5, - SSL_kRSA|SSL_aRSA|SSL_DES|SSL_MD5|SSL_SSLV2, + SSL_kRSA, + SSL_aRSA, + SSL_DES, + SSL_MD5, + SSL_SSLV2, SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW, 0, 56, 56, - SSL_ALL_CIPHERS, - SSL_ALL_STRENGTHS, }, + /* DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 */ { 1, SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5, SSL2_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5, - SSL_kRSA|SSL_aRSA|SSL_3DES|SSL_MD5|SSL_SSLV2, + SSL_kRSA, + SSL_aRSA, + SSL_3DES, + SSL_MD5, + SSL_SSLV2, SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH, 0, 168, 168, - SSL_ALL_CIPHERS, - SSL_ALL_STRENGTHS, }, -/* RC4_64_WITH_MD5 */ + #if 0 +/* RC4_64_WITH_MD5 */ { 1, SSL2_TXT_RC4_64_WITH_MD5, SSL2_CK_RC4_64_WITH_MD5, - SSL_kRSA|SSL_aRSA|SSL_RC4|SSL_MD5|SSL_SSLV2, + SSL_kRSA, + SSL_aRSA, + SSL_RC4, + SSL_MD5, + SSL_SSLV2, SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW, SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC, 64, 64, - SSL_ALL_CIPHERS, - SSL_ALL_STRENGTHS, }, #endif -/* NULL SSLeay (testing) */ + #if 0 +/* NULL SSLeay (testing) */ { 0, SSL2_TXT_NULL, @@ -203,8 +283,6 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[]={ 0, 0, 0, - SSL_ALL_CIPHERS, - SSL_ALL_STRENGTHS, }, #endif diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c index 4a34b445ee..2a19ec496e 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method, int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) { BUF_MEM *buf=NULL; - unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL),l; + unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); long num1; void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; int ret= -1; @@ -288,8 +288,8 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */ /* or PSK */ - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) - && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_kPSK)) + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && + !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; @@ -350,7 +350,6 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; - l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; /* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert * sent back */ /* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain @@ -940,10 +939,10 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (!i) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK)) - != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5) + && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) && + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ - ) + ) { al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); @@ -967,15 +966,15 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x); /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ - need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms - & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK)) - == (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))? 0: 1; + need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) && + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) + ? 0 : 1; #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x); printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey)); - printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name, - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms, need_cert); + printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name, + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) @@ -1047,7 +1046,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; unsigned char *param,*p; int al,i,j,param_len,ok; - long n,alg; + long n,alg_k,alg_a; EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa=NULL; @@ -1080,7 +1079,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems later.*/ - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_kPSK) + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) { s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new(); if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) @@ -1123,12 +1122,13 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) } param_len=0; - alg=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; + alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - if (alg & SSL_kPSK) - { + if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) + { char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; @@ -1164,7 +1164,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; - } + } p+=i; n-=param_len; @@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (alg & SSL_kRSA) + if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL) { @@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) n-=param_len; /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */ - if (alg & SSL_aRSA) + if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); else { @@ -1226,7 +1226,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) ; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - else if (alg & SSL_kEDH) + else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) { if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL) { @@ -1280,14 +1280,14 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) n-=param_len; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (alg & SSL_aRSA) + if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); #else if (0) ; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - else if (alg & SSL_aDSS) + else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509); #endif /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ @@ -1295,7 +1295,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh; dh=NULL; } - else if ((alg & SSL_kDHr) || (alg & SSL_kDHd)) + else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); @@ -1304,7 +1304,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - else if (alg & SSL_kEECDH) + else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) { EC_GROUP *ngroup; const EC_GROUP *group; @@ -1388,11 +1388,11 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) */ if (0) ; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - else if (alg & SSL_aRSA) + else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA - else if (alg & SSL_aECDSA) + else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); #endif /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ @@ -1403,7 +1403,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); srvr_ecpoint = NULL; } - else if (alg) + else if (alg_k) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); @@ -1508,7 +1508,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) } else { - if (!(alg & SSL_aNULL) && !(alg & SSL_kPSK)) + if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) /* aNULL or kPSK do not need public keys */ { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); @@ -1584,8 +1584,7 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s) /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { - l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; - if (l & SSL_aNULL) + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER); @@ -1724,7 +1723,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p,*d; int n; - unsigned long l; + unsigned long alg_k; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char *q; EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; @@ -1746,12 +1745,12 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p= &(d[4]); - l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; + alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* Fool emacs indentation */ if (0) {} #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - else if (l & SSL_kRSA) + else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { RSA *rsa; unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; @@ -1810,7 +1809,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - else if (l & SSL_kKRB5) + else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { krb5_error_code krb5rc; KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; @@ -1829,7 +1828,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n", - l, SSL_kKRB5); + l, SSL_kKRB5); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ authp = NULL; @@ -1935,7 +1934,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) n+=outl + 2; s->session->master_key_length= - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); @@ -1944,7 +1943,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - else if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) + else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) { DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt; @@ -2001,7 +2000,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - else if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & |