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authorBodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>2001-02-08 12:14:51 +0000
committerBodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>2001-02-08 12:14:51 +0000
commit35ed8cb8b6655606c2be31d44be942f6724ba405 (patch)
tree23cb17587c9eba1277d885d28d70e39e6a319af0
parent7edc5ed90a55ecaf94ded491c99cfe930da9ba2a (diff)
Integrate my implementation of a countermeasure against
Bleichenbacher's DSA attack. With this implementation, the expected number of iterations never exceeds 2. New semantics for BN_rand_range(): BN_rand_range(r, min, range) now generates r such that min <= r < min+range. (Previously, BN_rand_range(r, min, max) generated r such that min <= r < max. It is more convenient to have the range; also the previous prototype was misleading because max was larger than the actual maximum.)
-rw-r--r--CHANGES2
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn.h4
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_err.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_rand.c61
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c4
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod6
6 files changed, 67 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 3e2d97daaa..136dde4884 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
*) Add new function BN_rand_range(), and fix DSA_sign_setup() to prevent
Bleichenbacher's DSA attack.
- [Ulf Moeller]
+ [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller]
*) Update Rijndael code to version 3.0 and change EVP AES ciphers to
handle the new API. Currently only ECB, CBC modes supported. Add new
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn.h b/crypto/bn/bn.h
index be4e7ae2ba..8b2b970995 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn.h
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn.h
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ BIGNUM *BN_CTX_get(BN_CTX *ctx);
void BN_CTX_end(BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top,int bottom);
int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top,int bottom);
-int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *min, BIGNUM *max);
+int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *min, BIGNUM *range);
int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a);
int BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG);
BIGNUM *BN_new(void);
@@ -527,6 +527,7 @@ int BN_bntest_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top,int bottom);
#define BN_F_BN_MPI2BN 112
#define BN_F_BN_NEW 113
#define BN_F_BN_RAND 114
+#define BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE 122
#define BN_F_BN_USUB 115
/* Reason codes. */
@@ -539,6 +540,7 @@ int BN_bntest_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top,int bottom);
#define BN_R_EXPAND_ON_STATIC_BIGNUM_DATA 105
#define BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED 110
#define BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH 106
+#define BN_R_INVALID_RANGE 115
#define BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE 111
#define BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED 107
#define BN_R_NO_INVERSE 108
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_err.c b/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
index d7f0493f47..c713e1f154 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_functs[]=
{ERR_PACK(0,BN_F_BN_MPI2BN,0), "BN_mpi2bn"},
{ERR_PACK(0,BN_F_BN_NEW,0), "BN_new"},
{ERR_PACK(0,BN_F_BN_RAND,0), "BN_rand"},
+{ERR_PACK(0,BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE,0), "BN_rand_range"},
{ERR_PACK(0,BN_F_BN_USUB,0), "BN_usub"},
{0,NULL}
};
@@ -102,6 +103,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_reasons[]=
{BN_R_EXPAND_ON_STATIC_BIGNUM_DATA ,"expand on static bignum data"},
{BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED ,"input not reduced"},
{BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH ,"invalid length"},
+{BN_R_INVALID_RANGE ,"invalid range"},
{BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE ,"not a square"},
{BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED ,"not initialized"},
{BN_R_NO_INVERSE ,"no inverse"},
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c b/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
index f2c79b5e31..a7e35357d6 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
@@ -169,13 +169,62 @@ int BN_bntest_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
}
#endif
-/* random number r: min <= r < max */
-int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *min, BIGNUM *max)
+/* random number r: min <= r < min+range */
+int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *min, BIGNUM *range)
{
- int n = BN_num_bits(max);
- do
+ int n;
+
+ if (range->neg || BN_is_zero(range))
+ {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE, BN_R_INVALID_RANGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ n = BN_num_bits(range); /* n > 0 */
+
+ if (n == 1)
+ {
+ if (!BN_zero(r)) return 0;
+ }
+ else if (BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 2))
+ {
+ do
+ {
+ /* range = 11..._2, so each iteration succeeds with probability > .5 */
+ if (!BN_rand(r, n, 0, 0)) return 0;
+ fprintf(stderr, "?");
+ }
+ while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0);
+ fprintf(stderr, "! (11...)\n");
+ }
+ else
{
- if (!BN_rand(r, n, 0, 0)) return 0;
- } while ((min && BN_cmp(r, min) < 0) || BN_cmp(r, max) >= 0);
+ /* range = 10..._2,
+ * so 3*range (= 11..._2) is exactly one bit longer than range */
+ do
+ {
+ if (!BN_rand(r, n + 1, 0, 0)) return 0;
+ /* If r < 3*range, use r := r MOD range
+ * (which is either r, r - range, or r - 2*range).
+ * Otherwise, iterate once more.
+ * Since 3*range = 11..._2, each iteration succeeds with
+ * probability > .5. */
+ if (BN_cmp(r ,range) >= 0)
+ {
+ if (!BN_sub(r, r, range)) return 0;
+ if (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0)
+ if (!BN_sub(r, r, range)) return 0;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "?");
+ }
+ while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0);
+ fprintf(stderr, "! (10...)\n");
+ }
+
+ if (min != NULL)
+ {
+ if (!BN_add(r, r, min)) return 0;
+ }
+
return 1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
index 7304037947..1967290baf 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -180,7 +180,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
kinv=NULL;
/* Get random k */
- if (!BN_rand_range(&k, BN_value_one(), dsa->q)) goto err;
+ do
+ if (!BN_rand_range(&k, NULL, dsa->q)) goto err;
+ while (BN_is_zero(&k));
if ((dsa->method_mont_p == NULL) && (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P))
{
diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
index dc93949246..e4c94e3d12 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ BN_rand, BN_pseudo_rand - generate pseudo-random number
int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom);
- int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *min, BIGNUM *max);
+ int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *min, BIGNUM *range);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ non-cryptographic purposes and for certain purposes in cryptographic
protocols, but usually not for key generation etc.
BN_rand_range() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random
-number B<rnd> in the range B<min> E<lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<max>. B<min>
-may be NULL, in that case 0 E<lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<max>.
+number B<rnd> in the range B<min> E<lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<min> + B<range>.
+B<min> may be NULL, in that case 0 E<lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<range>.
The PRNG must be seeded prior to calling BN_rand() or BN_rand_range().