diff options
| author | Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org> | 2014-06-06 14:44:20 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2014-08-06 20:27:51 +0100 |
| commit | 099ccdb8084aff60efad0c91185cb465f9123859 (patch) | |
| tree | b2aa45120b6de5d4c1d3935b61ad827ca56221ef | |
| parent | 9871417fb74dca48ea1dc85ae666a6529d113ff8 (diff) | |
Fix return code for truncated DTLS fragment.
Previously, a truncated DTLS fragment in
|dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would cause *ok to be cleared, but
the return value would still be the number of bytes read. This would
cause |dtls1_get_message| not to consider it an error and it would
continue processing as normal until the calling function noticed that
*ok was zero.
I can't see an exploit here because |dtls1_get_message| uses
|s->init_num| as the length, which will always be zero from what I can
see.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/d1_both.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c index bb52d92a29..ac0fcaa8fc 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -771,7 +771,9 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, frag->fragment,frag_len,0); - if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + i = -1; + if (i<=0) goto err; } |