A general spring-cleaning (in autumn) to fix up signed/unsigned warnings.

I have tried to convert 'len' type variable declarations to unsigned as a
means to address these warnings when appropriate, but when in doubt I have
used casts in the comparisons instead. The better solution (that would get
us all lynched by API users) would be to go through and convert all the
function prototypes and structure definitions to use unsigned variables
except when signed is necessary. The proliferation of (signed) "int" for
strictly non-negative uses is unfortunate.

37 files changed, 97 insertions, 82 deletions

diff --git a/apps/ca.c b/apps/ca.c
index 780868a9f0..15211b8443 100644
--- a/apps/ca.c
+++ b/apps/ca.c
@@ -3005,7 +3005,8 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold, ASN1_G
 	char *tmp = NULL;
 	char *rtime_str, *reason_str = NULL, *arg_str = NULL, *p;
 	int reason_code = -1;
-	int i, ret = 0;
+	int ret = 0;
+	unsigned int i;
 	ASN1_OBJECT *hold = NULL;
 	ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL;
 	tmp = BUF_strdup(str);
diff --git a/apps/enc.c b/apps/enc.c
index 0a9f7310bf..ae18452e86 100644
--- a/apps/enc.c
+++ b/apps/enc.c
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ bad:
 			if (!nosalt)
 				{
 				printf("salt=");
-				for (i=0; i<sizeof salt; i++)
+				for (i=0; i<(int)sizeof(salt); i++)
 					printf("%02X",salt[i]);
 				printf("\n");
 				}
diff --git a/apps/passwd.c b/apps/passwd.c
index 3ad91d89d6..b9d9d7a36a 100644
--- a/apps/passwd.c
+++ b/apps/passwd.c
@@ -312,7 +312,8 @@ static char *md5crypt(const char *passwd, const char *magic, const char *salt)
 	static char out_buf[6 + 9 + 24 + 2]; /* "$apr1$..salt..$.......md5hash..........\0" */
 	unsigned char buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 	char *salt_out;
-	int n, i;
+	int n;
+	unsigned int i;
 	EVP_MD_CTX md,md2;
 	size_t passwd_len, salt_len;
 
diff --git a/apps/rand.c b/apps/rand.c
index 63724bc730..a893896033 100644
--- a/apps/rand.c
+++ b/apps/rand.c
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		int chunk;
 
 		chunk = num;
-		if (chunk > sizeof buf)
+		if (chunk > (int)sizeof(buf))
 			chunk = sizeof buf;
 		r = RAND_bytes(buf, chunk);
 		if (r <= 0)
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c b/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c
index 68a525fb12..d9db53f01d 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c
@@ -67,12 +67,13 @@
 
 int ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a, long v)
 	{
-	int i,j,k;
+	int j,k;
+	unsigned int i;
 	unsigned char buf[sizeof(long)+1];
 	long d;
 
 	a->type=V_ASN1_ENUMERATED;
-	if (a->length < (sizeof(long)+1))
+	if (a->length < (int)(sizeof(long)+1))
 		{
 		if (a->data != NULL)
 			OPENSSL_free(a->data);
@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ long ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a)
 	else if (i != V_ASN1_ENUMERATED)
 		return -1;
 	
-	if (a->length > sizeof(long))
+	if (a->length > (int)sizeof(long))
 		{
 		/* hmm... a bit ugly */
 		return(0xffffffffL);
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
index 78402cd985..4bb300c20b 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
@@ -313,12 +313,13 @@ err:
 
 int ASN1_INTEGER_set(ASN1_INTEGER *a, long v)
 	{
-	int i,j,k;
+	int j,k;
+	unsigned int i;
 	unsigned char buf[sizeof(long)+1];
 	long d;
 
 	a->type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
-	if (a->length < (sizeof(long)+1))
+	if (a->length < (int)(sizeof(long)+1))
 		{
 		if (a->data != NULL)
 			OPENSSL_free(a->data);
@@ -362,7 +363,7 @@ long ASN1_INTEGER_get(ASN1_INTEGER *a)
 	else if (i != V_ASN1_INTEGER)
 		return -1;
 	
-	if (a->length > sizeof(long))
+	if (a->length > (int)sizeof(long))
 		{
 		/* hmm... a bit ugly */
 		return(0xffffffffL);
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_object.c b/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
index 0a8e6c287c..124451d7a6 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ int i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(BIO *bp, ASN1_OBJECT *a)
 	if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
 		return(BIO_write(bp,"NULL",4));
 	i=i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf,sizeof buf,a);
-	if (i > sizeof buf) i=sizeof buf;
+	if (i > (int)sizeof(buf)) i=sizeof buf;
 	BIO_write(bp,buf,i);
 	return(i);
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c
index c035cc0f5d..277726cd50 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ static int append_exp(tag_exp_arg *arg, int exp_tag, int exp_class, int exp_cons
 
 static int asn1_str2tag(const char *tagstr, int len)
 	{
-	int i;
+	unsigned int i;
 	static struct tag_name_st *tntmp, tnst [] = {
 		ASN1_GEN_STR("BOOL", V_ASN1_BOOLEAN),
 		ASN1_GEN_STR("BOOLEAN", V_ASN1_BOOLEAN),
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
index e100e93bed..1905b090ed 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int asn1_get_length(unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl, int max)
 	{
 	unsigned char *p= *pp;
 	unsigned long ret=0;
-	int i;
+	unsigned int i;
 
 	if (max-- < 1) return(0);
 	if (*p == 0x80)
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_long.c b/crypto/asn1/x_long.c
index c04b192794..954d183975 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_long.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_long.c
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static int long_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype,
 	int neg, i;
 	long ltmp;
 	unsigned long utmp = 0;
-	if(len > sizeof(long)) {
+	if(len > (int)sizeof(long)) {
 		ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG);
 		return 0;
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
index bbcc62d831..8207bce230 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
@@ -91,28 +91,28 @@ void BN_set_params(int mult, int high, int low, int mont)
 	{
 	if (mult >= 0)
 		{
-		if (mult > (sizeof(int)*8)-1)
+		if (mult > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
 			mult=sizeof(int)*8-1;
 		bn_limit_bits=mult;
 		bn_limit_num=1<<mult;
 		}
 	if (high >= 0)
 		{
-		if (high > (sizeof(int)*8)-1)
+		if (high > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
 			high=sizeof(int)*8-1;
 		bn_limit_bits_high=high;
 		bn_limit_num_high=1<<high;
 		}
 	if (low >= 0)
 		{
-		if (low > (sizeof(int)*8)-1)
+		if (low > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
 			low=sizeof(int)*8-1;
 		bn_limit_bits_low=low;
 		bn_limit_num_low=1<<low;
 		}
 	if (mont >= 0)
 		{
-		if (mont > (sizeof(int)*8)-1)
+		if (mont > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
 			mont=sizeof(int)*8-1;
 		bn_limit_bits_mont=mont;
 		bn_limit_num_mont=1<<mont;
@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ BN_ULONG BN_get_word(const BIGNUM *a)
 	BN_ULONG ret=0;
 
 	n=BN_num_bytes(a);
-	if (n > sizeof(BN_ULONG))
+	if (n > (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG))
 		return(BN_MASK2);
 	for (i=a->top-1; i>=0; i--)
 		{
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ BN_ULONG BN_get_word(const BIGNUM *a)
 int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
 	{
 	int i,n;
-	if (bn_expand(a,sizeof(BN_ULONG)*8) == NULL) return(0);
+	if (bn_expand(a,(int)sizeof(BN_ULONG)*8) == NULL) return(0);
 
 	n=sizeof(BN_ULONG)/BN_BYTES;
 	a->neg=0;
diff --git a/crypto/des/destest.c b/crypto/des/destest.c
index 3983ac8e5f..788f552c88 100644
--- a/crypto/des/destest.c
+++ b/crypto/des/destest.c
@@ -333,7 +333,8 @@ static int cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher);
 static int ede_cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher);
 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	{
-	int i,j,err=0;
+	int j,err=0;
+	unsigned int i;
 	des_cblock in,out,outin,iv3,iv2;
 	des_key_schedule ks,ks2,ks3;
 	unsigned char cbc_in[40];
@@ -391,7 +392,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	DES_ede3_cbcm_encrypt(cbc_out,cbc_in,i,&ks,&ks2,&ks3,&iv3,&iv2,DES_DECRYPT);
 	if (memcmp(cbc_in,cbc_data,strlen((char *)cbc_data)+1) != 0)
 		{
-		int n;
+		unsigned int n;
 
 		printf("des_ede3_cbcm_encrypt decrypt error\n");
 		for(n=0 ; n < i ; ++n)
@@ -540,7 +541,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	if (memcmp(cbc_out,cbc3_ok,
 		(unsigned int)(strlen((char *)cbc_data)+1+7)/8*8) != 0)
 		{
-		int n;
+		unsigned int n;
 
 		printf("des_ede3_cbc_encrypt encrypt error\n");
 		for(n=0 ; n < i ; ++n)
@@ -556,7 +557,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(cbc_out,cbc_in,i,ks,ks2,ks3,&iv3,DES_DECRYPT);
 	if (memcmp(cbc_in,cbc_data,strlen((char *)cbc_data)+1) != 0)
 		{
-		int n;
+		unsigned int n;
 
 		printf("des_ede3_cbc_encrypt decrypt error\n");
 		for(n=0 ; n < i ; ++n)
diff --git a/crypto/des/set_key.c b/crypto/des/set_key.c
index 143008ed9c..55efe03f42 100644
--- a/crypto/des/set_key.c
+++ b/crypto/des/set_key.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static const unsigned char odd_parity[256]={
 
 void DES_set_odd_parity(DES_cblock *key)
 	{
-	int i;
+	unsigned int i;
 
 	for (i=0; i<DES_KEY_SZ; i++)
 		(*key)[i]=odd_parity[(*key)[i]];
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ void DES_set_odd_parity(DES_cblock *key)
 
 int DES_check_key_parity(const_DES_cblock *key)
 	{
-	int i;
+	unsigned int i;
 
 	for (i=0; i<DES_KEY_SZ; i++)
 		{
diff --git a/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c b/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
index 33349c2f98..fa5cbc7eb1 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static int b64_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 		{
 		i=ctx->buf_len-ctx->buf_off;
 		if (i > outl) i=outl;
-		OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_off+i < sizeof ctx->buf);
+		OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_off+i < (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
 		memcpy(out,&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]),i);
 		ret=i;
 		out+=i;
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c b/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c
index 3932f60e59..d37726ffae 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c
@@ -168,16 +168,17 @@ static int rc2_magic_to_meth(int i)
 static int rc2_get_asn1_type_and_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
 	{
 	long num=0;
-	int i=0,l;
+	int i=0;
 	int key_bits;
+	unsigned int l;
 	unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
 
 	if (type != NULL)
 		{
 		l=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
-		OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof iv);
+		OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof(iv));
 		i=ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring(type,&num,iv,l);
-		if (i != l)
+		if (i != (int)l)
 			return(-1);
 		key_bits =rc2_magic_to_meth((int)num);
 		if (!key_bits)
diff --git a/crypto/evp/encode.c b/crypto/evp/encode.c
index 08209357ce..32744ca686 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/encode.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/encode.c
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
 
 	*outl=0;
 	if (inl == 0) return;
-	OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= sizeof ctx->enc_data);
+	OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
 	if ((ctx->num+inl) < ctx->length)
 		{
 		memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]),in,inl);
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
 		/* only save the good data :-) */
 		if (!B64_NOT_BASE64(v))
 			{
-			OPENSSL_assert(n < sizeof ctx->enc_data);
+			OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
 			d[n++]=tmp;
 			ln++;
 			}
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
index be0758a879..db621bfc8b 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
@@ -187,7 +187,8 @@ skip_to_init:
 
 			case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE:
 
-			OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) <= sizeof ctx->iv);
+			OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) <=
+					(int)sizeof(ctx->iv));
 			if(iv) memcpy(ctx->oiv, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
 			memcpy(ctx->iv, ctx->oiv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
 			break;
@@ -274,7 +275,7 @@ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
 		}
 	i=ctx->buf_len;
 	bl=ctx->cipher->block_size;
-	OPENSSL_assert(bl <= sizeof ctx->buf);
+	OPENSSL_assert(bl <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
 	if (i != 0)
 		{
 		if (i+inl < bl)
@@ -320,7 +321,8 @@ int EVP_EncryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 
 int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 	{
-	int i,n,b,bl,ret;
+	int n,ret;
+	unsigned int i, b, bl;
 
 	b=ctx->cipher->block_size;
 	OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->buf);
@@ -356,7 +358,8 @@ int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
 	     const unsigned char *in, int inl)
 	{
-	int b, fix_len;
+	int fix_len;
+	unsigned int b;
 
 	if (inl == 0)
 		{
@@ -409,8 +412,8 @@ int EVP_DecryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 
 int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 	{
-	int i,b;
-	int n;
+	int i,n;
+	unsigned int b;
 
 	*outl=0;
 	b=ctx->cipher->block_size;
@@ -433,7 +436,7 @@ int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 			}
 		OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->final);
 		n=ctx->final[b-1];
-		if (n > b)
+		if (n > (int)b)
 			{
 			EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL,EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
 			return(0);
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c b/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
index 52a3b287be..c97cb9cea6 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
@@ -85,14 +85,15 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
 
 int EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
 	{
-	int i=0,l;
+	int i=0;
+	unsigned int l;
 
 	if (type != NULL) 
 		{
 		l=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
-		OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof c->iv);
+		OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof(c->iv));
 		i=ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring(type,c->oiv,l);
-		if (i != l)
+		if (i != (int)l)
 			return(-1);
 		else if (i > 0)
 			memcpy(c->iv,c->oiv,l);
@@ -102,12 +103,13 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
 
 int EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
 	{
-	int i=0,j;
+	int i=0;
+	unsigned int j;
 
 	if (type != NULL)
 		{
 		j=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
-		OPENSSL_assert(j <= sizeof c->iv);
+		OPENSSL_assert(j <= sizeof(c->iv));
 		i=ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring(type,c->oiv,j);
 		}
 	return(i);
diff --git a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c
index a1874e83b2..39306f4564 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
 		EVP_DigestFinal_ex (&ctx, md_tmp, NULL);
 	}
 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-	OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher) <= sizeof md_tmp);
+	OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher) <= (int)sizeof(md_tmp));
 	memcpy(key, md_tmp, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher));
 	OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) <= 16);
 	memcpy(iv, md_tmp + (16 - EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)),
diff --git a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
index b161d7664a..dca0514867 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
@@ -149,7 +149,8 @@ int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
                          int en_de)
 {
 	unsigned char *pbuf, *salt, key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
-	int saltlen, keylen, iter, plen;
+	int saltlen, iter, plen;
+	unsigned int keylen;
 	PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL;
 	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
 	PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL;
@@ -208,7 +209,7 @@ int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
 
 	/* Now check the parameters of the kdf */
 
-	if(kdf->keylength && (ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->keylength) != keylen)){
+	if(kdf->keylength && (ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->keylength) != (int)keylen)){
 		EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN,
 						EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH);
 		goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/hmac/hmac.c b/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
index 4c91f919d5..f7392a0dae 100644
--- a/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
+++ b/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ void HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len,
 		{
 		reset=1;
 		j=EVP_MD_block_size(md);
-		OPENSSL_assert(j <= sizeof ctx->key);
+		OPENSSL_assert(j <= (int)sizeof(ctx->key));
 		if (j < len)
 			{
 			EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->md_ctx,md, impl);
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ void HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len,
 			}
 		else
 			{
-			OPENSSL_assert(len <= sizeof ctx->key);
+			OPENSSL_assert(len <= (int)sizeof(ctx->key));
 			memcpy(ctx->key,key,len);
 			ctx->key_length=len;
 			}
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
index 900af737ed..d536b523d8 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(int (*i2d)(), const char *name, BIO *bp, char *x,
 			kstr=(unsigned char *)buf;
 			}
 		RAND_add(data,i,0);/* put in the RSA key. */
-		OPENSSL_assert(enc->iv_len <= sizeof iv);
+		OPENSSL_assert(enc->iv_len <= (int)sizeof(iv));
 		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv,enc->iv_len) < 0) /* Generate a salt */
 			goto err;
 		/* The 'iv' is used as the iv and as a salt.  It is
diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index eeffc0df4c..66b229c9b9 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
 	 * other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
 	 * the incremented counter).  By XORing it we keep at least as
 	 * much entropy as fits into md. */
-	for (k = 0; k < sizeof md; k++)
+	for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++)
 		{
 		md[k] ^= local_md[k];
 		}
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
index 3714b248c4..024e11b8e7 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -85,7 +85,8 @@ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, unsigned long e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
 static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, unsigned long e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
 	{
 	BIGNUM *r0=NULL,*r1=NULL,*r2=NULL,*r3=NULL,*tmp;
-	int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0,i;
+	int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0;
+	unsigned int i;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL,*ctx2=NULL;
 
 	ctx=BN_CTX_new();
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c b/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
index 881252608d..9c84a59d52 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ int X509_TRUST_get_count(void)
 X509_TRUST * X509_TRUST_get0(int idx)
 {
 	if(idx < 0) return NULL;
-	if(idx < X509_TRUST_COUNT) return trstandard + idx;
+	if(idx < (int)X509_TRUST_COUNT) return trstandard + idx;
 	return sk_X509_TRUST_value(trtable, idx - X509_TRUST_COUNT);
 }
 
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p)
 
 void X509_TRUST_cleanup(void)
 {
-	int i;
+	unsigned int i;
 	for(i = 0; i < X509_TRUST_COUNT; i++) trtable_free(trstandard + i);
 	sk_X509_TRUST_pop_free(trtable, trtable_free);
 	trtable = NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
index 4d145f71fd..b1a6d2632a 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
 X509_PURPOSE * X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
 {
 	if(idx < 0) return NULL;
-	if(idx < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx;
+	if(idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx;
 	return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
 }
 
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
 
 void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
 {
-	int i;
+	unsigned int i;
 	sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
 	for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) xptable_free(xstandard + i);
 	xptable = NULL;
diff --git a/engines/e_4758_cca.c b/engines/e_4758_cca.c
index ee52a3f66f..b006ed8763 100644
--- a/engines/e_4758_cca.c
+++ b/engines/e_4758_cca.c
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ static EVP_PKEY *ibm_4758_load_privkey(ENGINE* e, const char* key_id,
 	unsigned char exitData[8];
 	unsigned char ruleArray[8];
 	unsigned char keyLabel[64];
-	long keyLabelLength = strlen(key_id);
+	unsigned long keyLabelLength = strlen(key_id);
 	unsigned char modulus[256];
 	long modulusFieldLength = sizeof(modulus);
 	long modulusLength = 0;
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ static EVP_PKEY *ibm_4758_load_pubkey(ENGINE* e, const char* key_id,
 	unsigned char exitData[8];
 	unsigned char ruleArray[8];
 	unsigned char keyLabel[64];
-	long keyLabelLength = strlen(key_id);
+	unsigned long keyLabelLength = strlen(key_id);
 	unsigned char modulus[512];
 	long modulusFieldLength = sizeof(modulus);
 	long modulusLength = 0;
@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ static int cca_get_random_bytes(unsigned char* buf, int num)
 	unsigned char form[] = "RANDOM  ";
 	unsigned char rand_buf[8];
 
-	while(num >= sizeof(rand_buf))
+	while(num >= (int)sizeof(rand_buf))
 		{
 		randomNumberGenerate(&ret_code, &reason_code, &exit_data_length,
 			exit_data, form, rand_buf);
diff --git a/ssl/s2_clnt.c b/ssl/s2_clnt.c
index 1d24dedc91..62e83afb35 100644
--- a/ssl/s2_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_clnt.c
@@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ static int client_master_key(SSL *s)
 		sess->master_key_length=i;
 		if (i > 0)
 			{
-			if (i > sizeof sess->master_key)
+			if (i > (int)sizeof(sess->master_key))
 				{
 				ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ static int client_master_key(SSL *s)
 		else
 			enc=i;
 
-		if (i < enc)
+		if ((int)i < enc)
 			{
 			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR);
@@ -717,7 +717,7 @@ static int client_master_key(SSL *s)
 		d+=enc;
 		karg=sess->key_arg_length;	
 		s2n(karg,p); /* key arg size */
-		if (karg > sizeof sess->key_arg)
+		if (karg > (int)sizeof(sess->key_arg))
 			{
 			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
diff --git a/ssl/s2_enc.c b/ssl/s2_enc.c
index d3b144f1c5..12e17bf668 100644
--- a/ssl/s2_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_enc.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client)
 	if (ssl2_generate_key_material(s) <= 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	OPENSSL_assert(c->iv_len <= sizeof s->session->key_arg);
+	OPENSSL_assert(c->iv_len <= (int)sizeof(s->session->key_arg));
 	EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ws,c,NULL,&(s->s2->key_material[(client)?num:0]),
 		s->session->key_arg);
 	EVP_DecryptInit_ex(rs,c,NULL,&(s->s2->key_material[(client)?0:num]),
diff --git a/ssl/s2_lib.c b/ssl/s2_lib.c
index 910b9fe097..a0edfb8960 100644
--- a/ssl/s2_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_lib.c
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned