diff options
| author | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2023-07-07 14:39:48 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> | 2023-07-19 11:24:06 +0200 |
| commit | e9ddae17e302a7e6a0daf00f25efed7c70f114d4 (patch) | |
| tree | 17feffe8ed29314e00547d0d9c10b941b7e9deb3 | |
| parent | 8780a896543a654e757db1b9396383f9d8095528 (diff) | |
Add a test for CVE-2023-3446
Confirm that the only errors DH_check() finds with DH parameters with an
excessively long modulus is that the modulus is too large. We should not
be performing time consuming checks using that modulus.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21452)
| -rw-r--r-- | test/dhtest.c | 15 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/test/dhtest.c b/test/dhtest.c index 9d5609b943..00b3c47101 100644 --- a/test/dhtest.c +++ b/test/dhtest.c @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static int dh_test(void) || !TEST_true(DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, q, g))) goto err1; - if (!DH_check(dh, &i)) + if (!TEST_true(DH_check(dh, &i))) goto err2; if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME) || !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME) @@ -123,6 +123,17 @@ static int dh_test(void) /* check whether the public key was calculated correctly */ TEST_uint_eq(BN_get_word(pub_key2), 3331L); + /* Modulus of size: dh check max modulus bits + 1 */ + if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 1)) + || !TEST_true(BN_lshift(p, p, OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS))) + goto err3; + + /* + * We expect no checks at all for an excessively large modulus + */ + if (!TEST_false(DH_check(dh, &i))) + goto err3; + /* * II) key generation */ @@ -137,7 +148,7 @@ static int dh_test(void) goto err3; /* ... and check whether it is valid */ - if (!DH_check(a, &i)) + if (!TEST_true(DH_check(a, &i))) goto err3; if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME) || !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME) |