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authorCesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>2019-08-14 10:17:06 +0300
committerMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>2019-08-27 09:13:34 +0100
commit51e236df41871871dabd2f5f7156e27a0eef3b3b (patch)
tree654e61541217ee222ed4c33318eb2260e69a1935
parent4bdab2571782393e4ba3acb8578c415ce1575a75 (diff)
Fix SCA vulnerability when using PVK and MSBLOB key formats
This commit addresses a side-channel vulnerability present when PVK and MSBLOB key formats are loaded into OpenSSL. The public key was not computed using a constant-time exponentiation function. This issue was discovered and reported by the NISEC group at TAU Finland. Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9587) (cherry picked from commit 724339ff44235149c4e8ddae614e1dda6863e23e)
-rw-r--r--crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c3
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c b/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
index e39c243814..609e3ad9ca 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ static EVP_PKEY *b2i_dss(const unsigned char **in,
if (!read_lebn(&p, 20, &priv_key))
goto memerr;
+ /* Set constant time flag before public key calculation */
+ BN_set_flags(priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
/* Calculate public key */
pub_key = BN_new();
if (pub_key == NULL)