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authorDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>2006-09-14 17:25:02 +0000
committerDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>2006-09-14 17:25:02 +0000
commitbc7535bc7fe30fbba222c316a3957da7d906603b (patch)
tree2c7ea8fdce84052210512bb62f66c25ac68067b1
parent83357f047d994415ae96e07386fe55ed1087bdee (diff)
Support for AKID in CRLs and partial support for IDP. Overhaul of CRL
handling to support this.
-rw-r--r--CHANGES12
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_txt.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c159
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c81
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509v3/x509v3.h1
6 files changed, 218 insertions, 41 deletions
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index d205bca4b8..506e8fa4aa 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,18 @@
Changes between 0.9.8d and 0.9.9 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) Partial support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension. CRLs
+ partitioned by DP are handled but no indirect CRL or reason partitioning
+ (yet). Complete overhaul of CRL handling: now the most suitable CRL is
+ selected via a scoring technique which handles IDP and AKID in CRLs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New X509_STORE_CTX callbacks lookup_crls() and lookup_certs() which
+ will ultimately be used for all verify operations: this will remove the
+ X509_STORE dependency on certificate verification and allow alternative
+ lookup methods. X509_STORE based implementations of these two callbacks.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
*) Allow multiple CRLs to exist in an X509_STORE with matching issuer names.
Modify get_crl() to find a valid (unexpired) CRL if possible.
[Steve Henson]
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c b/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
index 7dd2b761d9..92f47a07b6 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
@@ -162,6 +162,10 @@ const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n)
return("invalid or inconsistent certificate policy extension");
case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY:
return("no explicit policy");
+ case X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE:
+ return("Different CRL scope");
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE:
+ return("Unsupported extension feature");
default:
BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"error number %ld",n);
return(buf);
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index f1f5fb9b3f..2292b27ff7 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid);
+static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl);
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
@@ -649,30 +651,81 @@ static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
return 1;
}
-/* Lookup CRLs from the supplied list. Look for matching isser name
- * and validity. If we can't find a valid CRL return the last one
- * with matching name. This gives more meaningful error codes. Otherwise
- * we'd get a CRL not found error if a CRL existed with matching name but
- * was invalid.
+/* Based on a set of possible CRLs decide which one is best suited
+ * to handle the current certificate. This is determined by a number
+ * of criteria. If any of the "must" criteria is not satisfied then
+ * the candidate CRL is rejected. If all "must" and all "should" are
+ * satisfied the CRL is accepted. If no CRL satisfies all criteria then
+ * a "best CRL" is used to provide some meaningful error information.
+ *
+ * CRL issuer name must match "nm" if not NULL.
+ * If IDP is present:
+ * a. it must be consistent.
+ * b. onlyuser, onlyCA, onlyAA should match certificate being checked.
+ * c. indirectCRL must be FALSE.
+ * d. onlysomereason must be absent.
+ * e. if name present a DP in certificate CRLDP must match.
+ * If AKID present it should match certificate AKID.
+ * Check time should fall between lastUpdate and nextUpdate.
*/
+/* IDP name field matches CRLDP or IDP name not present */
+#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 4
+/* AKID present and matches cert, or AKID not present */
+#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 2
+/* times OK */
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 1
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_ALL 7
+
+/* IDP flags which cause a CRL to be rejected */
+
+#define IDP_REJECT (IDP_INVALID|IDP_INDIRECT|IDP_REASONS)
+
static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl,
X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
{
- int i;
+ int i, crl_score, best_score = -1;
X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
{
+ crl_score = 0;
crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
continue;
if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
+
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT)
+ {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REJECT)
+ continue;
+ if (idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl))
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
+ }
+ else
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
+
+ if (crl->akid)
+ {
+ if (crl_akid_check(ctx, crl->akid))
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
+ }
+ else
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
+
+ if (crl_score == CRL_SCORE_ALL)
{
*pcrl = crl;
CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
return 1;
}
- best_crl = crl;
+
+ if (crl_score > best_score)
+ {
+ best_crl = crl;
+ best_score = crl_score;
+ }
}
if (best_crl)
{
@@ -683,9 +736,71 @@ static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl,
return 0;
}
-/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a
- * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...
+static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
+ {
+ int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
+ if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
+ cidx++;
+ if (X509_check_akid(sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx), akid) == X509_V_OK)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+
+/* Check IDP name matches at least one CRLDP name */
+
+static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl)
+ {
+ int i, j, k;
+ GENERAL_NAMES *inames, *dnames;
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
+ return 0;
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
+ {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!crl->idp->distpoint)
+ return 1;
+ if (crl->idp->distpoint->type != 0)
+ return 1;
+ if (!x->crldp)
+ return 0;
+ inames = crl->idp->distpoint->name.fullname;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(inames); i++)
+ {
+ GENERAL_NAME *igen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(inames, i);
+ for (j = 0; j < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); j++)
+ {
+ DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, j);
+ /* We don't handle these at present */
+ if (dp->reasons || dp->CRLissuer)
+ continue;
+ if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 0))
+ continue;
+ dnames = dp->distpoint->name.fullname;
+ for (k = 0; k < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dnames); k++)
+ {
+ GENERAL_NAME *cgen =
+ sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dnames, k);
+ if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(igen, cgen))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. Currently only
+ * one CRL is retrieved. Multiple CRLs may be needed if we handle
+ * CRLs partitioned on reason code later.
*/
+
static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x)
{
int ok;
@@ -765,6 +880,28 @@ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
if(!ok) goto err;
}
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT)
+ {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_REASONS|IDP_INDIRECT))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ if (!idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
@@ -843,6 +980,10 @@ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
if (ext->critical > 0)
{
+ /* We handle IDP now so permit it */
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(ext->object) ==
+ NID_issuing_distribution_point)
+ continue;
ctx->error =
X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
index d546cd9767..322637a6e4 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
@@ -334,6 +334,8 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
#define X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION 41
#define X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION 42
#define X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY 43
+#define X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE 44
+#define X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE 45
/* The application is not happy */
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
index ee2f08fe2d..47b7e0f328 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
@@ -644,39 +644,14 @@ int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
- if(subject->akid) {
- /* Check key ids (if present) */
- if(subject->akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(subject->akid->keyid, issuer->skid) )
- return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
- /* Check serial number */
- if(subject->akid->serial &&
- ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer),
- subject->akid->serial))
- return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
- /* Check issuer name */
- if(subject->akid->issuer) {
- /* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes
- * SEQUENCE OF GeneralName. So look for a DirName.
- * There may be more than one but we only take any
- * notice of the first.
- */
- GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
- GENERAL_NAME *gen;
- X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
- int i;
- gens = subject->akid->issuer;
- for(i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
- gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
- if(gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
- nm = gen->d.dirn;
- break;
- }
- }
- if(nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
- return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
+
+ if(subject->akid)
+ {
+ int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
+ if (ret != X509_V_OK)
+ return ret;
}
- }
+
if(subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
{
if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
@@ -687,3 +662,45 @@ int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
return X509_V_OK;
}
+int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
+ {
+
+ if(!akid)
+ return X509_V_OK;
+
+ /* Check key ids (if present) */
+ if(akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid) )
+ return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
+ /* Check serial number */
+ if(akid->serial &&
+ ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial))
+ return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
+ /* Check issuer name */
+ if(akid->issuer)
+ {
+ /* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes
+ * SEQUENCE OF GeneralName. So look for a DirName.
+ * There may be more than one but we only take any
+ * notice of the first.
+ */
+ GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
+ GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+ X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
+ int i;
+ gens = akid->issuer;
+ for(i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
+ {
+ gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+ if(gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME)
+ {
+ nm = gen->d.dirn;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if(nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
+ return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ return X509_V_OK;
+ }
+
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/x509v3.h b/crypto/x509v3/x509v3.h
index da349e51f5..26884d41ec 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/x509v3.h
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/x509v3.h
@@ -632,6 +632,7 @@ int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca);
int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex);
int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose);
int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject);
+int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid);
int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void);
X509_PURPOSE * X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx);
int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname);