diff options
author | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2015-03-09 16:09:04 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2015-03-19 11:11:22 +0000 |
commit | 819418110b6fff4a7b96f01a5d68f71df3e3b736 (patch) | |
tree | 14848aa0ae4588076ab7791684d27b186cacb0df | |
parent | 77c77f0a1b9f15b869ca3342186dfbedd1119d0e (diff) |
Fix Seg fault in DTLSv1_listen
The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes
the initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to
loop over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received
with an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen
means that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invokation to the
next that can lead to a segmentation fault. Erorrs processing the initial
ClientHello can trigger this scenario. An example of such an error could
be that a DTLS1.0 only client is attempting to connect to a DTLS1.2 only
server.
CVE-2015-0207
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/d1_lib.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/d1_lib.c b/ssl/d1_lib.c index 1f1005421e..ee78921ba8 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/d1_lib.c @@ -543,6 +543,9 @@ int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client) { int ret; + /* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */ + SSL_clear(s); + SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE); s->d1->listen = 1; |