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| author | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2015-04-27 11:13:56 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2015-04-30 23:26:07 +0100 |
| commit | 951ede2a06eba9a71c5d40b25f924e97f443c437 (patch) | |
| tree | 04cb05eff7196059e7bae9c058c0aaecacd6d2ec | |
| parent | 974d4d675cc6f3e1aa50b294ae12a5ba2acebd62 (diff) | |
Sanity check EVP_EncodeUpdate buffer len
There was already a sanity check to ensure the passed buffer length is not
zero. Extend this to ensure that it also not negative. Thanks to Kevin
Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for
reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b86d7dca69f5c80abd60896c8ed3039fc56210cc)
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/evp/encode.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/evp/encode.c b/crypto/evp/encode.c index d1d8a07c14..5c5988fc45 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/encode.c +++ b/crypto/evp/encode.c @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, unsigned int total = 0; *outl = 0; - if (inl == 0) + if (inl <= 0) return; OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data)); if ((ctx->num + inl) < ctx->length) { |