diff options
author | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2013-01-24 13:30:42 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2013-02-05 16:46:15 +0000 |
commit | ebc71865f0506a293242bd4aec97cdc7a8ef24b0 (patch) | |
tree | db65464c6800141aa8abbe2a2764b80268af1b75 | |
parent | 1dfa62d4c871a9007904812e06bdddb2d530ff64 (diff) |
Don't try and verify signatures if key is NULL (CVE-2013-0166)
Add additional check to catch this in ASN1_item_verify too.
-rw-r--r-- | CHANGES | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asn1/a_verify.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c | 9 |
3 files changed, 16 insertions, 3 deletions
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ Changes between 1.0.0j and 1.0.0k [xx XXX xxxx] + *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL. + This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166) + [Steve Henson] + *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate() so it returns the certificate actually sent. diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c index cecdb13c70..097ec813ac 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c @@ -136,6 +136,12 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signat int mdnid, pknid; + if (!pkey) + { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return -1; + } + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); /* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */ diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c index 8a5e788d96..276718304d 100644 --- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c @@ -91,9 +91,12 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, { EVP_PKEY *skey; skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer); - ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0); - EVP_PKEY_free(skey); - if(ret <= 0) + if (skey) + { + ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0); + EVP_PKEY_free(skey); + } + if(!skey || ret <= 0) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); goto end; |