/* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Created: Sat Mar 18 22:15:47 1995 ylo * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the * login (authentication) dialog. */ #include "includes.h" RCSID("$Id: sshconnect.c,v 1.19 1999/12/21 09:57:20 damien Exp $"); #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL #include #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SSL #include #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "packet.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "mpaux.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "compat.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "fingerprint.h" /* Session id for the current session. */ unsigned char session_id[16]; extern Options options; /* * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command. */ int ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, uid_t original_real_uid, const char *proxy_command) { Buffer command; const char *cp; char *command_string; int pin[2], pout[2]; int pid; char portstring[100]; /* Convert the port number into a string. */ snprintf(portstring, sizeof portstring, "%hu", port); /* Build the final command string in the buffer by making the appropriate substitutions to the given proxy command. */ buffer_init(&command); for (cp = proxy_command; *cp; cp++) { if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') { buffer_append(&command, "%", 1); cp++; continue; } if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'h') { buffer_append(&command, host, strlen(host)); cp++; continue; } if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'p') { buffer_append(&command, portstring, strlen(portstring)); cp++; continue; } buffer_append(&command, cp, 1); } buffer_append(&command, "\0", 1); /* Get the final command string. */ command_string = buffer_ptr(&command); /* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */ if (pipe(pin) < 0 || pipe(pout) < 0) fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s", strerror(errno)); debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string); /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { char *argv[10]; /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */ permanently_set_uid(original_real_uid); /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */ close(pin[1]); if (pin[0] != 0) { if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0) perror("dup2 stdin"); close(pin[0]); } close(pout[0]); if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0) perror("dup2 stdout"); /* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */ close(pout[1]); /* Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get printed on the user's terminal. */ argv[0] = "/bin/sh"; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = command_string; argv[3] = NULL; /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any extra privileges above. */ execv("/bin/sh", argv); perror("/bin/sh"); exit(1); } /* Parent. */ if (pid < 0) fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); /* Close child side of the descriptors. */ close(pin[0]); close(pout[1]); /* Free the command name. */ buffer_free(&command); /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ packet_set_connection(pout[0], pin[1]); return 1; } /* * Creates a (possibly privileged) socket for use as the ssh connection. */ int ssh_create_socket(uid_t original_real_uid, int privileged) { int sock; /* * If we are running as root and want to connect to a privileged * port, bind our own socket to a privileged port. */ if (privileged) { int p = IPPORT_RESERVED - 1; sock = rresvport(&p); if (sock < 0) fatal("rresvport: %.100s", strerror(errno)); debug("Allocated local port %d.", p); } else { /* * Just create an ordinary socket on arbitrary port. We use * the user's uid to create the socket. */ temporarily_use_uid(original_real_uid); sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (sock < 0) fatal("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); restore_uid(); } return sock; } /* * Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host. If * port is 0, the default port will be used. If anonymous is zero, * a privileged port will be allocated to make the connection. * This requires super-user privileges if anonymous is false. * Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per * second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h * and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact * the daemon. */ int ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_in * hostaddr, u_short port, int connection_attempts, int anonymous, uid_t original_real_uid, const char *proxy_command) { int sock = -1, attempt, i; int on = 1; struct servent *sp; struct hostent *hp; struct linger linger; debug("ssh_connect: getuid %d geteuid %d anon %d", (int) getuid(), (int) geteuid(), anonymous); /* Get default port if port has not been set. */ if (port == 0) { sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp"); if (sp) port = ntohs(sp->s_port); else port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; } /* If a proxy command is given, connect using it. */ if (proxy_command != NULL) return ssh_proxy_connect(host, port, original_real_uid, proxy_command); /* No proxy command. */ /* No host lookup made yet. */ hp = NULL; /* * Try to connect several times. On some machines, the first time * will sometimes fail. In general socket code appears to behave * quite magically on many machines. */ for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) { if (attempt > 0) debug("Trying again..."); /* Try to parse the host name as a numeric inet address. */ memset(hostaddr, 0, sizeof(hostaddr)); hostaddr->sin_family = AF_INET; hostaddr->sin_port = htons(port); hostaddr->sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(host); if ((hostaddr->sin_addr.s_addr & 0xffffffff) != 0xffffffff) { /* Valid numeric IP address */ debug("Connecting to %.100s port %d.", inet_ntoa(hostaddr->sin_addr), port); /* Create a socket. */ sock = ssh_create_socket(original_real_uid, !anonymous && geteuid() == 0 && port < IPPORT_RESERVED); /* * Connect to the host. We use the user's uid in the * hope that it will help with the problems of * tcp_wrappers showing the remote uid as root. */ temporarily_use_uid(original_real_uid); if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) hostaddr, sizeof(*hostaddr)) >= 0) { /* Successful connect. */ restore_uid(); break; } debug("connect: %.100s", strerror(errno)); restore_uid(); /* Destroy the failed socket. */ shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR); close(sock); } else { /* Not a valid numeric inet address. */ /* Map host name to an address. */ if (!hp) hp = gethostbyname(host); if (!hp) fatal("Bad host name: %.100s", host); if (!hp->h_addr_list[0]) fatal("Host does not have an IP address: %.100s", host); /* Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in sequence until the connection succeeds. */ for (i = 0; hp->h_addr_list[i]; i++) { /* Set the address to connect to. */ hostaddr->sin_family = hp->h_addrtype; memcpy(&hostaddr->sin_addr, hp->h_addr_list[i], sizeof(hostaddr->sin_addr)); debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %d.", host, inet_ntoa(hostaddr->sin_addr), port); /* Create a socket for connecting. */ sock = ssh_create_socket(original_real_uid, !anonymous && geteuid() == 0 && port < IPPORT_RESERVED); /* * Connect to the host. We use the user's * uid in the hope that it will help with * tcp_wrappers showing the remote uid as * root. */ temporarily_use_uid(original_real_uid); if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) hostaddr, sizeof(*hostaddr)) >= 0) { /* Successful connection. */ restore_uid(); break; } debug("connect: %.100s", strerror(errno)); restore_uid(); /* * Close the failed socket; there appear to * be some problems when reusing a socket for * which connect() has already returned an * error. */ shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR); close(sock); } if (hp->h_addr_list[i]) break; /* Successful connection. */ } /* Sleep a moment before retrying. */ sleep(1); } /* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */ if (attempt >= connection_attempts) return 0; debug("Connection established."); /* * Set socket options. We would like the socket to disappear as soon * as it has been closed for whatever reason. */ /* setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */ setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, (void *) &on, sizeof(on)); linger.l_onoff = 1; linger.l_linger = 5; setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (void *) &linger, sizeof(linger)); /* Set the connection. */ packet_set_connection(sock, sock); return 1; } /* * Checks if the user has an authentication agent, and if so, tries to * authenticate using the agent. */ int try_agent_authentication() { int status, type; char *comment; AuthenticationConnection *auth; unsigned char response[16]; unsigned int i; BIGNUM *e, *n, *challenge; /* Get connection to the agent. */ auth = ssh_get_authentication_connection(); if (!auth) return 0; e = BN_new(); n = BN_new(); challenge = BN_new(); /* Loop through identities served by the agent. */ for (status = ssh_get_first_identity(auth, e, n, &comment); status; status = ssh_get_next_identity(auth, e, n, &comment)) { int plen, clen; /* Try this identity. */ debug("Trying RSA authentication via agent with '%.100s'", comment); xfree(comment); /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA); packet_put_bignum(n); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Wait for server's response. */ type = packet_read(&plen); /* The server sends failure if it doesn\'t like our key or does not support RSA authentication. */ if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { debug("Server refused our key."); continue; } /* Otherwise it should have sent a challenge. */ if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type); packet_get_bignum(challenge, &clen); packet_integrity_check(plen, clen, type); debug("Received RSA challenge from server."); /* Ask the agent to decrypt the challenge. */ if (!ssh_decrypt_challenge(auth, e, n, challenge, session_id, 1, response)) { /* The agent failed to authenticate this identifier although it advertised it supports this. Just return a wrong value. */ log("Authentication agent failed to decrypt challenge."); memset(response, 0, sizeof(response)); } debug("Sending response to RSA challenge."); /* Send the decrypted challenge back to the server. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) packet_put_char(response[i]); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Wait for response from the server. */ type = packet_read(&plen); /* The server returns success if it accepted the authentication. */ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { debug("RSA authentication accepted by server."); BN_clear_free(e); BN_clear_free(n); BN_clear_free(challenge); return 1; } /* Otherwise it should return failure. */ if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type); } BN_clear_free(e); BN_clear_free(n); BN_clear_free(challenge); debug("RSA authentication using agent refused."); return 0; } /* * Computes the proper response to a RSA challenge, and sends the response to * the server. */ void respond_to_rsa_challenge(BIGNUM * challenge, RSA * prv) { unsigned char buf[32], response[16]; MD5_CTX md; int i, len; /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */ rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, prv); /* Compute the response. */ /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */ len = BN_num_bytes(challenge); if (len <= 0 || len > sizeof(buf)) packet_disconnect("respond_to_rsa_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len); memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + sizeof(buf) - len); MD5_Init(&md); MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32); MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16); MD5_Final(response, &md); debug("Sending response to host key RSA challenge."); /* Send the response back to the server. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) packet_put_char(response[i]); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); memset(response, 0, sizeof(response)); memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md)); } /* * Checks if the user has authentication file, and if so, tries to authenticate * the user using it. */ int try_rsa_authentication(const char *authfile) { BIGNUM *challenge; RSA *private_key; RSA *public_key; char *passphrase, *comment; int type, i; int plen, clen; /* Try to load identification for the authentication key. */ public_key = RSA_new(); if (!load_public_key(authfile, public_key, &comment)) { RSA_free(public_key); /* Could not load it. Fail. */ return 0; } debug("Trying RSA authentication with key '%.100s'", comment); /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA); packet_put_bignum(public_key->n); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* We no longer need the public key. */ RSA_free(public_key); /* Wait for server's response. */ type = packet_read(&plen); /* * The server responds with failure if it doesn\'t like our key or * doesn\'t support RSA authentication. */ if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { debug("Server refused our key."); xfree(comment); return 0; } /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */ if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type); /* Get the challenge from the packet. */ challenge = BN_new(); packet_get_bignum(challenge, &clen); packet_integrity_check(plen, clen, type); debug("Received RSA challenge from server."); private_key = RSA_new(); /* * Load the private key. Try first with empty passphrase; if it * fails, ask for a passphrase. */ if (!load_private_key(authfile, "", private_key, NULL)) { char buf[300]; snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Enter passphrase for RSA key '%.100s': ", comment); if (!options.batch_mode) passphrase = read_passphrase(buf, 0); else { debug("Will not query passphrase for %.100s in batch mode.", comment); passphrase = xstrdup(""); } /* Load the authentication file using the pasphrase. */ if (!load_private_key(authfile, passphrase, private_key, NULL)) { memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase)); xfree(passphrase); error("Bad passphrase."); /* Send a dummy response packet to avoid protocol error. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) packet_put_char(0); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Expect the server to reject it... */ packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); xfree(comment); return 0; } /* Destroy the passphrase. */ memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase)); xfree(passphrase); } /* We no longer need the comment. */ xfree(comment); /* Compute and send a response to the challenge. */ respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, private_key); /* Destroy the private key. */ RSA_free(private_key); /* We no longer need the challenge. */ BN_clear_free(challenge); /* Wait for response from the server. */ type = packet_read(&plen); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { debug("RSA authentication accepted by server."); return 1; } if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type); debug("RSA authentication refused."); return 0; } /* * Tries to authenticate the user using combined rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv * authentication and RSA host authentication. */ int try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(const char *local_user, RSA * host_key) { int type; BIGNUM *challenge; int plen, clen; debug("Trying rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication."); /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA); packet_put_string(local_user, strlen(local_user)); packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(host_key->n)); packet_put_bignum(host_key->e); packet_put_bignum(host_key->n); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Wait for server's response. */ type = packet_read(&plen); /* The server responds with failure if it doesn't admit our .rhosts authentication or doesn't know our host key. */ if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { debug("Server refused our rhosts authentication or host key."); return 0; } /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */ if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type); /* Get the challenge from the packet. */ challenge = BN_new(); packet_get_bignum(challenge, &clen); packet_integrity_check(plen, clen, type); debug("Received RSA challenge for host key from server."); /* Compute a response to the challenge. */ respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, host_key); /* We no longer need the challenge. */ BN_clear_free(challenge); /* Wait for response from the server. */ type = packet_read(&plen); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication accepted by server."); return 1; } if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type); debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication refused."); return 0; } #ifdef KRB4 int try_kerberos_authentication() { KTEXT_ST auth; /* Kerberos data */ char *reply; char inst[INST_SZ]; char *realm; CREDENTIALS cred; int r, type, plen; Key_schedule schedule; u_long checksum, cksum; MSG_DAT msg_data; struct sockaddr_in local, foreign; struct stat st; /* Don't do anything if we don't have any tickets. */ if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0) return 0; strncpy(inst, (char *) krb_get_phost(get_canonical_hostname()), INST_SZ); realm = (char *) krb_realmofhost(get_canonical_hostname()); if (!realm) { debug("Kerberos V4: no realm for %s", get_canonical_hostname()); return 0; } /* This can really be anything. */ checksum = (u_long) getpid(); r = krb_mk_req(&auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, inst, realm, checksum); if (r != KSUCCESS) { debug("Kerberos V4 krb_mk_req failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]); return 0; } /* Get session key to decrypt the server's reply with. */ r = krb_get_cred(KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, inst, realm, &cred); if (r != KSUCCESS) { debug("get_cred failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]); return 0; } des_key_sched((des_cblock *) cred.session, schedule); /* Send authentication info to server. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS); packet_put_string((char *) auth.dat, auth.length); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Zero the buffer. */ (void) memset(auth.dat, 0, MAX_KTXT_LEN); r = sizeof(local); memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local)); if (getsockname(packet_get_connection_in(), (struct sockaddr *) & local, &r) < 0) debug("getsockname failed: %s", strerror(errno)); r = sizeof(foreign); memset(&foreign, 0, sizeof(foreign)); if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), (struct sockaddr *) & foreign, &r) < 0) { debug("getpeername failed: %s", strerror(errno)); fatal_cleanup(); } /* Get server reply. */ type = packet_read(&plen); switch (type) { case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE: /* Should really be SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_FAILURE */ debug("Kerberos V4 authentication failed."); return 0; break; case SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE: /* SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_SUCCESS */ debug("Kerberos V4 authentication accepted."); /* Get server's response. */ reply = packet_get_string((unsigned int *) &auth.length); memcpy(auth.dat, reply, auth.length); xfree(reply); packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + auth.length, type); /* * If his response isn't properly encrypted with the session * key, and the decrypted checksum fails to match, he's * bogus. Bail out. */ r = krb_rd_priv(auth.dat, auth.length, schedule, &cred.session, &foreign, &local, &msg_data); if (r != KSUCCESS) { debug("Kerberos V4 krb_rd_priv failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]); packet_disconnect("Kerberos V4 challenge failed!"); } /* Fetch the (incremented) checksum that we supplied in the request. */ (void) memcpy((char *) &cksum, (char *) msg_data.app_data, sizeof(cksum)); cksum = ntohl(cksum); /* If it matches, we're golden. */ if (cksum == checksum + 1) { debug("Kerberos V4 challenge successful."); return 1; } else packet_disconnect("Kerberos V4 challenge failed!"); break; default: packet_disconnect("Protocol error on Kerberos V4 response: %d", type); } return 0; } #endif /* KRB4 */ #ifdef AFS int send_kerberos_tgt() { CREDENTIALS *creds; char pname[ANAME_SZ], pinst[INST_SZ], prealm[REALM_SZ]; int r, type, plen; unsigned char buffer[8192]; struct stat st; /* Don't do anything if we don't have any tickets. */ if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0) return 0; creds = xmalloc(sizeof(*creds)); if ((r = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, pname, pinst, prealm)) != KSUCCESS) { debug("Kerberos V4 tf_fullname failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]); return 0; } if ((r = krb_get_cred("krbtgt", prealm, prealm, creds)) != GC_OK) { debug("Kerberos V4 get_cred failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]); return 0; } if (time(0) > krb_life_to_time(creds->issue_date, creds->lifetime)) { debug("Kerberos V4 ticket expired: %s", TKT_FILE); return 0; } creds_to_radix(creds, buffer); xfree(creds); packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT); packet_put_string((char *) buffer, strlen(buffer)); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); type = packet_read(&plen); if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) debug("Kerberos TGT for realm %s rejected.", prealm); else if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) packet_disconnect("Protocol error on Kerberos TGT response: %d", type); return 1; } void send_afs_tokens(void) { CREDENTIALS creds; struct ViceIoctl parms; struct ClearToken ct; int i, type, len, plen; char buf[2048], *p, *server_cell; unsigned char buffer[8192]; /* Move over ktc_GetToken, here's something leaner. */ for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) { /* just in case */ parms.in = (char *) &i; parms.in_size = sizeof(i); parms.out = buf; parms.out_size = sizeof(buf); if (k_pioctl(0, VIOCGETTOK, &parms, 0) != 0) break; p = buf; /* Get secret token. */ memcpy(&creds.ticket_st.length, p, sizeof(unsigned int)); if (creds.ticket_st.length > MAX_KTXT_LEN) break; p += sizeof(unsigned int); memcpy(creds.ticket_st.dat, p, creds.ticket_st.length); p += creds.ticket_st.length; /* Get clear token. */ memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len)); if (len != sizeof(struct ClearToken)) break; p += sizeof(len); memcpy(&ct, p, len); p += len; p += sizeof(len); /* primary flag */ server_cell = p; /* Flesh out our credentials. */ strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof creds.service); creds.instance[0] = '\0'; strlcpy(creds.realm, server_cell, REALM_SZ); memcpy(creds.session, ct.HandShakeKey, DES_KEY_SZ); creds.issue_date = ct.BeginTimestamp; creds.lifetime = krb_time_to_life(creds.issue_date, ct.EndTimestamp); creds.kvno = ct.AuthHandle; snprintf(creds.pname, sizeof(creds.pname), "AFS ID %d", ct.ViceId); creds.pinst[0] = '\0'; /* Encode token, ship it off. */ if (!creds_to_radix(&creds, buffer)) break; packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN); packet_put_string((char *) buffer, strlen(buffer)); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Roger, Roger. Clearance, Clarence. What's your vector, Victor? */ type = packet_read(&plen); if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) debug("AFS token for cell %s rejected.", server_cell); else if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) packet_disconnect("Protocol error on AFS token response: %d", type); } } #endif /* AFS */ /* * Tries to authenticate with any string-based challenge/response system. * Note that the client code is not tied to s/key or TIS. */ int try_skey_authentication() { int type, i, payload_len; char *challenge, *response; debug("Doing skey authentication."); /* request a challenge */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); type = packet_read(&payload_len); if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE && type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) { packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response " "to skey-auth", type); } if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) { debug("No challenge for skey authentication."); return 0; } challenge = packet_get_string(&payload_len); if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! " "Reponse will be transmitted in clear text."); fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", challenge); fflush(stderr); for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { if (i != 0) error("Permission denied, please try again."); response = read_passphrase("Response: ", 0); packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE); packet_put_string(response, strlen(response)); memset(response, 0, strlen(response)); xfree(response); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); type = packet_read(&payload_len); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) return 1; if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response " "to skey-auth-reponse", type); } /* failure */ return 0; } /* * Tries to authenticate with plain passwd authentication. */ int try_password_authentication(char *prompt) { int type, i, payload_len; char *password; debug("Doing password authentication."); if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Password will be transmitted in clear text."); for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { if (i != 0) error("Permission denied, please try again."); password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD); packet_put_string(password, strlen(password)); memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); xfree(password); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); type = packet_read(&payload_len); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) return 1; if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to passwd auth", type); } /* failure */ return 0; } /* * Waits for the server identification string, and sends our own * identification string. */ void ssh_exchange_identification() { char buf[256], remote_version[256]; /* must be same size! */ int remote_major, remote_minor, i; int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); /* Read other side\'s version identification. */ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { if (read(connection_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: read: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (buf[i] == '\r') { buf[i] = '\n'; buf[i + 1] = 0; break; } if (buf[i] == '\n') { buf[i + 1] = 0; break; } } buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; /* * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. */ if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) fatal("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'", buf); debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s", remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); /* Check if the remote protocol version is too old. */ if (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor < 3) fatal("Remote machine has too old SSH software version."); /* We speak 1.3, too. */ if (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 3) { enable_compat13(); if (options.forward_agent && strcmp(remote_version, SSH_VERSION) != 0) { log("Agent forwarding disabled, remote version '%s' is not compatible.", remote_version); options.forward_agent = 0; } } #if 0 /* * Removed for now, to permit compatibility with latter versions. The * server will reject our version and disconnect if it doesn't * support it. */ if (remote_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) fatal("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d", PROTOCOL_MAJOR, remote_major); #endif /* Send our own protocol version identification. */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", PROTOCOL_MAJOR, PROTOCOL_MINOR, SSH_VERSION); if (atomicio(write, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf)) != strlen(buf)) fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } int ssh_cipher_default = SSH_CIPHER_3DES; int read_yes_or_no(const char *prompt, int defval) { char buf[1024]; FILE *f; int retval = -1; if (isatty(0)) f = stdin; else f = fopen("/dev/tty", "rw"); if (f == NULL) return 0; fflush(stdout); while (1) { fprintf(stderr, "%s", prompt); if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f) == NULL) { /* Print a newline (the prompt probably didn\'t have one). */ fprintf(stderr, "\n"); strlcpy(buf, "no", sizeof buf); } /* Remove newline from response. */ if (strchr(buf, '\n')) *strchr(buf, '\n') = 0; if (buf[0] == 0) retval = defval; if (strcmp(buf, "yes") == 0) retval = 1; if (strcmp(buf, "no") == 0) retval = 0; if (retval != -1) { if (f != stdin) fclose(f); return retval; } } } /* * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return only if ok. */ void check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr_in *hostaddr, RSA *host_key) { RSA *file_key; char *ip = NULL; char hostline[1000], *hostp; HostStatus host_status; HostStatus ip_status; int host_ip_differ = 0; int local = (ntohl(hostaddr->sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET; /* * Turn off check_host_ip for proxy connects, since * we don't have the remote ip-address */ if (options.proxy_command != NULL && options.check_host_ip) options.check_host_ip = 0; if (options.check_host_ip) ip = xstrdup(inet_ntoa(hostaddr->sin_addr)); /* * Store the host key from the known host file in here so that we can * compare it with the key for the IP address. */ file_key = RSA_new(); file_key->n = BN_new(); file_key->e = BN_new(); /* * Check if the host key is present in the user\'s list of known * hosts or in the systemwide list. */ host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(options.user_hostfile, host, host_key->e, host_key->n, file_key->e, file_key->n); if (host_status == HOST_NEW) host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(options.system_hostfile, host, host_key->e, host_key->n, file_key->e, file_key->n); /* * Force accepting of the host key for localhost and 127.0.0.1. The * problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple * machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of * them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings. This * essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however, * this is probably not a real problem. */ if (local) { debug("Forcing accepting of host key for localhost."); host_status = HOST_OK; } /* * Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are * localhost or the hostname was an ip address to begin with */ if (options.check_host_ip && !local && strcmp(host, ip)) { RSA *ip_key = RSA_new(); ip_key->n = BN_new(); ip_key->e = BN_new(); ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(options.user_hostfile, ip, host_key->e, host_key->n, ip_key->e, ip_key->n); if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(options.system_hostfile, ip, host_key->e, host_key->n, ip_key->e, ip_key->n); if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED && (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED || (BN_cmp(ip_key->e, file_key->e) || BN_cmp(ip_key->n, file_key->n)))) host_ip_differ = 1; RSA_free(ip_key); } else ip_status = host_status; RSA_free(file_key); switch (host_status) { case HOST_OK: /* The host is known and the key matches. */ debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the host key.", host); if (options.check_host_ip) { if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) { if (!add_host_to_hostfile(options.user_hostfile, ip, host_key->e, host_key->n)) log("Failed to add the host key for IP address '%.30s' to the list of known hosts (%.30s).", ip, options.user_hostfile); else log("Warning: Permanently added host key for IP address '%.30s' to the list of known hosts.", ip); } else if (ip_status != HOST_OK) log("Warning: the host key for '%.200s' differs from the key for the IP address '%.30s'", host, ip); } break; case HOST_NEW: /* The host is new. */ if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) { /* User has requested strict host key checking. We will not add the host key automatically. The only alternative left is to abort. */ fatal("No host key is known for %.200s and you have requested strict checking.", host); } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) { /* The default */ char prompt[1024]; char *fp = fingerprint(host_key->e, host_key->n); snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "The authenticity of host '%.200s' can't be established.\n" "Key fingerprint is %d %s.\n" "Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", host, BN_num_bits(host_key->n), fp); if (!read_yes_or_no(prompt, -1)) fatal("Aborted by user!\n"); } if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW && strcmp(host, ip)) { snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip); hostp = hostline; } else hostp = host; /* If not in strict mode, add the key automatically to the local known_hosts file. */ if (!add_host_to_hostfile(options.user_hostfile, hostp, host_key->e, host_key->n)) log("Failed to add the host to the list of known hosts (%.500s).", options.user_hostfile); else log("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' to the list of known hosts.", hostp); break; case HOST_CHANGED: if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) { char *msg; if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) msg = "is unknown"; else if (ip_status == HOST_OK) msg = "is unchanged"; else msg = "has a different value"; error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("The host key for %s has changed,", host); error("and the key for the according IP address %s", ip); error("%s. This could either mean that", msg); error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host"); error("and its host key have changed at the same time"); } /* The host key has changed. */ error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!"); error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!"); error("It is also possible that the host key has just been changed."); error("Please contact your system administrator."); error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.", options.user_hostfile); /* * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. */ if (options.strict_host_key_checking) fatal("Host key for %.200s has changed and you have requested strict checking.", host); /* * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow * the connection but without password authentication or * agent forwarding. */ if (options.password_authentication) { error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid trojan horses."); options.password_authentication = 0; } if (options.forward_agent) { error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid trojan horses."); options.forward_agent = 0; } /* * XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id. * This could be done by converting the host key to an * identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself * by that sentence, and ask the user if he/she whishes to * accept the authentication. */ break; } if (options.check_host_ip) xfree(ip); } /* * Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the * server. This does not need any extra privileges. The basic connection * to the server must already have been established before this is called. * User is the remote user; if it is NULL, the current local user name will * be used. Anonymous indicates that no rhosts authentication will be used. * If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns. * This function does not require super-user privileges. */ void ssh_login(int host_key_valid, RSA *own_host_key, const char *orighost, struct sockaddr_in *hostaddr, uid_t original_real_uid) { int i, type; struct passwd *pw; BIGNUM *key; RSA *host_key; RSA *public_key; int bits, rbits; unsigned char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; const char *server_user, *local_user; char *host, *cp; unsigned char check_bytes[8]; unsigned int supported_ciphers, supported_authentications; unsigned int server_flags, client_flags; int payload_len, clen, sum_len = 0; u_int32_t rand = 0; /* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */ host = xstrdup(orighost); for (cp = host; *cp; cp++) if (isupper(*cp)) *cp = tolower(*cp); /* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */ ssh_exchange_identification(); /* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */ packet_set_nonblocking(); /* Get local user name. Use it as server user if no user name was given. */ pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid); if (!pw) fatal("User id %d not found from user database.", original_real_uid); local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user; debug("Waiting for server public key."); /* Wait for a public key packet from the server. */ packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY); /* Get check bytes from the packet. */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) check_bytes[i] = packet_get_char(); /* Get the public key. */ public_key = RSA_new(); bits = packet_get_int();/* bits */ public_key->e = BN_new(); packet_get_bignum(public_key->e, &clen); sum_len += clen; public_key->n = BN_new(); packet_get_bignum(public_key->n, &clen); sum_len += clen; rbits = BN_num_bits(public_key->n); if (bits != rbits) { log("Warning: Server lies about size of server public key: " "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits); log("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh."); } /* Get the host key. */ host_key = RSA_new(); bits = packet_get_int();/* bits */ host_key->e = BN_new(); packet_get_bignum(host_key->e, &clen); sum_len += clen; host_key->n = BN_new(); packet_get_bignum(host_key->n, &clen); sum_len += clen; rbits = BN_num_bits(host_key->n); if (bits != rbits) { log("Warning: Server lies about size of server host key: " "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits); log("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh."); } /* Get protocol flags. */ server_flags = packet_get_int(); packet_set_protocol_flags(server_flags); supported_ciphers = packet_get_int(); supported_authentications = packet_get_int(); debug("Received server public key (%d bits) and host key (%d bits).", BN_num_bits(public_key->n), BN_num_bits(host_key->n)); packet_integrity_check(payload_len, 8 + 4 + sum_len + 0 + 4 + 0 + 0 + 4 + 4 + 4, SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY); check_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key); client_flags = SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER | SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN; compute_session_id(session_id, check_bytes, host_key->n, public_key->n); /* Generate a session key. */ arc4random_stir(); /* * Generate an encryption key for the session. The key is a 256 bit * random number, interpreted as a 32-byte key, with the least * significant 8 bits being the first byte of the key. */ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) rand = arc4random(); session_key[i] = rand & 0xff; rand >>= 8; } /* * According to the protocol spec, the first byte of the session key * is the highest byte of the integer. The session key is xored with * the first 16 bytes of the session id. */ key = BN_new(); BN_set_word(key, 0); for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) { BN_lshift(key, key, 8); if (i < 16) BN_add_word(key, session_key[i] ^ session_id[i]); else BN_add_word(key, session_key[i]); } /* * Encrypt the integer using the public key and host key of the * server (key with smaller modulus first). */ if (BN_cmp(public_key->n, host_key->n) < 0) { /* Public key has smaller modulus. */ if (BN_num_bits(host_key->n) < BN_num_bits(public_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: host_key %d < public_key %d + " "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", BN_num_bits(host_key->n), BN_num_bits(public_key->n), SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); } rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, public_key); rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key); } else { /* Host key has smaller modulus (or they are equal). */ if (BN_num_bits(public_key->n) < BN_num_bits(host_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: public_key %d < host_key %d + " "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", BN_num_bits(public_key->n), BN_num_bits(host_key->n), SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); } rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key); rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, public_key); } if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET) { if (cipher_mask() & supported_ciphers & (1 << ssh_cipher_default)) options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default; else { debug("Cipher %s not supported, using %.100s instead.", cipher_name(ssh_cipher_default), cipher_name(SSH_FALLBACK_CIPHER)); options.cipher = SSH_FALLBACK_CIPHER; } } /* Check that the selected cipher is supported. */ if (!(supported_ciphers & (1 << options.cipher))) fatal("Selected cipher type %.100s not supported by server.", cipher_name(options.cipher)); debug("Encryption type: %.100s", cipher_name(options.cipher)); /* Send the encrypted session key to the server. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY); packet_put_char(options.cipher); /* Send the check bytes back to the server. */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) packet_put_char(check_bytes[i]); /* Send the encrypted encryption key. */ packet_put_bignum(key); /* Send protocol flags. */ packet_put_int(client_flags); /* Send the packet now. */ packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Destroy the session key integer and the public keys since we no longer need them. */ BN_clear_free(key); RSA_free(public_key); RSA_free(host_key); debug("Sent encrypted session key."); /* Set the encryption key. */ packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, options.cipher); /* We will no longer need the session key here. Destroy any extra copies. */ memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key)); /* * Expect a success message from the server. Note that this message * will be received in encrypted form. */ packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); debug("Received encrypted confirmation."); /* Send the name of the user to log in as on the server. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_USER); packet_put_string(server_user, strlen(server_user)); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* * The server should respond with success if no authentication is * needed (the user has no password). Otherwise the server responds * with failure. */ type = packet_read(&payload_len); /* check whether the connection was accepted without authentication. */ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) return; if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to SSH_CMSG_USER", type); #ifdef AFS /* Try Kerberos tgt passing if the server supports it. */ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT)) && options.kerberos_tgt_passing) { if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Ticket will be transmitted in the clear!"); (void) send_kerberos_tgt(); } /* Try AFS token passing if the server supports it. */ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN)) && options.afs_token_passing && k_hasafs()) { if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Token will be transmitted in the clear!"); send_afs_tokens(); } #endif /* AFS */ #ifdef KRB4 if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS)) && options.kerberos_authentication) { debug("Trying Kerberos authentication."); if (try_kerberos_authentication()) { /* The server should respond with success or failure. */ type = packet_read(&payload_len); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) return; if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to Kerberos auth", type); } } #endif /* KRB4 */ /* * Use rhosts authentication if running in privileged socket and we * do not wish to remain anonymous. */ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS)) && options.rhosts_authentication) { debug("Trying rhosts authentication."); packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS); packet_put_string(local_user, strlen(local_user)); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* The server should respond with success or failure. */ type = packet_read(&payload_len); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) return; if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to rhosts auth", type); } /* * Try .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication with RSA host * authentication. */ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA)) && options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && host_key_valid) { if (try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(local_user, own_host_key)) return; } /* Try RSA authentication if the server supports it. */ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA)) && options.rsa_authentication) { /* * Try RSA authentication using the authentication agent. The * agent is tried first because no passphrase is needed for * it, whereas identity files may require passphrases. */ if (try_agent_authentication()) return; /* Try RSA authentication for each identity. */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) if (try_rsa_authentication(options.identity_files[i])) return; } /* Try skey authentication if the server supports it. */ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS)) && options.skey_authentication && !options.batch_mode) { if (try_skey_authentication()) return; } /* Try password authentication if the server supports it. */ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD)) && options.password_authentication && !options.batch_mode) { char prompt[80]; snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.40s's password: ", server_user, host); if (try_password_authentication(prompt)) return; } /* All authentication methods have failed. Exit with an error message. */ fatal("Permission denied."); /* NOTREACHED */ }