From 114e540b15d57618f9ebf624264298f80bbd8c77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Damien Miller Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2013 10:22:57 +1100 Subject: - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/02 02:50:27 [PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305] typo; from Jon Cave --- PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305') diff --git a/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 b/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 index c4b723af..9cf73a92 100644 --- a/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 +++ b/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ cipher by decrypting and using the packet length prior to checking the MAC. By using an independently-keyed cipher instance to encrypt the length, an active attacker seeking to exploit the packet input handling as a decryption oracle can learn nothing about the payload contents or -its MAC (assuming key derivation, ChaCha20 and Poly1306 are secure). +its MAC (assuming key derivation, ChaCha20 and Poly1305 are secure). The AEAD is constructed as follows: for each packet, generate a Poly1305 key by taking the first 256 bits of ChaCha20 stream output generated @@ -101,5 +101,5 @@ References [3] "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 based Cipher Suites for TLS", Adam Langley http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03 -$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305,v 1.1 2013/11/21 00:45:43 djm Exp $ +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305,v 1.2 2013/12/02 02:50:27 djm Exp $ -- cgit v1.2.3