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2021-02-26Revert "ssh: optional bind interface if bind address specified."Damien Miller
This reverts commit 5a878a71a3528c2626aa1d331934fd964782d41c. Apologies - I accidentally pushed this.
2021-02-26ssh: optional bind interface if bind address specified.Dmitrii Turlupov
Allows the -b and -B options to be used together. For example, when the interface is in the VRF.
2021-01-26upstream: move check_host_cert() from sshconnect,c to sshkey.c anddjm@openbsd.org
refactor it to make it more generally usable and testable. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 536f489f5ff38808c1fa711ba58d4579b636f9e4
2020-12-22upstream: add a ssh_config KnownHostsCommand that allows the clientdjm@openbsd.org
to obtain known_hosts data from a command in addition to the usual files. The command accepts bunch of %-expansions, including details of the connection and the offered server host key. Note that the command may be invoked up to three times per connection (see the manpage for details). ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2433cff4fb323918ae968da6ff38feb99b4d33d0
2020-12-21upstream: plumb ssh_conn_info through to sshconnect.c; feedback/okdjm@openbsd.org
markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8d14a09cda3f1dc55df08f8a4889beff74e68b0
2020-12-21upstream: allow UserKnownHostsFile=none; feedback and ok markus@djm@openbsd.org
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c46d515eac94a35a1d50d5fd71c4b1ca53334b48
2020-12-21upstream: load_hostkeys()/hostkeys_foreach() variants for FILE*djm@openbsd.org
Add load_hostkeys_file() and hostkeys_foreach_file() that accept a FILE* argument instead of opening the file directly. Original load_hostkeys() and hostkeys_foreach() are implemented using these new interfaces. Add a u_int note field to the hostkey_entry and hostkey_foreach_line structs that is passed directly from the load_hostkeys() and hostkeys_foreach() call. This is a lightweight way to annotate results between different invocations of load_hostkeys(). ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ff6db13ec9ee4edfa658b2c38baad0f505d8c20
2020-11-27upstream: Set the specified TOS/DSCP for interactive use prior todjm@openbsd.org
TCP connect. The connection phase of the SSH session is time-sensitive (due to server side login grace periods) and is frequently interactive (e.g. entering passwords). The ultimate interactive/bulk TOS/DSCP will be set after authentication completes. ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f31ab10d9233363a6d2c9996007083ba43a093f1
2020-11-27upstream: when mentioning that the host key has changed, don'tdjm@openbsd.org
report the type because it is ambiguous as to whether it referred to the known or new host key. bz3216; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2d5ce4a83dbcf44e340a572e361decad8aab7bad
2020-11-20upstream: Explicitly initialize all members of thedtucker@openbsd.org
find_by_key_ctx struct. Initializing a single member should be enough (the spec says the remainder should be initialized as per the static rules) but some GCCs warn on this which prevents us testing with -Werror on those. ok deraadt@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 687126e60a27d30f02614760ef3c3ae4e8d6af28
2020-11-13upstream: when prompting the user to accept a new hostkey, displaydjm@openbsd.org
any other host names/addresses already associated with the key. E.g. > The authenticity of host 'test (10.0.0.1)' can't be established. > ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:milU4MODXm8iJQI18wlsbPG7Yup+34fuNNmV08qDnax. > This host key is known by the following other names/addresses: > ~/.ssh/known_hosts:1: host.example.org,10.0.0.1 > ~/.ssh/known_hosts:2: [hashed name] > ~/.ssh/known_hosts:3: [hashed name] > ~/.ssh/known_hosts:4: host > ~/.ssh/known_hosts:5: [host]:2222 > Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f6f58a77b49f1368b5883b3a1f776447cfcc7ef4
2020-10-18upstream: use the new variant log macros instead of prependingdjm@openbsd.org
__func__ and appending ssh_err(r) manually; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f14b80bcfa85414b2a1a6ff714fb5362687ace8
2020-10-14upstream: Zap unused family parameter from ssh_connect_direct()kn@openbsd.org
sshconnect.c r1.241 from 2013 made it unused; found while reading code. OK djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 219ba6d7f9925d0b7992918612680399d86712b5
2020-10-07upstream: Disable UpdateHostkeys when hostkey checking failsdjm@openbsd.org
If host key checking fails (i.e. a wrong host key is recorded for the server) and the user elects to continue (via StrictHostKeyChecking=no), then disable UpdateHostkeys for the session. reminded by Mark D. Baushke; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98b524f121f4252309dd21becd8c4cacb0c6042a
2020-10-07upstream: don't UpdateHostkeys when the hostkey is verified by thedjm@openbsd.org
GlobalKnownHostsFile file, support only UserKnownHostsFile matches suggested by Mark D. Baushke; feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eabb771a6add676c398d38a143a1aff5f04abbb9
2020-10-07upstream: revert kex->flags cert hostkey downgrade back to a plaindjm@openbsd.org
key (commitid VtF8vozGOF8DMKVg). We now do this a simpler way that needs less plumbing. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb92d25b216bff8c136da818ac2221efaadf18ed
2020-10-07upstream: simply disable UpdateHostkeys when a certificatedjm@openbsd.org
successfully authenticated the host; simpler than the complicated plumbing via kex->flags we have now. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80e39644eed75717d563a7f177e8117a0e14f42c
2020-10-07upstream: when ordering host key algorithms in the client, considerdjm@openbsd.org
the ECDSA key subtype; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3097686f853c61ff61772ea35f8b699931392ece
2020-10-03upstream: There are lots of place where we want to redirect stdin,djm@openbsd.org
stdout and/or stderr to /dev/null. Factor all these out to a single stdfd_devnull() function that allows selection of which of these to redirect. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3033ba5a4c47cacfd5def020d42cabc52fad3099
2020-10-03upstream: record when the host key checking code downgrades adjm@openbsd.org
certificate host key to a plain key. This occurs when the user connects to a host with a certificate host key but no corresponding CA key configured in known_hosts; feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ada81853ff9ee7824c62f440bcf4ad62030c901
2020-09-16upstream: For the hostkey confirmation message:djm@openbsd.org
> Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? compare the fingerprint case sensitively; spotted Patrik Lundin ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 73097afee1b3a5929324e345ba4a4a42347409f2
2020-08-27upstream: let ssh_config(5)'s AddKeysToAgent keyword accept a timedjm@openbsd.org
limit for keys in addition to its current flag options. Time-limited keys will automatically be removed from ssh-agent after their expiry time has passed; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 792e71cacbbc25faab5424cf80bee4a006119f94
2020-07-17upstream: Add a '%k' TOKEN that expands to the effective HostKey ofdtucker@openbsd.org
the destination. This allows, eg, keeping host keys in individual files using "UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k". bz#1654, ok djm@, jmc@ (man page bits) OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7084d723c9cc987a5c47194219efd099af5beadc
2020-03-14upstream: use sshpkt_fatal() for kex_exchange_identification()djm@openbsd.org
errors. This ensures that the logged errors are consistent with other transport- layer errors and that the relevant IP addresses are logged. bz3129 ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c22891f0b9e1a6cd46771cedbb26ac96ec2e6ab
2020-01-25upstream: when AddKeysToAgent=yes is set and the key contains nodjm@openbsd.org
comment, add the key to the agent with the key's path as the comment. bz2564 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8dd8ca9340d7017631a27f4ed5358a4cfddec16f
2020-01-23upstream: Replace all calls to signal(2) with a wrapper arounddtucker@openbsd.org
sigaction(2). This wrapper blocks all other signals during the handler preventing races between handlers, and sets SA_RESTART which should reduce the potential for short read/write operations. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e047663fd77a40d7b07bdabe68529df51fd2519
2020-01-23upstream: Ignore whitespace when checking explict fingerprint.dtucker@openbsd.org
When confirming a host key using the fingerprint itself, ignore leading and trailing whitespace. ok deraadt@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cafd7f803bbdcd40c3a8f8f1a77747e6b6d8c011
2020-01-21upstream: revise the fix for reversed arguments onnaddy@openbsd.org
expand_proxy_command() Always put 'host' before 'host_arg' for consistency. ok markus@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ba5b25472779f1b1957295fcc6907bb961472a3
2020-01-09upstream: fix reversed arguments on expand_proxy_command(); spotteddjm@openbsd.org
by anton@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db1c32478a01dfbc9c4db171de0f25907bea5775
2019-11-15upstream: stdarg.h required more broadly; ok djmderaadt@openbsd.org
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5b15674cde1b54d6dbbae8faf30d47e6e5d6513
2019-11-13upstream: enable ed25519 support; ok djmmarkus@openbsd.org
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a399c5b3ef15bd8efb916110cf5a9e0b554ab7e
2019-11-01upstream: ssh AddKeysToAgent support for U2F/FIDO keysdjm@openbsd.org
feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac08e45c7f995fa71f8d661b3f582e38cc0a2f91
2019-11-01upstream: add new agent key constraint for U2F/FIDO providerdjm@openbsd.org
feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d880c380170704280b4003860a1744d286c7a172
2019-10-02remove duplicate #includesDamien Miller
Prompted by Jakub Jelen
2019-09-13upstream: whitespacedjm@openbsd.org
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57a71dd5f4cae8d61e0ac631a862589fb2bfd700
2019-09-13upstream: allow %n to be expanded in ProxyCommand stringsdjm@openbsd.org
From Zachary Harmany via github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/118 ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7eebf1b7695f50c66d42053d352a4db9e8fb84b6
2019-07-05upstream: When system calls indicate an error they return -1, notderaadt@openbsd.org
some arbitrary value < 0. errno is only updated in this case. Change all (most?) callers of syscalls to follow this better, and let's see if this strictness helps us in the future. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48081f00db7518e3b712a49dca06efc2a5428075
2019-06-21upstream: Add protection for private keys at rest in RAM againstdjm@openbsd.org
speculation and memory sidechannel attacks like Spectre, Meltdown, Rowhammer and Rambleed. This change encrypts private keys when they are not in use with a symmetic key that is derived from a relatively large "prekey" consisting of random data (currently 16KB). Attackers must recover the entire prekey with high accuracy before they can attempt to decrypt the shielded private key, but the current generation of attacks have bit error rates that, when applied cumulatively to the entire prekey, make this unlikely. Implementation-wise, keys are encrypted "shielded" when loaded and then automatically and transparently unshielded when used for signatures or when being saved/serialised. Hopefully we can remove this in a few years time when computer architecture has become less unsafe. been in snaps for a bit already; thanks deraadt@ ok dtucker@ deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19767213c312e46f94b303a512ef8e9218a39bd4
2019-05-08upstream: Free host on exit path. Patch from markus atdtucker@openbsd.org
blueflash.cc, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c54e9945d93c4ce28350d8b9fa8b71f744ef2b5a
2019-03-01upstream: dup stdout/in for proxycommand=-, otherwise stdout mightmarkus@openbsd.org
be redirected to /dev/null; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97dfce4c47ed4055042de8ebde85b7d88793e595
2019-02-01upstream: Save connection timeout and restore for 2nd anddtucker@openbsd.org
subsequent attempts, preventing them from having no timeout. bz#2918, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4977f1d0521d9b6bba0c9a20d3d226cefac48292
2019-01-25upstream: Accept the host key fingerprint as a synonym for "yes"dtucker@openbsd.org
when accepting an unknown host key. This allows you to paste a fingerprint obtained out of band into the yes/no prompt and have the client do the comparison for you. ok markus@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c47d10b9f43d3d345e044fd9ec09709583a2767
2019-01-20upstream: convert sshconnect.c to new packet APIdjm@openbsd.org
with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 222337cf6c96c347f1022d976fac74b4257c061f
2019-01-20upstream: begin landing remaining refactoring of packet parsingdjm@openbsd.org
API, started almost exactly six years ago. This change stops including the old packet_* API by default and makes each file that requires the old API include it explicitly. We will commit file-by-file refactoring to remove the old API in consistent steps. with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93c98a6b38f6911fd1ae025a1ec57807fb4d4ef4
2018-12-27upstream: move client/server SSH-* banners to buffers underdjm@openbsd.org
ssh->kex and factor out the banner exchange. This eliminates some common code from the client and server. Also be more strict about handling \r characters - these should only be accepted immediately before \n (pointed out by Jann Horn). Inspired by a patch from Markus Schmidt. (lots of) feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cc7885487a6754f63641d7d3279b0941890275b
2018-11-19upstream: Fix inverted logic for redirecting ProxyCommand stderr todtucker@openbsd.org
/dev/null. Fixes mosh in proxycommand mode that was broken by the previous ProxyCommand change that was reported by matthieu@. ok djm@ danj@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6fc9641bc250221a0a81c6beb2e72d603f8add6
2018-11-16upstream: redirect stderr of ProxyCommands to /dev/null when ssh isdjm@openbsd.org
started with ControlPersist; based on patch from Steffen Prohaska OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bcaa14a03ae80369d31021271ec75dce2597957
2018-10-22upstream: struct sockaddr_storage is guaranteed to be large enough,florian@openbsd.org
no need to check the size. OK kn, deraadt OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0aa56e92eb49c79f495b31a5093109ec5841f439
2018-09-20upstream: add CASignatureAlgorithms option for the client, allowingdjm@openbsd.org
it to specify which signature algorithms may be used by CAs when signing certificates. Useful if you want to ban RSA/SHA1; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9159e5e9f67504829bf53ff222057307a6e3230f
2018-07-31upstream: Now that ssh can't be setuid, remove thedtucker@openbsd.org
original_real_uid and original_effective_uid globals and replace with calls to plain getuid(). ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92561c0cd418d34e6841e20ba09160583e27b68c
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-08-26 11:11:04 +0000