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2020-12-21upstream: load_hostkeys()/hostkeys_foreach() variants for FILE*djm@openbsd.org
Add load_hostkeys_file() and hostkeys_foreach_file() that accept a FILE* argument instead of opening the file directly. Original load_hostkeys() and hostkeys_foreach() are implemented using these new interfaces. Add a u_int note field to the hostkey_entry and hostkey_foreach_line structs that is passed directly from the load_hostkeys() and hostkeys_foreach() call. This is a lightweight way to annotate results between different invocations of load_hostkeys(). ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ff6db13ec9ee4edfa658b2c38baad0f505d8c20
2020-10-07upstream: when ordering host key algorithms in the client, considerdjm@openbsd.org
the ECDSA key subtype; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3097686f853c61ff61772ea35f8b699931392ece
2020-06-26upstream: Defer creation of ~/.ssh by ssh(1) until we attempt todtucker@openbsd.org
write to it so we don't leave an empty .ssh directory when it's not needed. Use the same function to replace the code in ssh-keygen that does the same thing. bz#3156, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59c073b569be1a60f4de36f491a4339bc4ae870f
2020-05-27upstream: when ordering the hostkey algorithms to request from adjm@openbsd.org
server, prefer certificate types if the known_hosts files contain a key marked as a @cert-authority; bz#3157 ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8f194573e5bb7c01b69bbfaabc68f27c9fa5e0db
2015-02-17upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org
Refactor hostkeys_foreach() and dependent code Deal with IP addresses (i.e. CheckHostIP) Don't clobber known_hosts when nothing changed ok markus@ as part of larger commit
2015-01-27upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org
Host key rotation support. Add a hostkeys@openssh.com protocol extension (global request) for a server to inform a client of all its available host key after authentication has completed. The client may record the keys in known_hosts, allowing it to upgrade to better host key algorithms and a server to gracefully rotate its keys. The client side of this is controlled by a UpdateHostkeys config option (default on). ok markus@
2015-01-20upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org
introduce hostkeys_foreach() to allow iteration over a known_hosts file or controlled subset thereof. This will allow us to pull out some ugly and duplicated code, and will be used to implement hostkey rotation later. feedback and ok markus
2015-01-15upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org
sync ssh-keysign, ssh-keygen and some dependencies to the new buffer/key API; mostly mechanical, ok markus@
2013-07-18 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/12 00:19:59Damien Miller
[auth-options.c auth-rsa.c bufaux.c buffer.h channels.c hostfile.c] [hostfile.h mux.c packet.c packet.h roaming_common.c serverloop.c] fix pointer-signedness warnings from clang/llvm-3.3; "seems nice" deraadt@
2010-12-01 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/11/29 23:45:51Damien Miller
[auth.c hostfile.c hostfile.h ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c] [sshconnect.h sshconnect2.c] automatically order the hostkeys requested by the client based on which hostkeys are already recorded in known_hosts. This avoids hostkey warnings when connecting to servers with new ECDSA keys that are preferred by default; with markus@
2010-03-04 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/04 10:36:03Damien Miller
[auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c] [authfile.c authfile.h hostfile.c hostfile.h servconf.c servconf.h] [ssh-keygen.c ssh.1 sshconnect.c sshd_config.5] Add a TrustedUserCAKeys option to sshd_config to specify CA keys that are trusted to authenticate users (in addition than doing it per-user in authorized_keys). Add a RevokedKeys option to sshd_config and a @revoked marker to known_hosts to allow keys to me revoked and banned for user or host authentication. feedback and ok markus@
2010-02-27 - OpenBSD CVS SyncDamien Miller
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54 [PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c] [auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c] [hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c] [myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c] [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5] Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts. OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy. Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys when a CA certificate is marked as sh/known_hosts. see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details. Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details. Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage. Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys feedback and ok markus@
2006-03-26 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 22:22:43Damien Miller
[atomicio.h auth-options.h auth.h auth2-gss.c authfd.h authfile.h] [bufaux.h buffer.h canohost.h channels.h cipher.h clientloop.h] [compat.h compress.h crc32.c crc32.h deattack.h dh.h dispatch.h] [dns.c dns.h getput.h groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c] [gss-serv.c hostfile.h includes.h kex.h key.h log.h mac.h match.h] [misc.h monitor.h monitor_fdpass.h monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.h msg.h] [myproposal.h packet.h pathnames.h progressmeter.h readconf.h rsa.h] [scard.h servconf.h serverloop.h session.h sftp-common.h sftp.h] [ssh-gss.h ssh.h ssh1.h ssh2.h sshconnect.h sshlogin.h sshpty.h] [ttymodes.h uidswap.h uuencode.h xmalloc.h] standardise spacing in $OpenBSD$ tags; requested by deraadt@
2005-03-01 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2005/03/01 10:40:27Damien Miller
[hostfile.c hostfile.h readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 ssh_config.5] [sshconnect.c sshd.8] add support for hashing host names and addresses added to known_hosts files, to improve privacy of which hosts user have been visiting; ok markus@ deraadt@
2003-11-17 - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/11/10 16:23:41Damien Miller
[bufaux.c bufaux.h cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c hostfile.h key.c] [key.h sftp-common.c sftp-common.h sftp-server.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c uuencode.c uuencode.h] constify. ok markus@ & djm@
2002-12-23 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/11/21 23:03:51Ben Lindstrom
[auth-krb5.c auth1.c hostfile.h monitor_wrap.c sftp-client.c sftp-int.c ssh-add.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect.c] KNF
2002-09-12 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS SyncDamien Miller
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/08 20:24:08 [hostfile.h] no comma at end of enumerator list
2002-08-01 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/24 16:11:18Ben Lindstrom
[hostfile.c hostfile.h sshconnect.c] print out all known keys for a host if we get a unknown host key, see discussion at http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?t=101069210100016&r=1&w=4 the ssharp mitm tool attacks users in a similar way, so i'd like to pointed out again: A MITM attack is always possible if the ssh client prints: The authenticity of host 'bla' can't be established. (protocol version 2 with pubkey authentication allows you to detect MITM attacks)
2001-12-21 - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/12/18 10:04:21Damien Miller
[auth.h hostfile.c hostfile.h] remove auth_rsa_read_key, make hostfile_ready_key non static; ok markus@
2001-07-04 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 17:27:25Ben Lindstrom
[authfd.h authfile.h auth.h auth-options.h bufaux.h buffer.h canohost.h channels.h cipher.h clientloop.h compat.h compress.h crc32.h deattack.h dh.h dispatch.h groupaccess.c groupaccess.h hostfile.h kex.h key.h log.c log.h mac.h misc.c misc.h mpaux.h packet.h radix.h readconf.h readpass.h rsa.h servconf.h serverloop.h session.h sftp-common.c sftp-common.h sftp-glob.h sftp-int.h sshconnect.h ssh-dss.h sshlogin.h sshpty.h ssh-rsa.h sshtty.h tildexpand.h uidswap.h uuencode.h xmalloc.h] remove comments from .h, since they are cut&paste from the .c files and out of sync
2001-07-04 - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 06:32:58Ben Lindstrom
[atomicio.h authfd.h authfile.h auth.h auth-options.h bufaux.h buffer.h canohost.h channels.h cipher.h clientloop.h compat.h compress.h crc32.h deattack.h dh.h dispatch.h groupaccess.h hostfile.h kex.h key.h log.h mac.h match.h misc.h mpaux.h packet.h radix.h readconf.h readpass.h rsa.h] prototype pedant. not very creative... - () -> (void) - no variable names
2001-02-09 - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 19:30:52Ben Lindstrom
sync with netbsd tree changes. - more strict prototypes, include necessary headers - use paths.h/pathnames.h decls - size_t typecase to int -> u_long
2001-01-29 - niklas@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/2001Ben Lindstrom
[atomicio.h canohost.h clientloop.h deattack.h dh.h dispatch.h groupaccess.c groupaccess.h hmac.h hostfile.h includes.h kex.h key.h log.h login.h match.h misc.h myproposal.h nchan.ms pathnames.h radix.h readpass.h rijndael.h serverloop.h session.h sftp.h ssh-add.1 ssh-dss.h ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-rsa.h ssh1.h ssh_config sshconnect.h sshd_config tildexpand.h uidswap.h uuencode.h] $OpenBSD$
2000-12-22One way to massive patch. <sigh> It compiles and works under Linux..Ben Lindstrom
And I think I have all the bits right from the OpenBSD tree. 20001222 - Updated RCSID for pty.c - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Updates: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/21 15:10:16 [auth-rh-rsa.c hostfile.c hostfile.h sshconnect.c] print keyfile:line for changed hostkeys, for deraadt@, ok deraadt@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/20 19:26:56 [authfile.c] allow ssh -i userkey for root - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/20 19:37:21 [authfd.c authfd.h kex.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c uidswap.c uidswap.h] fix prototypes; from stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/20 19:32:08 [sshd.c] init pointer to NULL; report from Jan.Ivan@cern.ch - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/19 23:17:54 [auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c auth2-skey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufaux.h buffer.c canohost.c channels.c clientloop.c compress.c crc32.c deattack.c getput.h hmac.c hmac.h hostfile.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h log.c login.c match.c match.h mpaux.c mpaux.h packet.c packet.h radix.c readconf.c rsa.c scp.c servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c sftp-server.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-dss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c ssh-rsa.h ssh.c ssh.h uuencode.c uuencode.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c tildexpand.c] replace 'unsigned bla' with 'u_bla' everywhere. also replace 'char unsigned' with u_char.
2000-09-16 - (djm) Merge OpenBSD changes:Damien Miller
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 02:59:57 [session.c] print hostname (not hushlogin) - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:18:48 [authfile.c ssh-add.c] enable ssh-add -d for DSA keys - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:20:49 [sftp-server.c] cleanup - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/06 03:46:41 [authfile.h] prototype - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:27:56 [ALL] cleanup copyright notices on all files. I have attempted to be accurate with the details. everything is now under Tatu's licence (which I copied from his readme), and/or the core-sdi bsd-ish thing for deattack, or various openbsd developers under a 2-term bsd licence. We're not changing any rules, just being accurate. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:40:30 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c ssh.c] cleanup window and packet sizes for ssh2 flow control; ok niels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:53:00 [scp.c] typo - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 15:13:37 [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c auth.c] [authfile.h canohost.c channels.h compat.c hostfile.h log.c match.h] [pty.c readconf.c] some more Copyright fixes - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/08 03:02:51 [README.openssh2] bye bye - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/11 18:38:33 [LICENCE cipher.c] a few more comments about it being ARC4 not RC4 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/12 14:53:11 [log-client.c log-server.c log.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c] multiple debug levels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/14 14:25:15 [clientloop.c] typo - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/15 01:13:51 [ssh-agent.c] check return value for setenv(3) for failure, and deal appropriately
2000-04-16 - OpenBSD CVS updates.Damien Miller
[ssh.1 ssh.c] - ssh -2 [auth.c channels.c clientloop.c packet.c packet.h serverloop.c] [session.c sshconnect.c] - check payload for (illegal) extra data [ALL] - whitespace cleanup
2000-03-26 - OpenBSD CVS updateDamien Miller
- [auth-krb4.c] -Wall - [auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c hostfile.c hostfile.h key.c key.h match.c] [match.h ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshd.c] initial support for DSA keys. ok deraadt@, niels@ - [cipher.c cipher.h] remove unused cipher_attack_detected code - [scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh.1 sshd.8] Fix some formatting problems I missed before. - [ssh.1 sshd.8] fix spelling errors, From: FreeBSD - [ssh.c] switch to raw mode only if he _get_ a pty (not if we _want_ a pty).
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