diff options
-rw-r--r-- | PROTOCOL | 53 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | auth.h | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | clientloop.c | 353 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kex.h | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | monitor.c | 45 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | monitor_wrap.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | monitor_wrap.h | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | readconf.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | readconf.h | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | serverloop.c | 88 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssh_api.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssh_config.5 | 15 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sshd.c | 35 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssherr.c | 4 |
14 files changed, 537 insertions, 101 deletions
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00.txt "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" OpenSSH introduces new public key algorithms to support certificate -authentication for users and hostkeys. These methods are documented in -the file PROTOCOL.certkeys +authentication for users and host keys. These methods are documented +in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys 1.4. transport: Elliptic Curve cryptography @@ -283,26 +283,51 @@ by the client cancel the forwarding of a Unix domain socket. string socket path 2.5. connection: hostkey update and rotation "hostkeys@openssh.com" +and "hostkeys-prove@openssh.com" OpenSSH supports a protocol extension allowing a server to inform -a client of all its protocol v.2 hostkeys after user-authentication +a client of all its protocol v.2 host keys after user-authentication has completed. byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST string "hostkeys@openssh.com" string[] hostkeys -Upon receiving this message, a client may update its known_hosts -file, adding keys that it has not seen before and deleting keys -for the server host that are no longer offered. +Upon receiving this message, a client should check which of the +supplied host keys are present in known_hosts. For keys that are +not present, it should send a "hostkeys-prove@openssh.com" message +to request the server prove ownership of the private half of the +key. -This extension allows a client to learn key types that it had -not previously encountered, thereby allowing it to potentially -upgrade from weaker key algorithms to better ones. It also -supports graceful key rotation: a server may offer multiple keys -of the same type for a period (to give clients an opportunity to -learn them using this extension) before removing the deprecated -key from those offered. + byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST + string "hostkeys-prove@openssh.com" + char 1 /* want-reply */ + string[] hostkeys + +When a server receives this message, it should generate a signature +using each requested key over the following: + + string session identifier + string "hostkeys-prove@openssh.com" + string hostkey + +These signatures should be included in the reply, in the order matching +the hostkeys in the request: + + byte SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS + string[] signatures + +When the client receives this reply (and not a failure), it should +validate the signatures and may update its known_hosts file, adding keys +that it has not seen before and deleting keys for the server host that +are no longer offered. + +These extensions let a client learn key types that it had not previously +encountered, thereby allowing it to potentially upgrade from weaker +key algorithms to better ones. It also supports graceful key rotation: +a server may offer multiple keys of the same type for a period (to +give clients an opportunity to learn them using this extension) before +removing the deprecated key from those offered. 3. SFTP protocol changes @@ -428,4 +453,4 @@ respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message. This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "1". -$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.25 2015/01/26 03:04:45 djm Exp $ +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.26 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.81 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.82 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -206,9 +206,10 @@ Key *get_hostkey_by_index(int); Key *get_hostkey_public_by_index(int, struct ssh *); Key *get_hostkey_public_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *); Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *); -int get_hostkey_index(Key *, struct ssh *); +int get_hostkey_index(Key *, int, struct ssh *); int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *); -int sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, size_t *, u_char *, size_t, u_int); +int sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, size_t *, + const u_char *, size_t, u_int); /* debug messages during authentication */ void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c index c6f8e9dc..a19d9d06 100644 --- a/clientloop.c +++ b/clientloop.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.268 2015/02/16 22:08:57 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.269 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -2089,6 +2089,216 @@ client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) return 0; } +struct hostkeys_update_ctx { + /* The hostname and (optionally) IP address string for the server */ + char *host_str, *ip_str; + + /* + * Keys received from the server and a flag for each indicating + * whether they already exist in known_hosts. + * keys_seen is filled in by hostkeys_find() and later (for new + * keys) by client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(). + */ + struct sshkey **keys; + int *keys_seen; + size_t nkeys; + + size_t nnew; + + /* + * Keys that are in known_hosts, but were not present in the update + * from the server (i.e. scheduled to be deleted). + * Filled in by hostkeys_find(). + */ + struct sshkey **old_keys; + size_t nold; +}; + +static void +hostkeys_update_ctx_free(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx) +{ + size_t i; + + if (ctx == NULL) + return; + for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) + sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]); + free(ctx->keys); + free(ctx->keys_seen); + for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) + sshkey_free(ctx->old_keys[i]); + free(ctx->old_keys); + free(ctx->host_str); + free(ctx->ip_str); + free(ctx); +} + +static int +hostkeys_find(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) +{ + struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx; + size_t i; + struct sshkey **tmp; + + if (l->status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED || l->key == NULL || + l->key->type == KEY_RSA1) + return 0; + + /* Mark off keys we've already seen for this host */ + for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { + if (sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->keys[i])) { + debug3("%s: found %s key at %s:%ld", __func__, + sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum); + ctx->keys_seen[i] = 1; + return 0; + } + } + /* This line contained a key that not offered by the server */ + debug3("%s: deprecated %s key at %s:%ld", __func__, + sshkey_ssh_name(l->key), l->path, l->linenum); + if ((tmp = reallocarray(ctx->old_keys, ctx->nold + 1, + sizeof(*ctx->old_keys))) == NULL) + fatal("%s: reallocarray failed nold = %zu", + __func__, ctx->nold); + ctx->old_keys = tmp; + ctx->old_keys[ctx->nold++] = l->key; + l->key = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +static void +update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx) +{ + int r, loglevel = options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK ? + SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; + char *fp, *response; + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { + if (ctx->keys_seen[i] != 2) + continue; + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->keys[i], + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); + do_log2(loglevel, "Learned new hostkey: %s %s", + sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), fp); + free(fp); + } + for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) { + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->old_keys[i], + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); + do_log2(loglevel, "Deprecating obsolete hostkey: %s %s", + sshkey_type(ctx->old_keys[i]), fp); + free(fp); + } + if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) { + leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); + response = NULL; + for (i = 0; !quit_pending && i < 3; i++) { + free(response); + response = read_passphrase("Accept updated hostkeys? " + "(yes/no): ", RP_ECHO); + if (strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0) + break; + else if (quit_pending || response == NULL || + strcasecmp(response, "no") == 0) { + options.update_hostkeys = 0; + break; + } else { + do_log2(loglevel, "Please enter " + "\"yes\" or \"no\""); + } + } + if (quit_pending || i >= 3 || response == NULL) + options.update_hostkeys = 0; + free(response); + enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); + } + + /* + * Now that all the keys are verified, we can go ahead and replace + * them in known_hosts (assuming SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK didn't + * cancel the operation). + */ + if (options.update_hostkeys != 0 && + (r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[0], + ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys, + options.hash_known_hosts, 0, + options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0) + error("%s: hostfile_replace_entries failed: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +static void +client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx; + size_t i, ndone; + struct sshbuf *signdata; + int r; + const u_char *sig; + size_t siglen; + + if (ctx->nnew == 0) + fatal("%s: ctx->nnew == 0", __func__); /* sanity */ + if (type != SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { + error("Server failed to confirm ownership of " + "private host keys"); + hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); + return; + } + if ((signdata = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + /* Don't want to accidentally accept an unbound signature */ + if (ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0) + fatal("%s: ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0", __func__); + /* + * Expect a signature for each of the ctx->nnew private keys we + * haven't seen before. They will be in the same order as the + * ctx->keys where the corresponding ctx->keys_seen[i] == 0. + */ + for (ndone = i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { + if (ctx->keys_seen[i]) + continue; + /* Prepare data to be signed: session ID, unique string, key */ + sshbuf_reset(signdata); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(signdata, ssh->kex->session_id, + ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(signdata, + "hostkeys-prove@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_puts(ctx->keys[i], signdata)) != 0) + fatal("%s: failed to prepare signature: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + /* Extract and verify signature */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) { + error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_verify(ctx->keys[i], sig, siglen, + sshbuf_ptr(signdata), sshbuf_len(signdata), 0)) != 0) { + error("%s: server gave bad signature for %s key %zu", + __func__, sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i); + goto out; + } + /* Key is good. Mark it as 'seen' */ + ctx->keys_seen[i] = 2; + ndone++; + } + if (ndone != ctx->nnew) + fatal("%s: ndone != ctx->nnew (%zu / %zu)", __func__, + ndone, ctx->nnew); /* Shouldn't happen */ + ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); + + /* Make the edits to known_hosts */ + update_known_hosts(ctx); + out: + hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); +} + /* * Handle hostkeys@openssh.com global request to inform the client of all * the server's hostkeys. The keys are checked against the user's @@ -2097,34 +2307,35 @@ client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) static int client_input_hostkeys(void) { + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ const u_char *blob = NULL; - u_int i, len = 0, nkeys = 0; + size_t i, len = 0; struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; - struct sshkey *key = NULL, **tmp, **keys = NULL; - int r, success = 1; - char *fp, *host_str = NULL, *ip_str = NULL; + struct sshkey *key = NULL, **tmp; + int r; + char *fp; static int hostkeys_seen = 0; /* XXX use struct ssh */ extern struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* XXX from ssh.c */ + struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx; - /* - * NB. Return success for all cases other than protocol error. The - * server doesn't need to know what the client does with its hosts - * file. - */ - - blob = packet_get_string_ptr(&len); - packet_check_eom(); + ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx)); if (hostkeys_seen) fatal("%s: server already sent hostkeys", __func__); + if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK && + options.batch_mode) + return 1; /* won't ask in batchmode, so don't even try */ if (!options.update_hostkeys || options.num_user_hostfiles <= 0) return 1; - if ((buf = sshbuf_from(blob, len)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__); - while (sshbuf_len(buf) > 0) { + while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) { sshkey_free(key); key = NULL; - if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &key)) != 0) + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &len)) != 0) { + error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, len, &key)) != 0) fatal("%s: parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); @@ -2140,47 +2351,107 @@ client_input_hostkeys(void) __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); continue; } - if ((tmp = reallocarray(keys, nkeys + 1, - sizeof(*keys))) == NULL) - fatal("%s: reallocarray failed nkeys = %u", - __func__, nkeys); - keys = tmp; - keys[nkeys++] = key; + /* Skip certs */ + if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + debug3("%s: %s key is a certificate; skipping", + __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); + continue; + } + /* Ensure keys are unique */ + for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { + if (sshkey_equal(key, ctx->keys[i])) { + error("%s: received duplicated %s host key", + __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); + goto out; + } + } + /* Key is good, record it */ + if ((tmp = reallocarray(ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys + 1, + sizeof(*ctx->keys))) == NULL) + fatal("%s: reallocarray failed nkeys = %zu", + __func__, ctx->nkeys); + ctx->keys = tmp; + ctx->keys[ctx->nkeys++] = key; key = NULL; } - if (nkeys == 0) { + if (ctx->nkeys == 0) { error("%s: server sent no hostkeys", __func__); goto out; } + if ((ctx->keys_seen = calloc(ctx->nkeys, + sizeof(*ctx->keys_seen))) == NULL) + fatal("%s: calloc failed", __func__); get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, options.check_host_ip ? (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr : NULL, - options.port, &host_str, options.check_host_ip ? &ip_str : NULL); + options.port, &ctx->host_str, + options.check_host_ip ? &ctx->ip_str : NULL); + + /* Find which keys we already know about. */ + if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[0], hostkeys_find, + ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, + HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY|HKF_WANT_MATCH)) != 0) { + error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + + /* Figure out if we have any new keys to add */ + ctx->nnew = 0; + for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { + if (!ctx->keys_seen[i]) + ctx->nnew++; + } - debug3("%s: update known hosts for %s%s%s with %u keys from server", - __func__, host_str, - options.check_host_ip ? " " : "", - options.check_host_ip ? ip_str : "", nkeys); + debug3("%s: %zu keys from server: %zu new, %zu retained. %zu to remove", + __func__, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nnew, ctx->nkeys - ctx->nnew, ctx->nold); - if ((r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[0], - host_str, options.check_host_ip ? ip_str : NULL, - keys, nkeys, options.hash_known_hosts, 0, - options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0) { - error("%s: hostfile_replace_entries failed: %s", - __func__, ssh_err(r)); - goto out; + if (ctx->nnew == 0 && ctx->nold != 0) { + /* We have some keys to remove. Just do it. */ + update_known_hosts(ctx); + } else if (ctx->nnew != 0) { + /* + * We have received hitherto-unseen keys from the server. + * Ask the server to confirm ownership of the private halves. + */ + debug3("%s: asking server to prove ownership for %zu keys", + __func__, ctx->nnew); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, + "hostkeys-prove@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* bool: want reply */ + fatal("%s: cannot prepare packet: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { + if (ctx->keys_seen[i]) + continue; + sshbuf_reset(buf); + if ((r = sshkey_putb(ctx->keys[i], buf)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshkey_putb: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshpkt_put_string: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshpkt_send: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + client_register_global_confirm( + client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm, ctx); + ctx = NULL; /* will be freed in callback */ } /* Success */ out: - free(host_str); - free(ip_str); + hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); sshkey_free(key); - for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) - sshkey_free(keys[i]); sshbuf_free(buf); - return success; + /* + * NB. Return success for all cases. The server doesn't need to know + * what the client does with its hosts file. + */ + return 1; } static int @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.70 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.71 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -130,9 +130,9 @@ struct kex { int (*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *); struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *); struct sshkey *(*load_host_private_key)(int, int, struct ssh *); - int (*host_key_index)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *); + int (*host_key_index)(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *); int (*sign)(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, - u_char **, size_t *, u_char *, size_t, u_int); + u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, u_int); int (*kex[KEX_MAX])(struct ssh *); /* kex specific state */ DH *dh; /* DH */ @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.143 2015/02/13 18:57:00 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.144 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu> * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org> @@ -685,12 +685,15 @@ mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m) int mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m) { + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */ struct sshkey *key; + struct sshbuf *sigbuf; u_char *p; u_char *signature; size_t datlen, siglen; - int r, keyid; + int r, keyid, is_proof = 0; + const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove@openssh.com"; debug3("%s", __func__); @@ -701,9 +704,38 @@ mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m) /* * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes), * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes). + * + * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey + * proof. + * + * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too? + * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather + * than the full kex structure... */ - if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) - fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %zu", __func__, datlen); + if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) { + /* + * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what + * the client sent us. + */ + if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */ + fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen); + if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid); + if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2, + session_id2_len) != 0) || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0) + fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key " + "proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) || + memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0) + fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu", + __func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf)); + sshbuf_free(sigbuf); + is_proof = 1; + } /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */ if (session_id2_len == 0) { @@ -717,7 +749,7 @@ mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m) datafellows)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, active_state)) != NULL && + } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL && auth_sock > 0) { if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, datafellows)) != 0) { @@ -727,7 +759,8 @@ mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m) } else fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid); - debug3("%s: signature %p(%zu)", __func__, signature, siglen); + debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__, + is_proof ? "KEX" : "hostkey proof", signature, siglen); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0) diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c index c0935dc6..b379f055 100644 --- a/monitor_wrap.c +++ b/monitor_wrap.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.83 2015/01/19 20:16:15 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.84 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu> * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org> @@ -219,7 +219,8 @@ mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max) #endif int -mm_key_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, u_char *data, u_int datalen) +mm_key_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, + const u_char *data, u_int datalen) { struct kex *kex = *pmonitor->m_pkex; Buffer m; @@ -227,7 +228,7 @@ mm_key_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, u_char *data, u_int datalen) debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); - buffer_put_int(&m, kex->host_key_index(key, active_state)); + buffer_put_int(&m, kex->host_key_index(key, 0, active_state)); buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, &m); diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h index d97e8db1..e18784ac 100644 --- a/monitor_wrap.h +++ b/monitor_wrap.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.25 2015/01/19 19:52:16 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.26 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu> @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ struct Authctxt; void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, const char *, void *); int mm_is_monitor(void); DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int); -int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int); +int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int); void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *); struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *); char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void); @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.231 2015/02/02 07:41:40 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.232 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -1480,7 +1480,8 @@ parse_int: case oUpdateHostkeys: intptr = &options->update_hostkeys; - goto parse_flag; + multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; + goto parse_multistate; case oHostbasedKeyTypes: charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types; @@ -2107,6 +2108,7 @@ fmt_intarg(OpCodes code, int val) return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily); case oVerifyHostKeyDNS: case oStrictHostKeyChecking: + case oUpdateHostkeys: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoask); case oControlMaster: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_controlmaster); @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.108 2015/01/30 11:43:14 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.109 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ typedef struct { int fingerprint_hash; - int update_hostkeys; + int update_hostkeys; /* one of SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_* */ char *hostbased_key_types; @@ -174,6 +174,10 @@ typedef struct { #define SSHCONF_USERCONF 2 /* user provided config file not system */ #define SSHCONF_POSTCANON 4 /* After hostname canonicalisation */ +#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_NO 0 +#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_YES 1 +#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK 2 + void initialize_options(Options *); void fill_default_options(Options *); void fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *); diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c index 48bb3f63..5633ceb4 100644 --- a/serverloop.c +++ b/serverloop.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.176 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.177 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ #include "auth-options.h" #include "serverloop.h" #include "roaming.h" +#include "ssherr.h" extern ServerOptions options; @@ -1150,11 +1151,82 @@ server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) } static int +server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct sshbuf **respp) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + struct sshbuf *resp = NULL; + struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL; + struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL; + int r, ndx, success = 0; + const u_char *blob; + u_char *sig = 0; + size_t blen, slen; + + if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + + while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) { + sshkey_free(key); + key = NULL; + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) { + error("%s: couldn't parse key: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + /* + * Better check that this is actually one of our hostkeys + * before attempting to sign anything with it. + */ + if ((ndx = ssh->kex->host_key_index(key, 1, ssh)) == -1) { + error("%s: unknown host %s key", + __func__, sshkey_type(key)); + goto out; + } + /* + * XXX refactor: make kex->sign just use an index rather + * than passing in public and private keys + */ + if ((key_prv = get_hostkey_by_index(ndx)) == NULL && + (key_pub = get_hostkey_public_by_index(ndx, ssh)) == NULL) { + error("%s: can't retrieve hostkey %d", __func__, ndx); + goto out; + } + sshbuf_reset(sigbuf); + free(sig); + sig = NULL; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, + ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, + "hostkeys-prove@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0 || + (r = ssh->kex->sign(key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen, + sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf), 0)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, slen)) != 0) { + error("%s: couldn't prepare signature: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + } + /* Success */ + *respp = resp; + resp = NULL; /* don't free it */ + success = 1; + out: + free(sig); + sshbuf_free(resp); + sshbuf_free(sigbuf); + sshkey_free(key); + return success; +} + +static int server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { char *rtype; int want_reply; - int success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0; + int r, success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0; + struct sshbuf *resp = NULL; rtype = packet_get_string(NULL); want_reply = packet_get_char(); @@ -1191,6 +1263,10 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) &allocated_listen_port, &options.fwd_opts); } free(fwd.listen_host); + if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, allocated_listen_port)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u32: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-tcpip-forward") == 0) { struct Forward fwd; @@ -1234,16 +1310,20 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) } else if (strcmp(rtype, "no-more-sessions@openssh.com") == 0) { no_more_sessions = 1; success = 1; + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-prove@openssh.com") == 0) { + success = server_input_hostkeys_prove(&resp); } if (want_reply) { packet_start(success ? SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE); - if (success && allocated_listen_port > 0) - packet_put_int(allocated_listen_port); + if (success && resp != NULL) + ssh_packet_put_raw(active_state, sshbuf_ptr(resp), + sshbuf_len(resp)); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } free(rtype); + sshbuf_free(resp); return 0; } @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.c,v 1.3 2015/01/30 01:13:33 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.c,v 1.4 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2012 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ int _ssh_verify_host_key(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *); struct sshkey *_ssh_host_public_key(int, int, struct ssh *); struct sshkey *_ssh_host_private_key(int, int, struct ssh *); int _ssh_host_key_sign(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, - size_t *, u_char *, size_t, u_int); + size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, u_int); /* * stubs for the server side implementation of kex. @@ -524,7 +524,8 @@ _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(struct ssh *ssh) int _ssh_host_key_sign(struct sshkey *privkey, struct sshkey *pubkey, - u_char **signature, size_t *slen, u_char *data, size_t dlen, u_int compat) + u_char **signature, size_t *slen, + const u_char *data, size_t dlen, u_int compat) { return sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slen, data, dlen, compat); } diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index ce79fe03..fa59c518 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVIS |