diff options
author | dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> | 2015-05-15 05:44:21 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> | 2015-05-21 14:58:29 +1000 |
commit | 9173d0fbe44de7ebcad8a15618e13a8b8d78902e (patch) | |
tree | 482505d35ca1340c86ef35fe2e29555224d4d778 /ssh-agent.c | |
parent | d028d5d3a697c71b21e4066d8672cacab3caa0a8 (diff) |
upstream commit
Use a salted hash of the lock passphrase instead of plain
text and do constant-time comparisons of it. Should prevent leaking any
information about it via timing, pointed out by Ryan Castellucci. Add a 0.1s
incrementing delay for each failed unlock attempt up to 10s. ok markus@
(earlier version), djm@
Upstream-ID: c599fcc325aa1cc65496b25220b622d22208c85f
Diffstat (limited to 'ssh-agent.c')
-rw-r--r-- | ssh-agent.c | 53 |
1 files changed, 40 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c index c75575f6..9e2a37fa 100644 --- a/ssh-agent.c +++ b/ssh-agent.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.202 2015/04/24 06:26:49 jmc Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.203 2015/05/15 05:44:21 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ #include <time.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> +#include <util.h> #include "key.h" /* XXX for typedef */ #include "buffer.h" /* XXX for typedef */ @@ -140,8 +141,12 @@ char socket_name[PATH_MAX]; char socket_dir[PATH_MAX]; /* locking */ +#define LOCK_SIZE 32 +#define LOCK_SALT_SIZE 16 +#define LOCK_ROUNDS 1 int locked = 0; -char *lock_passwd = NULL; +char lock_passwd[LOCK_SIZE]; +char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE]; extern char *__progname; @@ -660,23 +665,45 @@ send: static void process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock) { - int r, success = 0; - char *passwd; + int r, success = 0, delay; + char *passwd, passwdhash[LOCK_SIZE]; + static u_int fail_count = 0; + size_t pwlen; - if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, NULL)) != 0) + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, &pwlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - if (locked && !lock && strcmp(passwd, lock_passwd) == 0) { - locked = 0; - explicit_bzero(lock_passwd, strlen(lock_passwd)); - free(lock_passwd); - lock_passwd = NULL; - success = 1; + if (pwlen == 0) { + debug("empty password not supported"); + } else if (locked && !lock) { + if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt), + passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0) + fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf"); + if (timingsafe_bcmp(passwdhash, lock_passwd, LOCK_SIZE) == 0) { + debug("agent unlocked"); + locked = 0; + fail_count = 0; + explicit_bzero(lock_passwd, sizeof(lock_passwd)); + success = 1; + } else { + /* delay in 0.1s increments up to 10s */ + if (fail_count < 100) + fail_count++; + delay = 100000 * fail_count; + debug("unlock failed, delaying %0.1lf seconds", + (double)delay/1000000); + usleep(delay); + } + explicit_bzero(passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash)); } else if (!locked && lock) { + debug("agent locked"); locked = 1; - lock_passwd = xstrdup(passwd); + arc4random_buf(lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt)); + if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt), + lock_passwd, sizeof(lock_passwd), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0) + fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf"); success = 1; } - explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd)); + explicit_bzero(passwd, pwlen); free(passwd); send_status(e, success); } |