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authorDamien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>2010-09-10 11:23:34 +1000
committerDamien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>2010-09-10 11:23:34 +1000
commit041ab7c1e7d6514ed84a539a767f79ffb356e807 (patch)
treec6528487bfc1cfa824655e48ef884b2c268c8588 /key.h
parent3796ab47d3f68f69512c360f178b77bf0fb12b4f (diff)
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/09/09 10:45:45
[kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c key.c key.h monitor.c ssh-ecdsa.c] ECDH/ECDSA compliance fix: these methods vary the hash function they use (SHA256/384/512) depending on the length of the curve in use. The previous code incorrectly used SHA256 in all cases. This fix will cause authentication failure when using 384 or 521-bit curve keys if one peer hasn't been upgraded and the other has. (256-bit curve keys work ok). In particular you may need to specify HostkeyAlgorithms when connecting to a server that has not been upgraded from an upgraded client. ok naddy@
Diffstat (limited to 'key.h')
-rw-r--r--key.h4
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/key.h b/key.h
index 2eb12436..ba1a20c0 100644
--- a/key.h
+++ b/key.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.31 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.32 2010/09/09 10:45:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@@ -112,8 +112,10 @@ int key_cert_is_legacy(Key *);
int key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *);
int key_curve_name_to_nid(const char *);
const char * key_curve_nid_to_name(int);
+u_int key_curve_nid_to_bits(int);
int key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int);
int key_ecdsa_group_to_nid(const EC_GROUP *);
+const EVP_MD * key_ec_nid_to_evpmd(int nid);
int key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
int key_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *);