- (djm) Big OpenBSD sync:

   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/09/30 10:27:44
     [log.c]
     allow loglevel debug
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/03 11:59:57
     [packet.c]
     hmac->mac
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/03 12:03:03
     [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c]
     move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in
     debug-msg
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/03 12:16:48
     ssh.c
     do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/09 15:30:44
     ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c
     -X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too.
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/09 15:32:34
     auth-options.c
     clear options on every call.
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/09 15:51:00
     authfd.c authfd.h
     interop with ssh-agent2, from <res@shore.net>
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/10 14:20:45
     compat.c
     use rexexp for version string matching
   - provos@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/10 22:02:18
     [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h]
     First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange.  The
     client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman
     in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer
     keys.  University of Windsor provided network, T the company.
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/11 13:59:52
     [auth-rsa.c auth2.c]
     clear auth options unless auth sucessfull
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/11 14:00:27
     [auth-options.h]
     clear auth options unless auth sucessfull
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/11 14:03:27
     [scp.1 scp.c]
     support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/11 14:11:35
     [dh.c]
     Wall
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/11 14:14:40
     [auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h]
     [ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h]
     add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by
     mkiernan@avantgo.com and me
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/11 14:27:24
     [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h]
     [myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c]
     [sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
     new cipher framework
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/11 14:45:21
     [cipher.c]
     remove DES
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/12 03:59:20
     [cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
     enable DES in SSH-1 clients only
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/12 08:21:13
     [kex.h packet.c]
     remove unused
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/13 12:34:46
     [sshd.c]
     Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/13 12:59:15
     [cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h  rijndael.c rijndael.h]
     rijndael/aes support
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/13 13:10:54
     [sshd.8]
     more info about -V
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/10/13 13:12:02
     [myproposal.h]
     prefer no compression

1 files changed, 195 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/cli.c b/cli.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7814a618
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cli.c
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$Id: cli.c,v 1.1 2000/10/14 05:23:12 djm Exp $");
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+static int cli_input = -1;
+static int cli_output = -1;
+static int cli_from_stdin = 0;
+
+sigset_t oset;
+sigset_t nset;
+struct sigaction nsa;
+struct sigaction osa;
+struct termios ntio;
+struct termios otio;
+int echo_modified;
+
+volatile int intr;
+
+static int
+cli_open(int from_stdin)
+{
+	if (cli_input >= 0 && cli_output >= 0 && cli_from_stdin == from_stdin)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (from_stdin) {
+		if (!cli_from_stdin && cli_input >= 0) {
+			(void)close(cli_input);
+		}
+		cli_input = STDIN_FILENO;
+		cli_output = STDERR_FILENO;
+	} else {
+		cli_input = cli_output = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR);
+		if (cli_input < 0)
+			fatal("You have no controlling tty.  Cannot read passphrase.");
+	}
+
+	cli_from_stdin = from_stdin;
+
+	return cli_input >= 0 && cli_output >= 0 && cli_from_stdin == from_stdin;
+}
+
+static void
+cli_close()
+{
+	if (!cli_from_stdin && cli_input >= 0)
+		close(cli_input);
+	cli_input = -1;
+	cli_output = -1;
+	cli_from_stdin = 0;
+	return;
+}
+
+void
+intrcatch()
+{
+	intr = 1;
+}
+
+static void
+cli_echo_disable()
+{
+	sigemptyset(&nset);
+	sigaddset(&nset, SIGTSTP);
+	(void) sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset);
+
+	intr = 0;
+
+	memset(&nsa, 0, sizeof(nsa));
+	nsa.sa_handler = intrcatch;
+	(void) sigaction(SIGINT, &nsa, &osa);
+
+	echo_modified = 0;
+	if (tcgetattr(cli_input, &otio) == 0 && (otio.c_lflag & ECHO)) {
+		echo_modified = 1;
+		ntio = otio;
+		ntio.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHOE | ECHOK | ECHONL);
+		(void) tcsetattr(cli_input, TCSANOW, &ntio);
+	}
+	return;
+}
+
+static void
+cli_echo_restore()
+{
+	if (echo_modified != 0) {
+		tcsetattr(cli_input, TCSANOW, &otio);
+		echo_modified = 0;
+	}
+
+	(void) sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
+	(void) sigaction(SIGINT, &osa, NULL);
+
+	if (intr != 0) {
+		kill(getpid(), SIGINT);
+		sigemptyset(&nset);
+		/* XXX tty has not neccessarily drained by now? */
+		sigsuspend(&nset);
+		intr = 0;
+	}
+	return;
+}
+
+static int
+cli_read(char* buf, int size, int echo)
+{
+	char ch = 0;
+	int i = 0;
+
+	if (!echo)
+		cli_echo_disable();
+
+	while (ch != '\n') {
+		if (read(cli_input, &ch, 1) != 1)
+			break;
+		if (ch == '\n' || intr != 0)
+			break;
+		if (i < size)
+			buf[i++] = ch;
+	}
+	buf[i] = '\0';
+
+	if (!echo)
+		cli_echo_restore();
+	if (!intr && !echo)
+		(void) write(cli_output, "\n", 1);
+	return i;
+}
+
+static int
+cli_write(char* buf, int size)
+{
+	int i, len, pos, ret = 0;
+	char *output, *p;
+
+	output = xmalloc(4*size);
+	for (p = output, i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+                if (buf[i] == '\n')
+                        *p++ = buf[i];
+                else
+                        p = vis(p, buf[i], 0, 0);
+        }
+	len = p - output;
+
+	for (pos = 0; pos < len; pos += ret) {
+		ret = write(cli_output, output + pos, len - pos);
+		if (ret == -1)
+			return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Presents a prompt and returns the response allocated with xmalloc().
+ * Uses /dev/tty or stdin/out depending on arg.  Optionally disables echo
+ * of response depending on arg.  Tries to ensure that no other userland
+ * buffer is storing the response.
+ */
+char*
+cli_read_passphrase(char* prompt, int from_stdin, int echo_enable)
+{
+	char	buf[BUFSIZ];
+	char*	p;
+
+	if (!cli_open(from_stdin))
+		fatal("Cannot read passphrase.");
+
+	fflush(stdout);
+
+	cli_write(prompt, strlen(prompt));
+	cli_read(buf, sizeof buf, echo_enable);
+
+	cli_close();
+
+	p = xstrdup(buf);
+	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	return (p);
+}
+
+char*
+cli_prompt(char* prompt, int echo_enable)
+{
+	return cli_read_passphrase(prompt, 0, echo_enable);
+}
+
+void
+cli_mesg(char* mesg)
+{
+	cli_open(0);
+	cli_write(mesg, strlen(mesg));
+	cli_write("\n", strlen("\n"));
+	cli_close();
+	return;
+}