diff options
author | Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> | 2010-07-16 13:57:51 +1000 |
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committer | Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> | 2010-07-16 13:57:51 +1000 |
commit | 8a0268f1b3f62292d4124f8d158e0587c4f7c330 (patch) | |
tree | 43493a3202569a2939f5616127d9de8689613a7b /channels.c | |
parent | d0244d498ba970b9d9348429eaf7a4a0ef2b903c (diff) |
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 11:52:06
[auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c]
[packet.c ssh-rsa.c]
implement a timing_safe_cmp() function to compare memory without leaking
timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for
some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing high-value was
readily attackable anyway); "looks ok" markus@
Diffstat (limited to 'channels.c')
-rw-r--r-- | channels.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.306 2010/06/25 07:20:04 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.307 2010/07/13 11:52:06 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -917,7 +917,7 @@ x11_open_helper(Buffer *b) } /* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */ if (data_len != x11_fake_data_len || - memcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), + timing_safe_cmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), x11_fake_data, x11_fake_data_len) != 0) { debug2("X11 auth data does not match fake data."); return -1; |