diff options
author | Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> | 2000-08-23 10:46:23 +1000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> | 2000-08-23 10:46:23 +1000 |
commit | ad833b3e65c1887674714d514eb818d862bb499a (patch) | |
tree | 16fa75fe42aede072c5d3edac562c2870d1bb0e5 /authfd.c | |
parent | b078567bf5de1dcf12d265d98acb4dc9eba8b325 (diff) |
- (djm) Pick up LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment or PATH if not set by headers
- (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates:
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:07:23
[ssh.c]
accept remsh as a valid name as well; roman@buildpoint.com
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:17:13
[deattack.c crc32.c packet.c]
rename crc32() to ssh_crc32() to avoid zlib name clash. do not move to
libz crc32 function yet, because it has ugly "long"'s in it;
oneill@cs.sfu.ca
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:26:08
[scp.1 scp.c]
-S prog support; tv@debian.org
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:50:07
[scp.c]
knf
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:57:33
[log-client.c]
shorten
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 12:48:11
[channels.c channels.h clientloop.c ssh.c ssh.h]
support for ~. in ssh2
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:29:40
[crc32.h]
proper prototype
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:34:44
[authfd.c authfd.h key.c key.h ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1]
[ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c Makefile]
[fingerprint.c fingerprint.h]
add SSH2/DSA support to the agent and some other DSA related cleanups.
(note that we cannot talk to ssh.com's ssh2 agents)
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:55:52
[channels.c channels.h clientloop.c]
more ~ support for ssh2
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 16:21:19
[clientloop.c]
oops
- millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:25:53
[session.c]
We have to stash the result of get_remote_name_or_ip() before we
close our socket or getpeername() will get EBADF and the process
will exit. Only a problem for "UseLogin yes".
- millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:30:59
[session.c]
Only check /etc/nologin if "UseLogin no" since login(1) may have its
own policy on determining who is allowed to login when /etc/nologin
is present. Also use the _PATH_NOLOGIN define.
- millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:42:43
[auth1.c auth2.c session.c ssh.c]
Add calls to setusercontext() and login_get*(). We basically call
setusercontext() in most places where previously we did a setlogin().
Add default login.conf file and put root in the "daemon" login class.
- millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/21 10:23:31
[session.c]
Fix incorrect PATH setting; noted by Markus.
Diffstat (limited to 'authfd.c')
-rw-r--r-- | authfd.c | 235 |
1 files changed, 155 insertions, 80 deletions
@@ -11,10 +11,13 @@ * * Functions for connecting the local authentication agent. * + * SSH2 implementation, + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.24 2000/08/15 19:20:46 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.25 2000/08/19 21:34:42 markus Exp $"); #include "ssh.h" #include "rsa.h" @@ -29,6 +32,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.24 2000/08/15 19:20:46 markus Exp $"); #include "key.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "kex.h" +#include "dsa.h" /* helper */ int decode_reply(int type); @@ -71,8 +75,7 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket() } int -ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, - Buffer *request, Buffer *reply) +ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply) { int l, len; char buf[1024]; @@ -162,7 +165,6 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection() auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth)); auth->fd = sock; - buffer_init(&auth->packet); buffer_init(&auth->identities); auth->howmany = 0; @@ -175,46 +177,57 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection() */ void -ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *ac) +ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth) { - buffer_free(&ac->packet); - buffer_free(&ac->identities); - close(ac->fd); - xfree(ac); + buffer_free(&auth->identities); + close(auth->fd); + xfree(auth); } /* * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent. - * Returns true if an identity is available, 0 otherwise. - * The caller must initialize the integers before the call, and free the - * comment after a successful call (before calling ssh_get_next_identity). */ -int -ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, - BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment) +Key * +ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version) { + int type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0; Buffer request; - int type; + + switch(version){ + case 1: + code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES; + code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER; + break; + case 2: + code1 = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES; + code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER; + break; + default: + return NULL; + } /* * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the * identities it can represent. */ buffer_init(&request); - buffer_put_char(&request, SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES); + buffer_put_char(&request, code1); buffer_clear(&auth->identities); if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &request, &auth->identities) == 0) { buffer_free(&request); - return 0; + return NULL; } buffer_free(&request); /* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */ type = buffer_get_char(&auth->identities); - if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) + if (type == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) { + return NULL; + } else if (type != code2) { fatal("Bad authentication reply message type: %d", type); + } /* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */ auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities); @@ -223,43 +236,49 @@ ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, auth->howmany); /* Return the first entry (if any). */ - return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, e, n, comment); + return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, comment, version); } -/* - * Returns the next authentication identity for the agent. Other functions - * can be called between this and ssh_get_first_identity or two calls of this - * function. This returns 0 if there are no more identities. The caller - * must free comment after a successful return. - */ - -int -ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, - BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment) +Key * +ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version) { unsigned int bits; + unsigned char *blob; + unsigned int blen; + Key *key = NULL; /* Return failure if no more entries. */ if (auth->howmany <= 0) - return 0; + return NULL; /* * Get the next entry from the packet. These will abort with a fatal * error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data. */ - bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities); - buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, e); - buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, n); - *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL); - - if (bits != BN_num_bits(n)) - log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u", - BN_num_bits(n), bits); - + switch(version){ + case 1: + key = key_new(KEY_RSA); + bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities); + buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e); + buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n); + *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL); + if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) + log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u", + BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits); + break; + case 2: + blob = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen); + *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL); + key = dsa_key_from_blob(blob, blen); + xfree(blob); + break; + default: + return NULL; + break; + } /* Decrement the number of remaining entries. */ auth->howmany--; - - return 1; + return key; } /* @@ -272,7 +291,7 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth, - BIGNUM* e, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *challenge, + Key* key, BIGNUM *challenge, unsigned char session_id[16], unsigned int response_type, unsigned char response[16]) @@ -282,15 +301,17 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int i; int type; - if (response_type == 0) - fatal("Compatibility with ssh protocol version " - "1.0 no longer supported."); - + if (key->type != KEY_RSA) + return 0; + if (response_type == 0) { + log("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported."); + return 0; + } buffer_init(&buffer); buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE); - buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(n)); - buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, e); - buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, n); + buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)); + buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e); + buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n); buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge); buffer_append(&buffer, (char *) session_id, 16); buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type); @@ -318,6 +339,45 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth, return success; } +/* ask agent to sign data, returns -1 on error, 0 on success */ +int +ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth, + Key *key, + unsigned char **sigp, int *lenp, + unsigned char *data, int datalen) +{ + Buffer msg; + unsigned char *blob; + unsigned int blen; + int type; + int ret = -1; + + if (dsa_make_key_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0) + return -1; + + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST); + buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); + buffer_put_string(&msg, data, datalen); + xfree(blob); + + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { + buffer_free(&msg); + return -1; + } + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + if (type == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) { + log("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key."); + } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { + fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type); + } else { + ret = 0; + *sigp = buffer_get_string(&msg, lenp); + } + buffer_free(&msg); + return ret; +} + /* Encode key for a message to the agent. */ void @@ -358,29 +418,29 @@ ssh_encode_identity_dsa(Buffer *b, DSA *key, const char *comment) int ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment) { - Buffer buffer; + Buffer msg; int type; - buffer_init(&buffer); + buffer_init(&msg); switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA: - ssh_encode_identity_rsa(&buffer, key->rsa, comment); + ssh_encode_identity_rsa(&msg, key->rsa, comment); break; case KEY_DSA: - ssh_encode_identity_dsa(&buffer, key->dsa, comment); + ssh_encode_identity_dsa(&msg, key->dsa, comment); break; default: - buffer_free(&buffer); + buffer_free(&msg); return 0; break; } - if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) { - buffer_free(&buffer); + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { + buffer_free(&msg); return 0; } - type = buffer_get_char(&buffer); - buffer_free(&buffer); + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); return decode_reply(type); } @@ -390,23 +450,35 @@ ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment) */ int -ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, RSA *key) +ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key) { - Buffer buffer; + Buffer msg; int type; - - buffer_init(&buffer); - buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY); - buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->n)); - buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->e); - buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->n); - - if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) { - buffer_free(&buffer); + unsigned char *blob; + unsigned int blen; + + buffer_init(&msg); + + if (key->type == KEY_RSA) { + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY); + buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)); + buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e); + buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n); + } else if (key->type == KEY_DSA) { + dsa_make_key_blob(key, &blob, &blen); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY); + buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); + xfree(blob); + } else { + buffer_free(&msg); return 0; } - type = buffer_get_char(&buffer); - buffer_free(&buffer); + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { + buffer_free(&msg); + return 0; + } + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); return decode_reply(type); } @@ -416,20 +488,23 @@ ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, RSA *key) */ int -ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth) +ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version) { - Buffer buffer; + Buffer msg; int type; + int code = (version==1) ? + SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES : + SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES; - buffer_init(&buffer); - buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES); + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, code); - if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) { - buffer_free(&buffer); + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { + buffer_free(&msg); return 0; } - type = buffer_get_char(&buffer); - buffer_free(&buffer); + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); return decode_reply(type); } |