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authorBen Lindstrom <mouring@eviladmin.org>2001-01-19 04:26:52 +0000
committerBen Lindstrom <mouring@eviladmin.org>2001-01-19 04:26:52 +0000
commitdb65e8fdedadaf79df2d8393a4d43e9094c80649 (patch)
treee5902db5ee2b69f9f3c2fa0dbdeb7f4fc20c68b4 /auth.c
parent5aa80596f76ce36dee4623a00a55548834c3328d (diff)
Please grep through the source and look for 'ISSUE' comments and verify
that I was able to get all the portable bits in the right location. As for the SKEY comment there is an email out to Markus as to how it should be resolved. Until then I just #ifdef SKEY/#endif out the whole block. - (bal) OpenBSD Resync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/18 16:20:21 [log-client.c log-server.c log.c readconf.c servconf.c ssh.1 ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c] log() is at pri=LOG_INFO, since LOG_NOTICE goes to /dev/console on many systems - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/18 16:59:59 [auth-passwd.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c serverloop.c session.c session.h sshconnect1.c] 1) removes fake skey from sshd, since this will be much harder with /usr/libexec/auth/login_XXX 2) share/unify code used in ssh-1 and ssh-2 authentication (server side) 3) make addition of BSD_AUTH and other challenge reponse methods easier. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/18 17:12:43 [auth-chall.c auth2-chall.c] rename *-skey.c *-chall.c since the files are not skey specific
Diffstat (limited to 'auth.c')
-rw-r--r--auth.c96
1 files changed, 74 insertions, 22 deletions
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 59c95fe4..814506d7 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -1,14 +1,4 @@
/*
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- *
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -33,19 +23,12 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.12 2001/01/13 18:56:48 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.13 2001/01/18 16:59:59 markus Exp $");
#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
#include "ssh.h"
-#include "pty.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "mpaux.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "channels.h"
#include "match.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
#include "groupaccess.h"
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
#include <login.h>
@@ -54,10 +37,8 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.12 2001/01/13 18:56:48 markus Exp $");
#include <shadow.h>
#endif /* defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) */
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
#include "auth.h"
-#include "session.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -179,3 +160,74 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
/* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
return 1;
}
+
+Authctxt *
+authctxt_new(void)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt));
+ memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+ return authctxt;
+}
+
+struct passwd *
+pwcopy(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ struct passwd *copy = xmalloc(sizeof(*copy));
+ memset(copy, 0, sizeof(*copy));
+ copy->pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+ copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd);
+ copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid;
+ copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid;
+#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
+ copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class);
+#endif
+ copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
+ copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
+ return copy;
+}
+
+void
+auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
+{
+ void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
+ char *authmsg;
+
+ /* Raise logging level */
+ if (authenticated == 1 ||
+ !authctxt->valid ||
+ authctxt->failures >= AUTH_FAIL_LOG ||
+ strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
+ authlog = log;
+
+ if (authctxt->postponed)
+ authmsg = "Postponed";
+ else
+ authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
+
+ authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
+ authmsg,
+ method,
+ authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",
+ authctxt->valid && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 ? "ROOT" : authctxt->user,
+ get_remote_ipaddr(),
+ get_remote_port(),
+ info);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if the user is logging in as root and root logins are disallowed.
+ * Note that root login is _allways_ allowed for forced commands.
+ */
+int
+auth_root_allowed(void)
+{
+ if (options.permit_root_login)
+ return 1;
+ if (forced_command) {
+ log("Root login accepted for forced command.");
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ log("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_canonical_hostname());
+ return 0;
+ }
+}