upstream commit

remove ssh1 server code; ok djm@

Upstream-ID: c24c0c32c49b91740d5a94ae914fb1898ea5f534

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 349 deletions

diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c
deleted file mode 100644
index cbd971be..00000000
--- a/auth-rsa.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,349 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.90 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
- * RSA-based authentication.  This code determines whether to admit a login
- * based on RSA authentication.  This file also contains functions to check
- * validity of the host key.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-
-#include "digest.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-/*
- * Session identifier that is used to bind key exchange and authentication
- * responses to a particular session.
- */
-extern u_char session_id[16];
-
-/*
- * The .ssh/authorized_keys file contains public keys, one per line, in the
- * following format:
- *   options bits e n comment
- * where bits, e and n are decimal numbers,
- * and comment is any string of characters up to newline.  The maximum
- * length of a line is SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES characters.  See sshd(8) for a
- * description of the options.
- */
-
-BIGNUM *
-auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key)
-{
-	BIGNUM *challenge;
-	BN_CTX *ctx;
-
-	if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_new() failed");
-	/* Generate a random challenge. */
-	if (BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0) == 0)
-		fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_rand failed");
-	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_CTX_new failed");
-	if (BN_mod(challenge, challenge, key->rsa->n, ctx) == 0)
-		fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_mod failed");
-	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-
-	return challenge;
-}
-
-int
-auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
-{
-	u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];
-	struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
-	int len;
-
-	/* don't allow short keys */
-	if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
-		error("%s: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
-		    __func__,
-		    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
-		return (0);
-	}
-
-	/* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
-	len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
-	if (len <= 0 || len > 32)
-		fatal("%s: bad challenge length %d", __func__, len);
-	memset(buf, 0, 32);
-	BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
-	if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
-	    ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 ||
-	    ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 ||
-	    ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0)
-		fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
-	ssh_digest_free(md);
-
-	/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
-	if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
-		/* Wrong answer. */
-		return (0);
-	}
-	/* Correct answer. */
-	return (1);
-}
-
-/*
- * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
- * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
- * our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer.
- */
-
-int
-auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *key)
-{
-	BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge;
-	u_char response[16];
-	int i, success;
-
-	if ((encrypted_challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_new() failed");
-
-	challenge = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key));
-
-	/* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */
-	if (rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, key->rsa) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt failed", __func__);
-
-	/* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */
-	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
-	packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge);
-	packet_send();
-	BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge);
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	/* Wait for a response. */
-	packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
-	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-		response[i] = (u_char)packet_get_char();
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	success = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_verify_response(key, challenge, response));
-	BN_clear_free(challenge);
-	return (success);
-}
-
-static int
-rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
-    const BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
-{
-	char *fp, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
-	int allowed = 0, bits;
-	FILE *f;
-	u_long linenum = 0;
-	Key *key;
-
-	debug("trying public RSA key file %s", file);
-	if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-	/*
-	 * Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key.  If
-	 * found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the
-	 * user really has the corresponding private key.
-	 */
-	key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
-	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
-		char *cp;
-		char *key_options;
-		int keybits;
-
-		/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
-		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
-			;
-		if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
-			continue;
-
-		/*
-		 * Check if there are options for this key, and if so,
-		 * save their starting address and skip the option part
-		 * for now.  If there are no options, set the starting
-		 * address to NULL.
-		 */
-		if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') {
-			int quoted = 0;
-			key_options = cp;
-			for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
-				if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
-					cp++;	/* Skip both */
-				else if (*cp == '"')
-					quoted = !quoted;
-			}
-		} else
-			key_options = NULL;
-
-		/* Parse the key from the line. */
-		if (hostfile_read_key(&cp, &bits, key) == 0) {
-			debug("%.100s, line %lu: non ssh1 key syntax",
-			    file, linenum);
-			continue;
-		}
-		/* cp now points to the comment part. */
-
-		/*
-		 * Check if the we have found the desired key (identified
-		 * by its modulus).
-		 */
-		if (BN_cmp(key->rsa->n, client_n) != 0)
-			continue;
-
-		/* check the real bits  */
-		keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
-		if (keybits < 0 || bits != keybits)
-			logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
-			    "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
-			    file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
-
-		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
-		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
-			continue;
-		debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
-		    file, linenum, key_type(key), fp);
-		free(fp);
-
-		/* Never accept a revoked key */
-		if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
-			break;
-
-		/* We have found the desired key. */
-		/*
-		 * If our options do not allow this key to be used,
-		 * do not send challenge.
-		 */
-		if (!auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum))
-			continue;
-		if (key_is_cert_authority)
-			continue;
-		/* break out, this key is allowed */
-		allowed = 1;
-		break;
-	}
-
-	/* Close the file. */
-	fclose(f);
-
-	/* return key if allowed */
-	if (allowed && rkey != NULL)
-		*rkey = key;
-	else
-		key_free(key);
-
-	return allowed;
-}
-
-/*
- * check if there's user key matching client_n,
- * return key if login is allowed, NULL otherwise
- */
-
-int
-auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
-{
-	char *file;
-	u_int i, allowed = 0;
-
-	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
-	for (i = 0; !allowed && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
-		if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
-			continue;
-		file = expand_authorized_keys(
-		    options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
-		allowed = rsa_key_allowed_in_file(pw, file, client_n, rkey);
-		free(file);
-	}
-
-	restore_uid();
-
-	return allowed;
-}
-
-/*
- * Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client.  This returns
- * 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was
- * successful.  This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation.
- */
-int
-auth_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM *client_n)
-{
-	Key *key;
-	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
-
-	/* no user given */
-	if (!authctxt->valid)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_key_allowed(pw, client_n, &key))) {
-		auth_clear_options();
-		return (0);
-	}
-
-	/* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */
-	if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(key)) {
-		/* Wrong response. */
-		verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
-		packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
-		/*
-		 * Break out of the loop. Otherwise we might send
-		 * another challenge and break the protocol.
-		 */
-		key_free(key);
-		return (0);
-	}
-	/*
-	 * Correct response.  The client has been successfully
-	 * authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the
-	 * options; this will be reset if the options cause the
-	 * authentication to be rejected.
-	 */
-	pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
-
-	packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted.");
-	return (1);
-}
-
-#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */