- Merged very large OpenBSD source code reformat

 - OpenBSD CVS updates
   - [channels.c cipher.c compat.c log-client.c scp.c serverloop.c]
     [ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c]
     syslog changes:
     * Unified Logmessage for all auth-types, for success and for failed
     * Standard connections get only ONE line in the LOG when level==LOG:
       Auth-attempts are logged only, if authentication is:
          a) successfull or
          b) with passwd or
          c) we had more than AUTH_FAIL_LOG failues
     * many log() became verbose()
     * old behaviour with level=VERBOSE
   - [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 ssh.h sshconnect.c sshd.c]
     tranfer s/key challenge/response data in SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE
     messages. allows use of s/key in windows (ttssh, securecrt) and
     ssh-1.2.27 clients without 'ssh -v', ok: niels@
   - [sshd.8]
     -V, for fallback to openssh in SSH2 compatibility mode
   - [sshd.c]
     fix sigchld race; cjc5@po.cwru.edu

1 files changed, 86 insertions, 88 deletions

diff --git a/auth-rh-rsa.c b/auth-rh-rsa.c
index 68e0b829..4e9a383a 100644
--- a/auth-rh-rsa.c
+++ b/auth-rh-rsa.c
@@ -1,21 +1,21 @@
 /*
-
-auth-rh-rsa.c
-
-Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
-
-Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
-                   All rights reserved
-
-Created: Sun May  7 03:08:06 1995 ylo
-
-Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication combined with RSA host
-authentication.
-
-*/
+ * 
+ * auth-rh-rsa.c
+ * 
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * 
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * 
+ * Created: Sun May  7 03:08:06 1995 ylo
+ * 
+ * Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication combined with RSA host
+ * authentication.
+ *
+ */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$Id: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.5 1999/11/16 02:37:16 damien Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.6 1999/11/24 13:26:21 damien Exp $");
 
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
@@ -26,78 +26,76 @@ RCSID("$Id: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.5 1999/11/16 02:37:16 damien Exp $");
 /* Tries to authenticate the user using the .rhosts file and the host using
    its host key.  Returns true if authentication succeeds. */
 
-int auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user,
-		    BIGNUM *client_host_key_e, BIGNUM *client_host_key_n)
+int 
+auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user,
+		BIGNUM *client_host_key_e, BIGNUM *client_host_key_n)
 {
-  extern ServerOptions options;
-  const char *canonical_hostname;
-  HostStatus host_status;
-  BIGNUM *ke, *kn;
-
-  debug("Trying rhosts with RSA host authentication for %.100s", client_user);
-
-  /* Check if we would accept it using rhosts authentication. */
-  if (!auth_rhosts(pw, client_user))
-    return 0;
-
-  canonical_hostname = get_canonical_hostname();
-
-  debug("Rhosts RSA authentication: canonical host %.900s",
-	canonical_hostname);
-  
-  /* Check if we know the host and its host key. */
-  /* Check system-wide host file. */
-  ke = BN_new();
-  kn = BN_new();
-  host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE, canonical_hostname,
-				       client_host_key_e, client_host_key_n, ke, kn);
-
-  /* Check user host file unless ignored. */
-  if (host_status != HOST_OK && !options.ignore_user_known_hosts) {
-    struct stat st;
-    char *user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid);
-    /* Check file permissions of SSH_USER_HOSTFILE,
-       auth_rsa() did already check pw->pw_dir, but there is a race XXX */
-    if (options.strict_modes &&
-	(stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
-	((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
-	(st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
-       log("Rhosts RSA authentication refused for %.100s: bad owner or modes for %.200s",
-	   pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
-    } else {
-      /* XXX race between stat and the following open() */
-      temporarily_use_uid(pw->pw_uid);
-      host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile, canonical_hostname,
-					   client_host_key_e, client_host_key_n, ke, kn);
-      restore_uid();
-    }
-    xfree(user_hostfile);
-  }
-  BN_free(ke);
-  BN_free(kn);
-
-  if (host_status != HOST_OK) {
-    /* The host key was not found. */
-    debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication denied: unknown or invalid host key");
-    packet_send_debug("Your host key cannot be verified: unknown or invalid host key.");
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  /* A matching host key was found and is known. */
-  
-  /* Perform the challenge-response dialog with the client for the host key. */
-  if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key_e, client_host_key_n))
-    {
-      log("Client on %.800s failed to respond correctly to host authentication.",
-	  canonical_hostname);
-      return 0;
-    }
-
-  /* We have authenticated the user using .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv, and
-     the host using RSA.  We accept the authentication. */
-  
-  log("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted for %.100s, %.100s on %.700s.",
-      pw->pw_name, client_user, canonical_hostname);
-  packet_send_debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted.");
-  return 1;
+	extern ServerOptions options;
+	const char *canonical_hostname;
+	HostStatus host_status;
+	BIGNUM *ke, *kn;
+
+	debug("Trying rhosts with RSA host authentication for %.100s", client_user);
+
+	/* Check if we would accept it using rhosts authentication. */
+	if (!auth_rhosts(pw, client_user))
+		return 0;
+
+	canonical_hostname = get_canonical_hostname();
+
+	debug("Rhosts RSA authentication: canonical host %.900s",
+	      canonical_hostname);
+
+	/* Check if we know the host and its host key. */
+	ke = BN_new();
+	kn = BN_new();
+	host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE, canonical_hostname,
+			   		     client_host_key_e, client_host_key_n,
+					     ke, kn);
+
+	/* Check user host file unless ignored. */
+	if (host_status != HOST_OK && !options.ignore_user_known_hosts) {
+		struct stat st;
+		char *user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid);
+		/* Check file permissions of SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, auth_rsa()
+		   did already check pw->pw_dir, but there is a race XXX */
+		if (options.strict_modes &&
+		    (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
+		    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
+		     (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+			log("Rhosts RSA authentication refused for %.100s: bad owner or modes for %.200s",
+			    pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
+		} else {
+			/* XXX race between stat and the following open() */
+			temporarily_use_uid(pw->pw_uid);
+			host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile, canonical_hostname,
+							     client_host_key_e, client_host_key_n,
+							     ke, kn);
+			restore_uid();
+		}
+		xfree(user_hostfile);
+	}
+	BN_free(ke);
+	BN_free(kn);
+
+	if (host_status != HOST_OK) {
+		debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication denied: unknown or invalid host key");
+		packet_send_debug("Your host key cannot be verified: unknown or invalid host key.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* A matching host key was found and is known. */
+
+	/* Perform the challenge-response dialog with the client for the host key. */
+	if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key_e, client_host_key_n)) {
+		log("Client on %.800s failed to respond correctly to host authentication.",
+		    canonical_hostname);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* We have authenticated the user using .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv, and the host using RSA.
+	   We accept the authentication. */
+
+	verbose("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted for %.100s, %.100s on %.700s.",
+		pw->pw_name, client_user, canonical_hostname);
+	packet_send_debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted.");
+	return 1;
 }