upstream: make sshd_config AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand and

AuthorizedKeysCommand accept the %D (routing domain) and a new %C (connection
address/port 4-tuple) as expansion sequences; ok markus

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ee9a48bf1a74c4ace71b69de69cfdaa2a7388565

2 files changed, 31 insertions, 16 deletions

diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index b4f1f638..3f49e1df 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.118 2023/02/17 04:22:50 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.119 2023/07/27 22:25:17 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -340,8 +340,8 @@ match_principals_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
  * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise.
  */
 static int
-match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw,
-    const struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key,
+    const char *conn_id, const char *rdomain, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
 {
 	struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
 	const struct sshkey_cert *cert = key->cert;
@@ -416,6 +416,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw,
 	    (unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid);
 	for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
 		tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
+		    "C", conn_id,
+		    "D", rdomain,
 		    "U", uidstr,
 		    "u", user_pw->pw_name,
 		    "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
@@ -477,7 +479,7 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw,
 static int
 user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
     const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
-    struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+    const char *conn_id, const char *rdomain, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
 {
 	char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
 	const char *reason;
@@ -514,7 +516,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
 	}
 	/* Try querying command if specified */
 	if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key,
-	    &principals_opts))
+	    conn_id, rdomain, &principals_opts))
 		found_principal = 1;
 	/* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */
 	use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL ||
@@ -613,7 +615,7 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
 static int
 user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key,
     const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
-    struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+    const char *conn_id, const char *rdomain, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
 {
 	struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
 	FILE *f = NULL;
@@ -675,6 +677,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key,
 	    (unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid);
 	for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
 		tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
+		    "C", conn_id,
+		    "D", rdomain,
 		    "U", uidstr,
 		    "u", user_pw->pw_name,
 		    "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
@@ -749,11 +753,9 @@ user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
     int auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
 {
 	u_int success = 0, i;
-	char *file;
+	char *file, *conn_id;
 	struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
-	const char *remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
-	const char *remote_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh,
-	    options.use_dns);
+	const char *rdomain, *remote_ip, *remote_host;
 
 	if (authoptsp != NULL)
 		*authoptsp = NULL;
@@ -764,6 +766,14 @@ user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
 	    auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
 		return 0;
 
+	if ((rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL)
+		rdomain = "";
+	remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+	remote_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
+	xasprintf(&conn_id, "%s %d %s %d",
+	    ssh_local_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_local_port(ssh),
+	    remote_ip, ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+
 	for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
 		if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
 			continue;
@@ -781,18 +791,19 @@ user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
 		goto out;
 
 	if ((success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key, remote_ip, remote_host,
-	    &opts)) != 0)
+	    conn_id, rdomain, &opts)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 	sshauthopt_free(opts);
 	opts = NULL;
 
 	if ((success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key, remote_ip,
-	    remote_host, &opts)) != 0)
+	    remote_host, conn_id, rdomain, &opts)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 	sshauthopt_free(opts);
 	opts = NULL;
 
  out:
+	free(conn_id);
 	if (success && authoptsp != NULL) {
 		*authoptsp = opts;
 		opts = NULL;
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 9a1578f7..b5b77245 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.348 2023/03/03 04:36:20 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: March 3 2023 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.349 2023/07/27 22:25:17 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: July 27 2023 $
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -2021,6 +2021,10 @@ which are expanded at runtime:
 .It %%
 A literal
 .Sq % .
+.It %C
+Identifies the connection endpoints, containing
+four space-separated values: client address, client port number,
+server address, and server port number.
 .It \&%D
 The routing domain in which the incoming connection was received.
 .It %F
@@ -2048,13 +2052,13 @@ The username.
 .El
 .Pp
 .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
-accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, %U, and %u.
+accepts the tokens %%, %C, %D, %f, %h, %k, %t, %U, and %u.
 .Pp
 .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
 accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
 .Pp
 .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
-accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K, %k, %s, %T, %t, %U, and %u.
+accepts the tokens %%, %C, %D, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K, %k, %s, %T, %t, %U, and %u.
 .Pp
 .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
 accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.