- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/12/19 07:18:56

     [auth1.c auth2.c auth2-chall.c auth-bsdauth.c auth.c authfile.c auth.h]
     [auth-krb4.c auth-rhosts.c auth-skey.c bufaux.c canohost.c channels.c]
     [cipher.c clientloop.c compat.c compress.c deattack.c key.c log.c mac.c]
     [match.c misc.c nchan.c packet.c readconf.c rijndael.c rijndael.h scard.c]
     [servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c sftp.c sftp-client.c]
     [sftp-glob.c sftp-int.c sftp-server.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh.c]
     [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshconnect.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config]
     [ssh-keygen.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c sshtty.c ttymodes.c uidswap.c]
     basic KNF done while i was looking for something else

54 files changed, 666 insertions, 658 deletions

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 552d6588..3b9814f5 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -28,6 +28,16 @@
      [auth-rsa.c]
      log fingerprint on successful public key authentication, simplify 
      usage of key structs; ok markus@
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/12/19 07:18:56
+     [auth1.c auth2.c auth2-chall.c auth-bsdauth.c auth.c authfile.c auth.h]
+     [auth-krb4.c auth-rhosts.c auth-skey.c bufaux.c canohost.c channels.c]
+     [cipher.c clientloop.c compat.c compress.c deattack.c key.c log.c mac.c]
+     [match.c misc.c nchan.c packet.c readconf.c rijndael.c rijndael.h scard.c]
+     [servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c sftp.c sftp-client.c]
+     [sftp-glob.c sftp-int.c sftp-server.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh.c]
+     [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshconnect.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config]
+     [ssh-keygen.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c sshtty.c ttymodes.c uidswap.c]
+     basic KNF done while i was looking for something else
 
 20011219
  - (stevesk) OpenBSD CVS sync X11 localhost display
@@ -7056,4 +7066,4 @@
  - Wrote replacements for strlcpy and mkdtemp
  - Released 1.0pre1
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.1700 2001/12/21 01:52:39 djm Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.1701 2001/12/21 03:45:46 djm Exp $
diff --git a/auth-bsdauth.c b/auth-bsdauth.c
index 3732477d..b70d48f2 100644
--- a/auth-bsdauth.c
+++ b/auth-bsdauth.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.1 2001/05/18 14:13:28 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.2 2001/12/19 07:18:56 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -36,74 +36,74 @@ bsdauth_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
 }
 
 static int
-bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, 
+bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
    u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
 {
-        Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
-        char *challenge = NULL;
-
-        if (authctxt->as != NULL) {
-                debug2("bsdauth_query: try reuse session");
-                challenge = auth_getitem(authctxt->as, AUTHV_CHALLENGE);
-                if (challenge == NULL) {
-                        auth_close(authctxt->as);
-                        authctxt->as = NULL;
-                }
-        }
-
-        if (challenge == NULL) {
-                debug2("bsdauth_query: new bsd auth session");
-                debug3("bsdauth_query: style %s",
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
+	char *challenge = NULL;
+
+	if (authctxt->as != NULL) {
+		debug2("bsdauth_query: try reuse session");
+		challenge = auth_getitem(authctxt->as, AUTHV_CHALLENGE);
+		if (challenge == NULL) {
+			auth_close(authctxt->as);
+			authctxt->as = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (challenge == NULL) {
+		debug2("bsdauth_query: new bsd auth session");
+		debug3("bsdauth_query: style %s",
 		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "<default>");
-                authctxt->as = auth_userchallenge(authctxt->user,
+		authctxt->as = auth_userchallenge(authctxt->user,
 		     authctxt->style, "auth-ssh", &challenge);
-                if (authctxt->as == NULL)
-                        challenge = NULL;
-                debug2("bsdauth_query: <%s>", challenge ? challenge : "empty");
-        }
-        
-        if (challenge == NULL)
-                return -1;
-
-        *name       = xstrdup("");
-        *infotxt    = xstrdup("");
-        *numprompts = 1;
-        *prompts = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(char*));
-        *echo_on = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(u_int));
-        (*echo_on)[0] = 0;
-        (*prompts)[0] = xstrdup(challenge);
-
-        return 0;
+		if (authctxt->as == NULL)
+			challenge = NULL;
+		debug2("bsdauth_query: <%s>", challenge ? challenge : "empty");
+	}
+
+	if (challenge == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	*name       = xstrdup("");
+	*infotxt    = xstrdup("");
+	*numprompts = 1;
+	*prompts = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(char*));
+	*echo_on = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(u_int));
+	(*echo_on)[0] = 0;
+	(*prompts)[0] = xstrdup(challenge);
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int
 bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
 {
-        Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
-        int authok;
-        
-        if (authctxt->as == 0)
-                error("bsdauth_respond: no bsd auth session");
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
+	int authok;
+
+	if (authctxt->as == 0)
+		error("bsdauth_respond: no bsd auth session");
 
-        if (numresponses != 1)
-                return -1;
+	if (numresponses != 1)
+		return -1;
 
-        authok = auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, responses[0], 0);
-        authctxt->as = NULL;
-        debug3("bsdauth_respond: <%s> = <%d>", responses[0], authok);
+	authok = auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, responses[0], 0);
+	authctxt->as = NULL;
+	debug3("bsdauth_respond: <%s> = <%d>", responses[0], authok);
 
-        return (authok == 0) ? -1 : 0;
+	return (authok == 0) ? -1 : 0;
 }
 
 static void
 bsdauth_free_ctx(void *ctx)
 {
-        Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
 
-        if (authctxt && authctxt->as) {
-                auth_close(authctxt->as);
-                authctxt->as = NULL;
-        }
+	if (authctxt && authctxt->as) {
+		auth_close(authctxt->as);
+		authctxt->as = NULL;
+	}
 }
 
 KbdintDevice bsdauth_device = {
diff --git a/auth-krb4.c b/auth-krb4.c
index 031dcd30..f7a144f9 100644
--- a/auth-krb4.c
+++ b/auth-krb4.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb4.c,v 1.24 2001/06/26 16:15:22 dugsong Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb4.c,v 1.25 2001/12/19 07:18:56 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ krb4_init(void *context)
 	const char *tkt_root = TKT_ROOT;
 	struct stat st;
 	int fd;
-	
+
 	if (!authctxt->krb4_ticket_file) {
 		/* Set unique ticket string manually since we're still root. */
 		authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
@@ -79,13 +79,13 @@ krb4_init(void *context)
 	}
 	/* Failure - cancel cleanup function, leaving ticket for inspection. */
 	log("WARNING: bad ticket file %s", authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
-	
+
 	fatal_remove_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, authctxt);
 	cleanup_registered = 0;
-	
+
 	xfree(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
 	authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = NULL;
-	
+
 	return (0);
 }
 
@@ -103,10 +103,10 @@ auth_krb4_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 	char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN], phost[INST_SZ], realm[REALM_SZ];
 	u_int32_t faddr;
 	int r;
-	
+
 	if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL)
 		return (0);
-	
+
 	/*
 	 * Try Kerberos password authentication only for non-root
 	 * users and only if Kerberos is installed.
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ auth_krb4_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 		}
 		/* Successful authentication. */
 		chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
-		
+
 		/*
 		 * Now that we have a TGT, try to get a local
 		 * "rcmd" ticket to ensure that we are not talking
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ auth_krb4_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 		strlcpy(phost, (char *)krb_get_phost(localhost),
 		    sizeof(phost));
 		r = krb_mk_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost, realm, 33);
-		
+
 		if (r == KSUCCESS) {
 			if ((hp = gethostbyname(localhost)) == NULL) {
 				log("Couldn't get local host address!");
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ auth_krb4_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 			}
 			memmove((void *)&faddr, (void *)hp->h_addr,
 			    sizeof(faddr));
-			
+
 			/* Verify our "rcmd" ticket. */
 			r = krb_rd_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost,
 			    faddr, &adata, "");
@@ -186,13 +186,13 @@ auth_krb4_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 	} else
 		/* Logging in as root or no local Kerberos realm. */
 		debug("Unable to authenticate to Kerberos.");
-	
+
  failure:
 	krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
-	
+
 	if (!options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
 		return (0);
-	
+
 	/* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
 	return (-1);
 }
@@ -220,9 +220,9 @@ auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, KTEXT auth, char **client)
 	socklen_t slen;
 	u_int cksum;
 	int r, s;
-	
+
 	s = packet_get_connection_in();
-	
+
 	slen = sizeof(local);
 	memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local));
 	if (getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *) & local, &slen) < 0)
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, KTEXT auth, char **client)
 	}
 	instance[0] = '*';
 	instance[1] = 0;
-	
+
 	/* Get the encrypted request, challenge, and session key. */
 	if ((r = krb_rd_req(auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, instance,
 	    0, &adat, ""))) {
@@ -243,11 +243,11 @@ auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, KTEXT auth, char **client)
 		return (0);
 	}
 	des_key_sched((des_cblock *) adat.session, schedule);
-	
+
 	*client = xmalloc(MAX_K_NAME_SZ);
 	(void) snprintf(*client, MAX_K_NAME_SZ, "%s%s%s@%s", adat.pname,
 	    *adat.pinst ? "." : "", adat.pinst, adat.prealm);
-	
+
 	/* Check ~/.klogin authorization now. */
 	if (kuserok(&adat, authctxt->user) != KSUCCESS) {
 		log("Kerberos v4 .klogin authorization failed for %s to "
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, KTEXT auth, char **client)
 	   session key. */
 	cksum = adat.checksum + 1;
 	cksum = htonl(cksum);
-	
+
 	/* If we can't successfully encrypt the checksum, we send back an
 	   empty message, admitting our failure. */
 	if ((r = krb_mk_priv((u_char *) & cksum, reply.dat, sizeof(cksum) + 1,
@@ -269,10 +269,10 @@ auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, KTEXT auth, char **client)
 		reply.length = 0;
 	} else
 		reply.length = r;
-	
+
 	/* Clear session key. */
 	memset(&adat.session, 0, sizeof(&adat.session));
-	
+
 	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE);
 	packet_put_string((char *) reply.dat, reply.length);
 	packet_send();
@@ -287,19 +287,19 @@ auth_krb4_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *string)
 {
 	CREDENTIALS creds;
 	struct passwd *pw;
-	
+
 	if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL)
 		goto failure;
-	
+
 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-	
+
 	if (!radix_to_creds(string, &creds)) {
 		log("Protocol error decoding Kerberos v4 TGT");
 		goto failure;
 	}
 	if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0)	/* backward compatibility */
 		strlcpy(creds.service, "krbtgt", sizeof creds.service);
-	
+
 	if (strcmp(creds.service, "krbtgt")) {
 		log("Kerberos v4 TGT (%s%s%s@%s) rejected for %s",
 		    creds.pname, creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst,
@@ -308,10 +308,10 @@ auth_krb4_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *string)
 	}
 	if (!krb4_init(authctxt))
 		goto failure;
-	
+
 	if (in_tkt(creds.pname, creds.pinst) != KSUCCESS)
 		goto failure;
-	
+
 	if (save_credentials(creds.service, creds.instance, creds.realm,
 	    creds.session, creds.lifetime, creds.kvno, &creds.ticket_st,
 	    creds.issue_date) != KSUCCESS) {
@@ -320,20 +320,20 @@ auth_krb4_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *string)
 	}
 	/* Successful authentication, passed all checks. */
 	chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
-	
+
 	debug("Kerberos v4 TGT accepted (%s%s%s@%s)",
 	    creds.pname, creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst, creds.realm);
 	memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-	
+
 	restore_uid();
-	
+
 	return (1);
-	
+
  failure:
 	krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
 	memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
 	restore_uid();
-	
+
 	return (0);
 }
 
@@ -343,22 +343,22 @@ auth_afs_token(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *token_string)
 	CREDENTIALS creds;
 	struct passwd *pw;
 	uid_t uid;
-	
+
 	if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL)
 		return (0);
-	
+
 	if (!radix_to_creds(token_string, &creds)) {
 		log("Protocol error decoding AFS token");
 		return (0);
 	}
 	if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0)	/* backward compatibility */
 		strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof creds.service);
-	
+
 	if (strncmp(creds.pname, "AFS ID ", 7) == 0)
 		uid = atoi(creds.pname + 7);
 	else
 		uid = pw->pw_uid;
-	
+
 	if (kafs_settoken(creds.realm, uid, &creds)) {
 		log("AFS token (%s@%s) rejected for %s",
 		    creds.pname, creds.realm, pw->pw_name);
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ auth_afs_token(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *token_string)
 	}
 	debug("AFS token accepted (%s@%s)", creds.pname, creds.realm);
 	memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-	
+
 	return (1);
 }
 #endif /* AFS */
diff --git a/auth-rhosts.c b/auth-rhosts.c
index 9ba64dbc..cbceb631 100644
--- a/auth-rhosts.c
+++ b/auth-rhosts.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.24 2001/06/23 15:12:17 itojun Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.25 2001/12/19 07:18:56 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
 	 * servers.
 	 */
 	for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
-	     rhosts_file_index++) {
+	    rhosts_file_index++) {
 		/* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
 		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
 			 pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
@@ -204,16 +204,16 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
 
 	/* If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and shosts.equiv. */
 	if (pw->pw_uid != 0) {
-		if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr, client_user,
-				      pw->pw_name)) {
+		if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
+		    client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
 			packet_send_debug("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by /etc/hosts.equiv.",
-					  hostname, ipaddr);
+			    hostname, ipaddr);
 			return 1;
 		}
-		if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr, client_user,
-				      pw->pw_name)) {
+		if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
+		    client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
 			packet_send_debug("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by %.100s.",
-				      hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV);
+			    hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV);
 			return 1;
 		}
 	}
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
 	}
 	if (options.strict_modes &&
 	    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
-	     (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+	    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
 		log("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad ownership or modes for home directory.",
 		    pw->pw_name);
 		packet_send_debug("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad ownership or modes for home directory.",
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
 
 	/* Check all .rhosts files (currently .shosts and .rhosts). */
 	for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
-	     rhosts_file_index++) {
+	    rhosts_file_index++) {
 		/* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
 		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
 			 pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
 		 */
 		if (options.strict_modes &&
 		    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
-		     (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
 			log("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s",
 			    pw->pw_name, buf);
 			packet_send_debug("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
diff --git a/auth-skey.c b/auth-skey.c
index f921fc1b..6dc71223 100644
--- a/auth-skey.c
+++ b/auth-skey.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-skey.c,v 1.12 2001/05/18 14:13:28 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-skey.c,v 1.13 2001/12/19 07:18:56 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #ifdef SKEY
 
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ skey_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
 #define PROMPT "\nS/Key Password: "
 
 static int
-skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, 
+skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
     u_int* numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
@@ -72,9 +72,9 @@ static int
 skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
- 
+
 	if (authctxt->valid &&
-	    numresponses == 1 && 
+	    numresponses == 1 &&
 	    skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
 	    skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, responses[0]) != -1)
 	    return 0;
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index a21ad414..9541640a 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.30 2001/11/17 19:14:34 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.31 2001/12/19 07:18:56 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
 #include <login.h>
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ expand_filename(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
 		}
 		if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'u') {
 			buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_name,
-			     strlen(pw->pw_name));
+			    strlen(pw->pw_name));
 			cp++;
 			continue;
 		}
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
 		if (options.strict_modes &&
 		    (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
 		    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
-		     (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
 			log("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
 			    "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
 			    pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
 		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
 		    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
 		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-			snprintf(err, errlen, 
+			snprintf(err, errlen,
 			    "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
 			return -1;
 		}
diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
index f1bc9db6..01787195 100644
--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  *
- * $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.24 2001/12/18 10:04:21 jakob Exp $
+ * $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.25 2001/12/19 07:18:56 deraadt Exp $
  */
 #ifndef AUTH_H
 #define AUTH_H
@@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ struct Authctxt {
 
 /*
  * Keyboard interactive device:
- * init_ctx	returns: non NULL upon success 
- * query	returns: 0 - success, otherwise failure 
+ * init_ctx	returns: non NULL upon success
+ * query	returns: 0 - success, otherwise failure
  * respond	returns: 0 - success, 1 - need further interaction,
  *		otherwise - failure
  */
diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
index 0e5e2e55..d7e80c28 100644
--- a/auth1.c
+++ b/auth1.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.26 2001/12/05 03:56:39 itojun Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.27 2001/12/19 07:18:56 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
 
 	debug("Attempting authentication for %s%.100s.",
-	     authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ", authctxt->user);
+	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ", authctxt->user);
 
 	/* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */
 	if (options.password_authentication &&
@@ -120,17 +120,17 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 				verbose("Kerberos authentication disabled.");
 			} else {
 				char *kdata = packet_get_string(&dlen);
-				
+
 				packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
-				
+
 				if (kdata[0] == 4) { /* KRB_PROT_VERSION */
 #ifdef KRB4
 					KTEXT_ST tkt;
-					
+
 					tkt.length = dlen;
 					if (tkt.length < MAX_KTXT_LEN)
 						memcpy(tkt.dat, kdata, tkt.length);
-					
+
 					if (auth_krb4(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user)) {
 						authenticated = 1;
 						snprintf(info, sizeof(info),
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 					krb5_data tkt;
 					tkt.length = dlen;
 					tkt.data = kdata;
-					
+
 					if (auth_krb5(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user)) {
 						authenticated = 1;
 						snprintf(info, sizeof(info),
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 			}
 			break;
 #endif /* KRB4 || KRB5 */
-